PART 1

Anger Management in
Early Modern Philosophical Discourses
Chapter 3

Neo-Stoicism as an Antidote to Public Violence before Lipsius’s *De constantia*: Johann Weyer’s (Wier’s) Anger Therapy, *De ira morbo* (1577)

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Among the works of Johann Weyer (Wier, Piscinarius; 1515/1516–1588), court physician to Wilhelm the Rich, 5th Duke of Cleve, Jülich, and Berg,1 occurs a most intriguing treatise, *De ira morbo, eiusdem curatione philosophica, medicina et theologica—On the Disease (Kranckheit) of Anger, and its Philosophical, Medical, and Theological Therapy*, which appeared in 1577.2 Weyer intended to


2 Ed. pr. Basel, Officina of Johannes Oporinus: 1577; for the Latin text cf. also Ioannes Wierus, *Opera omnia* (2. Aufl. Amsterdam, Pieter vanden Berge: 1660) pp. 771–875 (with the title *De irae morbo*). In the edition by the Officina of Oporinus the work is divided into (unnumbered) chapters, and in the *Opera omnia* edition it is divided into (unnumbered) chapters and *numbered* paragraphs; in the quotations below I added chapter numbers. The layout
compose a work that would be useful for his contemporaries, and to contribute to the ‘public good’ (*publicum commodum*). He devoted it to the emotion of anger because he considered anger’s most devastating effects—acts of outrageous public violence, including mass killing, torture, and assassination—as a peculiarity of his time, i.e. the 16th century:

Proinde, quando in *nostri saeculi* intuerer tum *extremas calamitates*, tum calamitatum occasiones, commentari volui aliquid de causis veris ac remediis certis ipsius Irae, e qua hodie privatae factiones, publica bella, caedes truculentae ac inauditae immanitatis exempla in Christiani popelli cervices et fortunas miserrime exundant. [...] Una est, quod quum *nulla pestis* magis depopuletur sua crudelitate vastissima regna, amplissimas ditiones, florentissimas respublicas, quam haec ipsa, cuius, proh dolor, recentia nimis testimonia coram coelesti tribunali vindictam clamant [...] .

Therefore, since I watched the most terrible catastrophes of our century and the occasions on which they occurred, I wanted to comment on their true reasons of and on the effective remedies against anger itself, of anger that nowadays leads to riots of private factions, public wars, cruel murders, and examples of unheard of cruelty that are poured out on the shoulders and fortunes of the poor Christians. There is no other epidemic

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of the two editions is very different: the Off. Oporinus edition is in 8° and in italics; the Amsterdam edition is in folio and in Roman type. In Weyer’s lifetime a German translation appeared: *Vom Zorn Iracundiae Antidotum. Von der gefährlichen Krankheit dem Zorn, und desselbigen Philosophischer, und Theologischer Cur oder Erzteney. Allen Zornsüchtigen in allerley Stenden, so mit dieser Schweren Plag behaffet, D. Iohannis Wieri Des hochberühmpten Philosophi und Medici Buch, Zu nützlichem brauch und nötigem heil aus dem Latein in gut verstandlich deutsch gebracht*, trans. by Lukas Mai (Wittenberg, Matthes Welack: 1585). So far, *De ira morbo* has not been studied in detail; there are summaries of its content in Binz, *Doctor Johann Weyer 140–150*, and Hoorens, *Een ketterse arts voor de heksen* 263–272. Binz had already remarked that the work would deserve a separate study (*Doctor Johann Weyer* 141).

disease that, with its cruelty, depopulated more profoundly the largest kingdoms, the richest reigns, the most flourishing republics, than anger itself, the most recent instances of which cry out for wrath at the heavenly court [...].

The Latin ‘pestis’ indeed refers to an ‘epidemic disease’, even in a technical sense, as the following sentence shows (‘[…] exitialem morbum, qui vere Epidemicus nominari hoc tempore potest, proponere curationem’).  

In her recent biography of Jan Weyer, Een ketters arts voor de heksen [...], Vera Hoorens regarded Weyer as a Calvinist and interpreted the De ira morbo as an ardent polemical writing directed against the Catholics and Spaniards, and the cruel acts of violence they committed during the Dutch revolt. As Hoorens puts it, Weyer’s main goal was to criticize the Spaniards and Catholics, and the topic of his work, anger, was in fact only a pretext to express his religious and ideological criticism. According to Hoorens, the work was written in 1572/1573, partly during the siege of Haarlem (1573), and thus represented a direct reaction to the Spanish war crimes in Zutphen and Naarden (1572). In her biography Hoorens has brought many interesting facts to light, and at first glance, her thesis on De ira morbo seems attractive. But if one looks closer at the contents of the treatise, it becomes doubtful whether Weyer indeed would have conceived it primarily as a polemical writing, and whether it was...
indeed composed ‘in anger’, so to speak, immediately after the bloodshed of Zutphen and Naarden\textsuperscript{10}—although Weyer may have been a Protestant (or had Protestant sympathies).\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} It is hard to describe the genesis of the work in terms of exact dates, and to ascribe certain chapters or paragraphs to certain weeks or months. Hoorens's view that he ‘must have written it’ (or completed it?) in 1573 is speculative; undisputable evidence is lacking.

I think that in *De ira morbo* Weyer’s scope was much broader. He wrote
the work not only, and certainly not primarily, as an attack on Spaniards and
Catholics, but his advice was directed to other nations, and to Protestants
as well; not only to princes or monarchs, but also to the administrators of
towns; not only to politicians, but also to private persons from various pro-
fessions; and it is a telling detail that Weyer also included himself. In con-
nection with the composition of *De ira morbo*, he took a personal *impresa* or
motto *VINCÉ TE IPSUM*, which refers to his personal effort to overcome anger
[Fig. 3.1].\(^{12}\) Furthermore, since Weyer discussed *superbia* (pride/arrogance) as
an important reason for *ira*, it is clear that he regarded noblemen as a cat-
egory of people who were especially prone to suffering from attacks of anger.\(^{13}\)
Within this category of patients, however, he made no discernible difference
between Catholics and Protestants. The same is true for scholars and academ-
ics, who might be prideful of their learning and status. Another important
reason for anger, according to Weyer, is envy.\(^{14}\) Envy, however, is relevant for
all kinds of people, nations, and social classes, and members of all religious
confessions. Envy is universal. The same goes for bad fortune (‘*adversitas for-
tuneae*’), poverty, illnesses, bodily shortcomings, or various sorts of stress;\(^{15}\) and

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\(^{12}\) The *impresa* appears on a woodcut portrait of Weyer, dated 1576, printed as an author’s por-
trait on the verso of the title page (fol. *<A1>v*) in the fifth and final edition of his *De praes-
tigiis daemonum et incantationibus ac veneficiis libri sex*, postrema editione quinta aucti
et recognitii. *Accessit liber Apologeticus, et Pseudomonarchia daemonum* (Basel, Officina
of Oporinus: 1577) (cf. exemplar of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek digitalized: http://
dfg-viewer.de/show/?tx_dlf%5Bid%5D=http%3A%2F%2Fdaten.digitale-sammlungen
.de%2F--db%2Fmets%2Fbsb00022713_mets.xml&tx_dlf%5Bpage%5D=6&tx_dlf%5Bdouble%5D=0&cHash=62ac2ad9c3e0772ead55e0c63d93b9). Weyer’s author’s portrait
with the impresa VINCE TE IPSUM also appears (as an etching) in the *Opera omnia*
edition of 1660. There are several allusions to Weyer’s *impresa* in his treatise *De ira morbo*, cf.
below, and Hoorens, *Een ketterse arts voor de heksen* 272: ‘Tot twee keer toe zinspeelde hij
erin [i.e. in *De ira morbo*] op wat korte tijd later zijn lijfspreuk zou blijken, *Vince te ipsum*,
Overwin jezelf’. Hoorens suggests that Weyer chose his *impresa* after the composition of
*De ira morbo*; the woodcut, however, dates from 1576, and *De ira morbo* appeared in 1577.
Therefore, it seems likely that he chose the *impresa* during the composition of the trea-
tise. The motto *Vince te ipsum* indeed played a role in Weyer’s daily spiritual exercises, as
is apparent from their description in *De ira morbo*; for this aspect, see below.

\(^{13}\) *De ira morbo*, ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 25–26; *Op. omn.*, chapt. 2 (“*De causis irae*”), § 17, p. 785.

\(^{14}\) Ibidem.

social or personal contempt, slander, etc. And, moreover, the scope of the work is surely not limited to the depreciation of people who are guided in their behaviour by ire; on the contrary, Weyer conceives anger as a *mental disease that can seize anybody*, and can severely damage anybody’s mental and physical health. A person who suffers from anger not only harms others, but in the

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first place harms herself, even in a physical sense: according to Weyer, anger causes, among other things, fever, paralysis, epilepsy, phrenitis, and sudden death by cerebral haemorrhage.\textsuperscript{17} Weyer’s conception of anger as a mental and physical disease, of course, implies that it cannot be a sin in the first place, or cannot just be the result of moral guilt. Furthermore, Weyer avoids connecting a state of mind that is free from anger with the Calvinist conception of divine grace: he does not say that the chosen people, the \textit{electi}, are free from anger. As he conceives anger as a disease, he devotes the longest and most important part of his treatise to \textit{prophylactic therapy} (ca. 50\%, \textit{Op. omn.} pp. 802–845 and 853–875). The way in which this therapy is shaped proves that it is meant not just for violent, tyrannical, cruel, and morally abject characters, but for decent, just, morally conscious people; for people with a humanistic and philosophical education;\textsuperscript{18} for those who are able to engage in meditation, reflection, and critical investigation of the self; for those who enjoy spiritual exercises; and for those who are willing to work on their moral, mental, and religious improvement on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{19} It is a telling detail that Weyer even lists a certain ‘\textit{bonus impetus animi},’ i.e. a sense for justice and moral integrity, among the reasons for anger.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, if one looks more carefully at the way in which Weyer mentions contemporary outbursts of anger caused by religious and political conflicts, it becomes clear that he always refrains from direct attacks, deliberately avoids harsh, polemical criticism, and above all does not mention names. In a revealing passage, in which he deals with historical examples of outrageous cruelties, he says that he leaves contemporary examples that occurred ‘in the religious struggles that arose’ (‘\textit{in motibus religionis ergo ortis}’) and their evaluation (whether they are more cruel than the calamities of other ages or not) to other writers with ‘\textit{a more free pen}’.\textsuperscript{21} Surprisingly, Hoorens misunderstood Weyer’s statement and translated it in the opposite way: ‘But however tragic the

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\item E.g. ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 25; \textit{Op. omn.}, chapt. 2, § 17, p. 785, is directed toward \textit{academicians}—people who are proud of their ‘\textit{eruditionis titulus}’.
\item On the spiritual exercises which contain the most important part of the treatise (ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 55 ff.; \textit{Op. omn.}, chapt. 5, § 4–90, pp. 803–853), see below.
\item Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 105; \textit{Op. omn.}, chapt. 5, § 67, p. 831: ‘\textit{Similiane, an tragica magis quam supra enarravi, immanium irarum exempla hoc nostrum viderit aevum, et adhuc calami-tosissime experiatur, in motibus religionis ergo ortis, aliorum liberiori calamo relinquendum securios existimavi}. From the same passage it becomes apparent that Weyer thought primarily of the religious conflicts in ‘Germany’ (i.e. the Empire), and only thought of the
examples I gave above may be, with respect to their calamities they are surpassed (sic!) by far (sic!) by the inhuman cruelties we experienced in a most disastrous way during the religious struggles. In fact, Weyer explicitly does not maintain this, and he says that he prefers to leave this judgement to other writers because it is safer to do so; furthermore, he does not indicate that he talks specifically about his personal experience or the experience of the members of his confession (i.e., in Hoorens’s view, Calvinism). In the whole treatise, Weyer remains deliberately vague about confessional issues, and especially his own confession.

However, Weyer’s idea that anger represented a peculiar feature of the 16th century is remarkable. In a passage in chapter 4 (“De effectibus irae”) Weyer dwells in detail, as it seems, on the contemporary damage brought forth by anger:

*Si porro fusius huius effectus et damna aliis illata intueri lubet, nulla pestis humano generi stetis pluris. Videbis caedes et veneficia, atque eorum mutuas sordes et urbiunm clades, exitia item gentium multarum et principum, quorum exempla admodum funesta annis retro paucis in nostra Germania, Gallis, apud Belgas et alibi, nimirum (proh dolor) conspicati sumus et quotidian adhuc truculentiora cernimus; item sub civili hasta venalia capita, bona nobilium ac ditionum induxta nequiter exuta, sobole mendicitati prostituta; [et] subiectas tectis faces nec intra moenia.*

Low Countries (‘Belgicae provinciae’) at the very last; and that he identifies himself with Germany.

22 Emphasis mine; see Hoorens, *Een ketterse arts voor de heksen* 268: ‘“Maar hoe tragisch de voorbeelden ook zijn die ik hierboven verteld heb”, schreef Wier, “toch laten de onmenselijke wreedheden die we tijdens de godsdienststroebelen op allerrampzaligste wijze hebben ervaren hen in ellende ver achter zich”’.


24 Seneca, *De ira* 1, 2 has ‘reorum’ (‘of accused persons’; cf. also Lipsius’s text of 1604, with his correct interpretation of the phrase in the *apparatus criticus*: ‘persons that accuse and are accused’—‘Qui accusant invicem, et accusantur’); ‘eorum’ (present both in ed. Off. Oporinus and *Op. omn.*) is either the reading of Weyer’s Seneca, and thus of Weyer’s paraphrasing of the passage, or a printing error. Its sense, compared with ‘reorum’, is a bit poor.

25 Seneca, *De ira* 1, 2 has ‘totarum’.

26 ‘et’ is an addition of *Op. omn.*; it is not in ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 47.

27 The text of *Op. omn.*, p. 797, has erroneously ‘testis’, which does not make sense; the correct text ‘tectis’ is in ed. Off. Oporinus, as in Seneca, *De ira* 1, 2, which means that it is the reading both of Weyer’s Seneca and Weyer’s paraphrase in *De ira morbo*.
coercitos ignes, sed ingentia spacia regionum iracunda\textsuperscript{28} flamma longe reluentia. Intuere nobilissimarum civitatum fundamenta agnitii difficilia: has ira prostravit. Aspice iam nunc tot memoriae proditos duces mali exempla fati: alium ira in cubili suo quandoque etiam post datam soennitier fidem confodit; alium intra sacra mensae et nuptiarum\textsuperscript{29}  

\textit{ira}\textsuperscript{30} percussit, alium intra leges celebrisque spectaculum fori lancinavit, alium\textsuperscript{31} filii parricidio dare sanguinem iussit, et ediverso; alium servili manu regalem aperire iugulum, et contra; alium in cruce\textsuperscript{32} membra diffindere.

Moreover, if you wish to view its (i.e. anger’s) results and the harm of it done to other people, no plague has cost the human race more dear. You will see murderous bloodshed and poisoning, and their [?] vile effects, many nations given to destruction, the downfall of cities, and of princely persons as well—the terrible examples of which we have observed a few years ago in our Germany, in France, among the Dutch, and elsewhere, and daily watch more cruel ones; persons sold at public auction, the loss of possessions of noblemen and rich citizens unjustly put to charge, and their offspring condemned to the state of beggars; houses put to the torch, and conflagration that halts not within the city walls, but makes great stretches of the country glow with the flame of ire. Look at the most glorious cities whose foundations can scarcely be traced anymore—anger cast them down; look at so many leaders (or: dukes) who have been handed down to posterity as instances of an evil fate—anger stabbed this one in his bed, even after having received a solemn oath of faith; struck down this one amid the sanctities of wedding feasts, tore this one to pieces in the very home of the law and in full view of the crowded forum, forced this one to have his blood spilled by the murderous act of his son, and the other way round; another one to have his royal

\textsuperscript{28} Seneca, \textit{De ira} I, 2 has ‘hostili’.

\textsuperscript{29} ‘nuptiarum’ does not appear in Seneca’s \textit{De ira}, and it was added by Weyer. As Hoorens, \textit{Een ketterse arts voor de heksen} 266, correctly remarked, it was meant as a pun on the bloodshed of the Night of Barthelme of 1572.

\textsuperscript{30} Weyer’s Seneca had obviously ‘ira’, which is also the relevant reading of his paraphrase. ‘Ira’ is still there in Lipsius’s new Seneca edition; the modern textus receptus of \textit{De ira} I, 2, however, is ‘iura’.

\textsuperscript{31} The text of \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 797, has ‘alam’ erroneously.

\textsuperscript{32} Weyer’s Seneca, like many other prints and manuscripts, had ‘cruces’, which, however, makes little sense. Lipsius in 1604 in his new edition of Seneca printed ‘cruces’ as well (\textit{De ira} I, 2), although in a critical note he mentioned ‘cruce’ as an alternative reading, which became the reading of the modern textus receptus.
throat cut by the hand of a slave, and the other way round; and another to have his limbs torn apart upon the cross.

First of all, it is clear that Weyer here again looks at the devastating effects of anger not from a Dutch, but a German (‘in nostra Germania’) perspective. But even more important is the fact that the greater part of the text does not represent Weyer’s words, but is taken from the treatise *De ira* written in the middle of the 1st century AD by the Roman Stoic Seneca the Younger. The italics in the cited text indicate its dependence on Seneca’s *De ira*, which is quoted *verbatim* or paraphrased by Weyer. Thus, maybe surprisingly, the idea of anger’s special connection with the 16th century is taken from a text written in the 1st century AD. This brings us to the heart of Weyer’s treatise: many of its basic ideas closely resemble those in Seneca’s *De ira*, and it is essentially built on Stoic concepts, views, and methods. As Weyer indicates in the introduction, in his work *De ira morbo* he tried to ‘imitate the Stoics […] and Galen’. It is

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35 *De ira morbo*, ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 7; *Op. omn.*, Introduction, § 1, p. 775: ‘Dicturus de Ira morbo […] imitari conabob tum Stoicos, qui affectus tamquam morbos ex homine nituntur evellere, tum Galenum nostrum […]’ (‘Writing about the disease of anger […] I am imitating on the one hand the Stoics who strive for kill the emotions as if they were bodily diseases, on the other hand our Galen […]’). Galen’s influence will be mentioned briefly below; however, within the framework of this article it is impossible to fully discuss Galen’s role in *De ira morbo*: this will be done elsewhere. For the Stoics’ theory of emotions cf. *inter alia* Krewet M., *Die stoische Theorie der Gefühle. Ihre Aporien. Ihre Wirkmacht* (Heidelberg: 2013); Buddensiek F., “Stoa und Epikur: Affekte als Defekte oder als Weltbezug”, in Landwehr H. – Renz U. (eds.), *Klassische Emotionstheorien. Von Platon bis*
essentially a Stoic stand to regard strong emotions as a mental disease, and the Stoic philosopher (sapiens) as a physician, and Stoicism is also the longest and most important part of Weyer's prophylactic therapy, the 'philosophical' one (= chapter 5, “De Prophylactica Irae curature philosophica”).

1 Neo-Stoicism, Weyer, and Lipsius

Justus Lipsius\textsuperscript{36} is usually seen as the great inventor of Renaissance Neo-Stoicism,\textsuperscript{37} especially with his \textit{De constantia} [...] \textit{in publicis malis}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{36} For Lipsius, see Jan Papy’s contribution in this volume.
\end{footnotesize}
but also with his *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* (1604); the dialogue *De Constantia*, a literary masterpiece, served as the founding text and manifesto of the new 'philosophical movement'. The *Manuductio* is less a manifesto of a new philosophy than it is a new comprehensive history of Greek and Roman philosophy focused on Stoicism, a work that was originally meant to function as a kind of introduction to Lipsius's edition of

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Seneca (1605) but proved to be of independent value as a manual of Stoic thought, equipped with a large number of antique sources. John Sellars renders the *communis opinio* when he remarks ‘Although early Renaissance figures such as Petrarch and Politian displayed an interest in and sympathy for Stoic philosophy, the first concerted attempt to resurrect Stoicism as a living philosophical movement (called Neo-Stoicism) must be credited to […] Justus Lipsius’. Other Neo-Stoics listed the most often are Guillaume du Vair (1556–1621), with his *Philosophie morale des Stoïques* (ca. 1586), his *Traité de la constance et consolation és calamités publiques* (1590; ed. pr. Paris: 1594), his *Le Manuel d’Épictète, suivi des réponses à l’empereur Hadrien et translaté en langue française par Guillaume Du Vair* (1591), and his *La Saincte Philosophie, avec plusieurs traitez de piété* (1603); Pierre Charron (1541–1603), with his *De la sagesse* (he, however, was more of a sceptic philosopher); and Francisco de Quevedo (1580–1645), with his *Doctrina Estoica* (1636) and his Spanish

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41 Cf. its subtitle, as given in the *editio princeps*: L. Annaeo Senecae, *aliaisque scriptoribus illustrandis*.
42 In his art. “Neo-Stoicism”, *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (http://www.iep.utm.edu/neostoic/); very similar Papy, “Neostoizismus und Humanismus”.
45 Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 125–145, with a full description of its content.
48 For Quevedo see Méchoulan H., “Quevedo stoicien?”, in Moreau (ed.), *Le stoïcisme au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle* 189–203.
translations of Lipsius’s *De constantia*, Epictetus’s *Encheiridion*, and, occasionally, works by Montaigne. Abel added a number of other intellectuals: printers, translators, possessors, and readers of Lipsius’s works; printers such as Claude de Monstr’oeil and Jean Richer; the translators of *De constantia*, such as Clovis Hesteau and Charles Le Ber (who also translated Boethius’s *De consolatione philosophiae* into French); the translators of Lipsius’s *Politica*, such as Simon Goulart and again Le Ber (*Livre des Politiques*); Calvinists, such as the poet François Beroalde de Verville, Jacques Bongars, and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay; some of Lipsius’s correspondents in France; members of the Politiques, such as François Hotman; and so on. Marc Morford added Lipsius’s pupils in the Southern Low Countries, such as Philipp Rubens, Joannes Woverius, and the famous painter Peter Paul Rubens.


51 Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 278–280. Cf. the contribution by Anita Traninger in this volume.

52 Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 272–310 (chapter “Neustoisches Denken in Frankreich zwischen 1580 und 1610/20”); Abel’s chapter indeed suggests a “movement” but remains rather speculative and vague. For example, printers, editors, translators, and possessors do not exclusively print, edit, translate, and possess works that express their innermost convictions; furthermore, it is questionable whether it is adequate to regard Lipsius’s *Politica* as a manifesto of Neo-Stoicism. Oestreich’s effort to identify Neo-Stoicism also as a political conviction and “movement” has been regarded as attractive, but is not at all convincing. Cf. his *Antiker Geist und moderner Staat bei Justus Lipsius* (1547–1606): der Neustoizismus als politische Bewegung.

53 *Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius*. Morford’s picture of the relationship between Lipsius and his pupils—especially in chapters two and three (14–95)—is a bit biased, as if it were predominantly about Stoic education; Lipsius, however, taught in primarily Latin philology and antiquarianism. The timetable Lipsius drafted for his pupils (Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics* 31–32) shows the character of the education of the ‘*contubernales*’: philological training, reading of various Greek and Latin classics. Morford’s chapter on the painter Peter Paul Rubens’s ‘Neostoicism’ is very speculative (181–210). The fact that Rubens owned a replica of a bust of Seneca and designed the title pages and illustrations to Lipsius’s *Seneca* editions is no valid proof of Neo-Stoic convictions. Rubens painted and designed a great number of extremely different topics, and for the Plantin-Moretus Officina he designed many frontispieces without sharing the views of the works he adorned. Furthermore, Morford’s picture of Lipsius’s Neo-Stoicism suffers from the fact that he mixes it up with Lipsius’s interest in Tacitus. Cf. chapter 5 “Tacitus and Seneca” (139–180).
An important goal of Neostoic philosophy is the reconciliation of antique Stoicism with Christian religion, for example with respect to Stoic determinism denying free will, Fate’s superiority to God as the principal of natural and everlasting order, Stoic materialism, the Stoics’ denial of contingency, and, last but not least, their theory of the emotions. The Stoic stand of radically “killing” the emotions and the one-sided emphasis on ratio differ considerably from Christian positions. Most interestingly, both Lipsius in De constantia and Weyer in De ira morbo focused on reintroducing and adapting the Stoic doctrine of emotion management, both departed from Seneca’s theory and therapy of the passions, and both regarded control of the emotions as a major remedy against the public calamities of their times. Weyer, however, so far has not been mentioned in the discussions on Neo-Stoicism, Neostoic views on the emotions, or Lipsius’s De constantia.

Lipsius very much emphasized the originality of his revival of Stoic philosophy, and especially its application as an antidote against the public calamities of his time. In the letter of dedication for De constantia, addressed to the Magistrates of Antwerp and dated September 1583, he points to the ‘novitas’ of his work and plainly says that he is ‘the first to level and build this road to Wisdom’ (‘hanc Sapientiae viam sternere et munire aggredimur primi’) ‘[…] which alone can lead to Tranquillity and Peace’ (‘quae sola possit ducere ad Tranquillitatem et Quietem’). Similarly, in the preface “To the Reader” (“Ad lectorem”) of the 1584 edition he says ‘I have sought out consolations against public evils: who has done so before me?’—‘solatia publicis malis quaesivi: quis ante me?’ And, the interpreters of both Neostoicism and De constantia have unanimously supported Lipsius’s claim for originality and novelty.

However, the one who designed Neostoicism before Lipsius’s De constantia (1583/1584), and who adapted ancient Stoicism as a remedy against the political calamities of the 16th century, was Johann Weyer with his De ira morbo, which appeared some seven years earlier (1577) and was composed eight (1576) or even a few more years earlier. At that time Lipsius was not yet appointed

54 Cf. Abel, Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit passim; with respect to Lipsius, Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 158–171.


56 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 161.

57 Cf., inter alia, especially Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 160–161, who stresses ‘the originality of Lipsius’s approach to Seneca’—with respect to the application of Stoic philosophy to the political problems of the 16th century—by pointing to the ‘personal nature’ of Lipsius’s approach.
professor in Leiden (which took place in 1578); Mark Morford has correctly dated Lipsius’s first intensive study of Stoic philosophy in his Leiden years (1578–1591), although he over-interprets it as a ‘final move from philology to philosophy’. In fact, Lipsius kept on working on philological and antiquarian projects. By the end of 1580 Lipsius said that was about to go into or dig deeply in Stoic philosophy, Mark Morford is probably right when he thinks that around 1582 Lipsius ‘became especially interested in Seneca’s philosophy as a source of comfort in the troubles of his own time’. The result of these studies was De constantia. Lipsius did not publish anything before De constantia in which he would have unfolded his Neostoic ideas, and, as far as we know, there was no personal contact between Weyer and Lipsius. Weyer’s De ira morbo does not just coincidentally render some Stoic ideas; as we will see below, Stoicism determines its main message and its very structure as a therapeutic treatise. It remains unclear whether Lipsius knew Weyer’s work. He could have known it, because the Oporinus factory was famous in the humanist Republic of Letters and was an important source of text editions of classical authors. However, Lipsius never mentioned Weyer’s De ira morbo.

With respect to the adaptation of the Stoic management of the emotions, and its application to the calamities and conflicts of the 16th century, Weyer’s and Lipsius’s works have many features in common, but also have some differences in scope and perspective: Lipsius deals more with the mental reaction of the individual as a victim of the calamities of his age, and he includes catastrophes that were not caused by acts of human violence, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and floods. Weyer, on the other hand, only takes into account

58 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 158–160.
59 Ibidem, 160: ‘This was the period in which he (Lipsius) moved finally away from philology to philosophy’. I am afraid that such a definite move never took place.
60 ILE, vol. 1, 128, to friend Janus Lernutius (d.d. 31 December 1580): ‘Philosophiam dico, in quam me penetreo: et quidem Stoicam’; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 158.
61 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 159. Morford bases his argument on two letters: ILE, vol. 1, 192, to Alexander Ratlo, professor of philosophy at Ghent (d.d. 23 January 1582); and ILE, vol. 1, 213, to Andreas Schott, who was then staying in Toledo (d.d. 7 July 1582).
62 Cf. ILE, vols. 1–3.
63 However, as the dialogue setting of De constantia suggests, Lipsius’s major source of inspiration probably was the acts of violence that appeared in the Dutch ‘civil war’. In De constantia 1, 1, young Lipsius says: ‘Quis enim, Langius, [. . .] tam firmo et tam ferreo pectore, qui diutius ferendis iis malis sit? Iactamur iam tot annos, ut vides, bellorum civilium aestu, et, ut in undoso mari, non uno vento agitamur turbarum seditionumque’ (‘Who posses, Langius, [. . .] such a strong and iron mind that he could any longer bear those calamities? We are thrown to and fro, as you see, in the storm of civil wars, and we are shaken, as if it were on the high waves of the sea, by the storm of riots and rebellions’).
acts of public violence caused by human beings, either by individuals (such as assassinations) or by communities (factions, religious groups, armies), and he explicitly discusses the state of the human mind that causes such calamities, especially in terms of revenge, murder, war, and genocide. Lipsius's Stoic virtue of *constantia* aims at avoiding emotions on the level of the individual (especially pain, fear, and desire), and only implicitly includes anger (e.g. as a form of desire); as Jan Papy correctly remarks, ‘Lipsius urges his readers to detach themselves completely from all feelings which might lead to any sort of emotional involvement in the political and religious wars which were raging around them’.64 The argument of *De constantia* is directed toward proving that public evils range among the Stoic *indifferentia*, that they are neither unusual nor grievous, and that we may even take advantage of them, but also that they are imposed by God and necessity.65 Weyer's therapy of anger tries to safeguard a quiet state of mind that sometimes comes close to Lipsius's *constantia*, but it pays less attention to the spectrum of the other emotions and hardly ever addresses the ideal state of mind as constancy.

More important, however, are the features in common: both works developed Stoicism, and especially the control of emotions, as a major tool for mastering the political and religious violence of their times, and in doing so, they were both inspired by Seneca.66 As the above-quoted passage of Weyer's chapter 4 shows, it was Seneca who brought him to the idea of regarding anger as a peculiarity of his age; and it was also Seneca who gave anger a status different from those of the other emotions. Seneca ascribed to *ira* the potential to affect whole communities: anger was for him—at least potentially—a “public

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64 Papy, “Justus Lipsius” (revised 2011); cf. also Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 72–73, 79.
It was only a small step from this Senecan thought to Weyer's application of the medical *terminus technicus* of 'epidemic disease'.

2 Seneca's *De ira* as a Therapeutic Treatise, and the Shades of Its Stoic Approach

As a Stoic, Seneca in *De ira* also regarded anger as a mental disease. Therefore, it is not surprising that he too devoted a considerable part of his *De ira* to therapy (III, 10–40), especially to prophylactic therapy (book II, 18–36, and book III, 5–9), and that the whole work is designed as a so-called therapeutic treatise. Seneca's therapy is shaped by, among other things, three important features: first, a strong emphasis on active and intellectual aspects in the genesis of anger; second, revenge (*ultio*) as a *sine qua non* in the definition of *ira*; and third, a pragmatic approach, in which he displays a keen sense of psychological sensitivity. In accordance with the Stoic founding father Chrysippus in his treatise *On the Passions/ Emotions (Peri pathoon)*, but probably a bit

67 Cf. above.

68 Cf., *inter alia*, Seneca, *De ira* 1, 1 (2–4) 2: ‘But you have only to behold the aspect of those possessed by anger to know that they are insane. For the marks of a madman are unmistakable—a bold and threatening mien, a gloomy brow, a fierce expression, a hurried step, restless hands, an altered colour, a quick and more violent breathing […]’ (transl. Basor).


69 Cf. Julia Wildberger, ”Nachwort“, to her German transl. of Seneca's *De ira* (Stuttgart: 2007) 313: ‘Da Wut schädlich und ungesund ist, muss sie behandelt und ausgerottet werden. *De ira* ist also eine therapeutische Schrift und hat dementsprechend eine zweigliedrige Form, wie man sie auch in anderen therapeutischen Texten findet: Zunächst zeigt man, dass die betreffende Emotion behandelt werden muss, wobei man sie definiert und charakterisiert und ihre schädlichen Auswirkungen herausstellt (in *De ira* bis 11, 17). Dann folgt die eigentliche Behandlung (in *De ira* ab 11, 18)."

70 For this aspect cf. especially Vogt, ”Anger, Present Injustice“; Seneca does not acknowledge milder forms of anger, or certain gradations and nuances of it. Cf. *De ira* 1, 4, 2 f.

differently from Posidonius, Seneca insists on the fact that active steps taken by the mind (animus)—which is ideally guided by ratio—play a crucial part in the genesis of anger (ira). According to Seneca, a person cannot get angry “automatically”, “unwillingly”, “spontaneously”, or “unconsciously”, i.e. without the assent of the animus; anger is always caused by erroneous perceptions, estimations, conclusions, judgements, and decisions. Seneca analyzes the process of getting angry by subtly splitting the reaction of the animus into four steps: (a) a first, still unfocused perception of ‘something’, i.e. something unpleasant (‘intellexit aliquid [sc. animus]’, ‘the mind has grasped something’; De ira II, 1, 4); (b) an indignant reaction to the animus on the initial perception of something unpleasant (‘indignatus est [sc. animus]’, ibidem); (c) the judgement of the perceived fact as an injury or an act of injustice (‘damnavit [sc. animus]’, ‘the mind has condemned the act’; ibidem); and (d) the decision to retaliate against the perceived fact or act with an aggressive counteraction, i.e. to take revenge (‘ulciscitur [sc. animus]’, ibidem). This process displays two or three steps of voluntary ‘assent’ of the mind (consentiens animus; animus approbans), while even more ‘assents’ may well exert their influence in the background. Only after all of these assents can the passion of anger come into being.

Philosophy 21–70; Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice”, too reads De ira ‘as essentially in agreement with orthodox Stoic thought on the emotions’ (59) and states: ‘In line with the early Stoics, Seneca thinks that we generate emotions by assent on impressions’ (65). For the connection of anger and revenge in antique anger control cf. Harris W.V., Restraining Rage. The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, Mass.: 2001).


Cf. Seneca, De ira II, 1, 3: ‘The question is whether it (i.e. the passion of anger) follows immediately upon the impression (sc. of an injury) and springs up without the assistance from the mind, or whether it is aroused only with the assent of the mind. Our opinion is that it ventures nothing by itself, but acts only with the approval of the mind’ (transl. by Basor).

For Seneca, the perception of an injury is a sine qua non of anger; cf., inter alia, De ira II, 1, 3: ‘There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the impression of an injury’ (transl. by Basor, adapted).

Seneca regarded the first step, obviously, as involuntary. Cf. De ira II, 4, 1; Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice” 65. Vogt, ibidem, however, seems to be inclined to regard only the two last steps as voluntary movements of the mind.

As demonstrated by Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice” 66; for example, ‘when someone is offending me, he needs to be paid back’ or ‘when people don’t greet me, they express disrespect’.

As Seneca himself clearly states in De ira II, 1, 5: ‘These steps are impossible unless the mind has given assent to the impressions that moved it’ (transl. Basor, adapted).
Therefore, anger is something essentially different from spontaneous physical reactions to outward influences, such as shivering as a reaction to cold.\textsuperscript{78} And it is this theoretical analysis of anger that instigated Seneca to focus his therapy on detecting, arguing against, neutralizing, and destroying the erroneous perceptions, estimations, conclusions, judgements, and decisions that may lead to anger. Seneca’s pragmatic and casuistic approach very much depends on this goal. He unfolds before the eyes of his readers a great number of cases he considers typical for the genesis of anger; e.g. ‘a slave is too slow, or the water for the wine is lukewarm, or the couch-cushion is disarranged, or the table carelessly set’,\textsuperscript{79} ‘For why is it that we are thrown into a rage by somebody’s cough or sneeze, by negligence in chasing a fly away, by a dog’s hanging around, or by the dropping of a key that has slipped from the hands of a careless servant?’,\textsuperscript{80} or social contempt, gossip, irritating social interaction,\textsuperscript{81} labour, illness, sleeplessness, falling in love, etc.\textsuperscript{82} The wrong perceptions, estimations, conclusions, judgements, and decisions are especially provoked in the course of social interaction: ‘Suspicion and surmise—provocations that are most deceptive—ought to be banished from the mind. “That man did not give me a civil greeting; that one did not return my kiss; that one broke off the conversation abruptly; that one did not invite me to dinner; that one seemed to avoid seeing me.” Pretext for suspicion will not be lacking’.\textsuperscript{83} The connection of \textit{ira} with revenge is a feature of many ancient texts on anger and is certainly also there in Stoic texts.

3 Spiritual Exercises: Weyer’s Prophylactic Course of Neostoic Anger Management

In his \textit{De ira morbo} Weyer has borrowed the basic ideas of Seneca’s \textit{De ira}, the design of the work as a therapeutic treatise, some of its definitions, and many elements, thoughts, observations, and historical examples. Weyer shaped his therapy for anger, however, as a more systematic, complete, and complex course of mental exercises, \textit{exercitia spiritualia} in the sense of the philosophical “Seelenleitung” (as described by, among others, Paul Rabbow and Ilsetraut)

\textsuperscript{78} Ibidem II, 2, 1.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibidem II, 25, 1 (transl. Basor).
\textsuperscript{80} Ibidem II, 25, 3 (transl. Basor).
\textsuperscript{81} Ibidem II, 24.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibidem II, 20.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibidem II, 24, 1–2 (transl. Basor).
One may say that in his central chapter on “philosophical prophylactic therapy” (chapter 5) Weyer designed a true course of anger management, carefully built up in nine parts. In the original edition special attention is given to these parts, by large Roman numbers in the margins.

The first part is daily philosophical self-reflection (recognitio sui), in the morning and in the evening. The morning meditation reflects on the moral status quo of the self and formulates concrete plans for self-improvement; the evening meditation is an examen conscientiae (“Selbstprüfung”; “Gewissenserforschung”) or self-investigation (“sibi rationem reddere”). Which moral progress has been achieved? What has been done well, what went wrong? With respect to the philosophical self-investigation Weyer advises the individual to act as his own judge (iudex), evaluator (censor), and observer (speculator sui), to be totally open and honest, to hide nothing, and

89 Ibidem: ‘vespertinis itidem, priusquam lectum ingrediatur, sibiipsi rationem reddat [. . .]’.
90 Weyer, De ira morbo, ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 58; chapt. Op. omn., p. 804: ‘Quod hodie malum tuum sanasti? Cui vitio restitisti? Qua parte melior es?’ (‘Which evil [disease] of you did you cure today? Which vice did you resist? Which part of you has improved?’); Weyer ascribes these methodical questions to the Stoic philosopher Aulus Sextius; Weyer’s text is, however, a literal quote from Seneca, De ira 111, 36, 1 (instead of ‘restitisti’ Seneca has ‘obstitisti’).
to evaluate every single action committed and word spoken during the past day.\textsuperscript{92} Moreover, the evening meditation should focus on the management of the emotions, especially ira. The individual should ask ‘whether it is more honest to give way to the emotions’ or to control them, and he should concentrate on the sentence ‘se ipsum vincere […] omnium celeberrimam esse victoriam’ viz. ‘Seipsum vincere Victoria maxima’.\textsuperscript{93} The importance of this kind of self-control is emphasized by the highlightening of the sentence as a marginal note.\textsuperscript{94} The fact that Weyer considered this exercise to be of the highest importance for himself proves his personal \textit{impresa} VINCE TE IPSUM, which he created in connection with the treatise (Fig. 3.1).\textsuperscript{95} Morning meditation and evening self-investigation, of course, were important for moral improvement of any kind; but these exercises were regarded as especially relevant for anger, since it is this emotion that makes a person go totally out of control, and both exercises were means \textit{par excellence} to establish a kind of permanent self-control.\textsuperscript{96}

The way in which Weyer shapes the \textit{examen conscientiae} shows that he gave it a typically Stoic flavour: it focuses on controlling the emotions, it is ascribed particularly to the Stoic philosopher Sextius, and moreover, Weyer found it in Seneca’s \textit{De ira} (111, 36), from which he partly copied it literally. From the same passage of \textit{De ira} it appears that Seneca himself used to engage in this daily exercise:

\begin{quote}
I avail myself of this privilege, and every day I plead my cause before the bar of self. When the light has been removed from sight, and my wife, long aware of my habit, has become silent, I scan the whole of my day
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 58; \textit{Op. omn.}, § 6, p. 804. For the \textit{sententia} that comes close to proverbial wisdom cf. Publilius Syrus, \textit{Sententiae} 77 ‘Bis vincit qui se vincit in victoria’; Publilius focuses on victory, which includes the ideas of anger and revenge, of course on the side of the victorious.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibidem, both in ed. Off. Oporinus and in \textit{Op. omn.}
\item \textsuperscript{95} See above, esp. note 12.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 58–59; \textit{Op. omn.} § 7, p. 804: ‘Minus certe corrumpere […] volet animus, qui ad rationem reddendam quotidian vocandus est. […] Desinet ira vel erit sedatio, quae sibi quotidie coram iudice comparandum esse sciit’ (‘A mind who knows that he must report on a daily basis, will be certainly less inclined to deteriorate […] […] Anger will stop or at least will calm down, if it knows that it must appear daily before a judge’); cf. Seneca, \textit{De ira} 111, 36, 1–2.
\end{itemize}
and retrace all my deeds and words. I conceal nothing from myself, I omit nothing. For why should I shrink from any of my mistakes […]?

Utor hac potestate et quotidianum meum apud me causam dico. Cum sublatum est conspectus lumen est et conticuit uxor moris iam mei conscia, totum diem meum scutor factaque ac dicta mea remetior; nihil mihi ipse abscondo, nihil transeo. Quare enim quicquam ex erroribus meis timeam […]?97

Weyer reformulated Seneca’s autobiographical self-description as a general moral imperative, in which he curiously included the collaborating role of the wife,98 and he connected it with the morning meditation, not mentioned by Seneca ad loc. As Weyer indicates, Stoic self-investigation goes very well together with Christian moral theology (‘quod et Theologorum schola docet […]’; ed. Off. Oporinus p. 58; Op. omn. § 6, p. 804).99 In the same sense Petrarch had already presented it in his De vita solitaria (1345),100 and Erasmus in his Adagia (1526; no. 2901).

Justus Lipsius attached a very high value to this exercise: as he indicates in the last chapter of his Manuductio (III, 24), he regarded it as one of the three methods that would make Stoic philosophy “living” and fruitful for his contemporaries. He advises his pupil (auditor) to engage daily in the examen conscientiae, and he quotes the above-cited Seneca passage in extenso. According to Lipsius, Seneca’s examen conscientiae proves man’s moral greatness, and it leads him to the emotional comment and appeal: ‘O vel hoc argumento virum bonum, virum magnum! Et qui non scripsit sensitque solum talia, sed fecit! Nos quoque, tu meus, et examen hoc, stimulum et protelum virtutis, cottidie adhibeamus!’— ‘Oh good and great man, who would be great solely because of this! He who not only wrote and thought this, but who also practised it! My good

98 Weyer reformulated also Seneca’s autobiographical remark on his wife as an imperative: When the individual is going to undertake his examen conscientiae (as usual) in bed, his wife should ‘shut up’ (§ 8 ‘conticescat uxor’). This is a bit odd. One wonders whether Weyer did so in close imitation of Seneca or because he was (a bit overly) concerned with the practicalities of the exercise. Of course, it is less curious that he automatically looked at his exercises solely from a male perspective and with an eye on male persons; this goes for the majority of 16th-century philosophers and intellectuals.
friend, let us also exercise it daily, as incitement and motor (literally ‘draught oxen’) of Virtue!’

Thus, similarly to Weyer, Lipsius presented Seneca’s *examen conscientiae* as a general moral imperative for his contemporaries. This, however, he did in 1603, the year in which he finished his *Manuductio*. One may take into account that he did so after he had returned to the Southern Low Countries and to Roman Catholicism.

The second part of Weyer’s programme has a pragmatic design: it demands that one always think about keeping up a good reputation, i.e. to be counted among the composed, civilized, and morally good persons. This advice is directed toward outward appearance only, otherwise not much appreciated by the Stoics, but Weyer included it because he expected it to be helpful in slowing down the process of getting angry. The structural care for one’s reputation was meant to bring forth cautiousness and increase moral consciousness.

The third part of the programme prescribes a personal coach or advisor. This coach should be a morally outstanding, serious, severe, and critical person, ideally a kind of Cato the Elder. Weyer’s advice seems to draw on the Greco-Roman philosophical practice of the so-called *contubernium* (originally a military term referring to soldiers on campaign, sharing a tent, in German “Zeltgemeinschaft”). According to this practice, pupils lived together with their philosophical teachers, ideally in the same house. In daily contact with his personal coach, the pupil was supposed to imitate his behaviour and adopt the right ethical attitudes and judgements. The pedagogical impact of the *contubernium* is referred to frequently in Seneca’s *Letters to Lucilius*; in a sense, one can read them as a kind of artificial replacement of the *contubernium*, since the philosophical teacher Seneca lived in Rome and its surroundings, while pupil Lucilius stayed in faraway Sicily. Thus, Seneca advised Lucilius to choose an imaginary mental coach: ‘Iam clausulam epistula poscit. Accipe, et quidem utilem et salutarem, quam te affigere animo volo: “Aliquis vir bonus eligendus et semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tamquam illo spectante vivamus et omnia tamquam illo vidente faciamus”. […] Magna pars peccatorum tollitur, si peccaturis testis adsistit’—‘But my letter calls for its closing motto. Hear and take to heart this useful and wholesome motto: “Choose some man of high

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102 The approbatio of the censor of the *Manuductio* dates 6 March 1603.
104 Ibidem.
105 Ibidem. In proposing Cato Weyer was probably inspired by Seneca, *Epistulae morales* 11, 10: ‘Elige itaque Catonem’—‘Thus choose Cato [i.e. as a moral guardian].’
106 Rabbow, *Seelenführung* 60–79.
character, and keep him ever before your eyes, living as if he were watching you, and ordering all your actions as if he beheld them. […] We can get rid of most faults, if we have a witness who stands near us when we are likely to go wrong. The concept of *contubernium*, however, does not occur in Seneca’s *De ira*, let alone as a philosophical exercise.

Lipsius was well aware of the *contubernium*; he attached a high value to it and exercised it himself by taking students into his house. In his *Manuductio in Stoicam philosophiam* he called the device ‘bonorum virorum conversatio’ (‘contact with good people’) and shaped it in a more general way, not in the least by extending it to the meditative imagination of a moral coach (*Manuductio* 111, 24), as Seneca had done.

The fourth part of Weyer’s therapy is closely connected with the third: it works out the positive effects of corrective instances in controlling anger. Its special aims are to improve the individual’s ability to accept criticism without getting angry, to get used to very harsh, exaggerated, and even unjustified criticism; in a second step, this moral improvement was supposed to enable the pupil to develop and sharpen the tool of self-criticism.

The fifth part is an analytical meditation on the reasons, outward symptoms, and terrible effects of anger, such as those described in Weyer’s chapters 2 (“De causis irae”), 3 (“De signis irae”), and 4 (“De effectibus irae”) with a special emphasis on their disadvantageous, harmful, destructive, and self-destructive aspects for both the body and the mind. As he indicates, Weyer included in this meditation the larger descriptive part of his treatise up to this point (ca. 2/3; ed. Off. Oporinus pp. 15–55). This meditation should be exerted by the ‘clear inner eye’ of the *animus/mens*, and be exercised on a daily basis (Weyer says ‘constantly’/’semper’): its heart is its rational and analytical design, which enables the individual (a) to understand the awkward and partly ridiculous reasons that cause anger; (b) to understand the extremely disadvantageous

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108 Cf. Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics* 14 ff. However, Lipsius taught his pupils not in the first place Stoic philosophy, but philology and antiquarianism.


mental and physical results of anger, such as the loss of social decorum, cruel bloodshed among family members, divorce, factions, war, self-destruction, the loss of physical health, and even the loss of one’s life; (c) to compare the futile reasons for anger with its much more harmful results; and (d) to estimate the dangerous and devastating character of anger in comparison with other emotions, especially the worst, such as avarice/greed (avaritia), sexual desire (luxuria), and envy (invidia).

The core of this mental exercise is to count, enumerate, compare, weigh, and estimate. One should enumerate and count as many harmful and destructive results of anger as possible, put them, as it were, on scales, and weigh them by comparing them with the results of other harmful passions; one should recall and memorize the reasons for anger and carefully compare them with its results. Then one will clearly see that anger is the worst of all passions. For example, the result of avarice is that one acquires possessions, but the result of anger is that they will be destroyed. Nobody seized by an attack of anger is able to get rid of it without the loss of possessions. Thus, anger is more disadvantageous than avarice. A person’s sexual desire (luxuria) results in his lust, whereas anger leads to another person’s pain. Ergo: with respect to its results, anger is worse than sexual desire. And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for envy. Another example of the meditation’s structure: A lord may get angry at servants because their negligence may have caused some material loss. In an attack of anger he chases them away or kills them. By comparing the reason for anger with its results one must conclude that the passion has caused a much heavier loss than its reason did.

If this mental exercise is repeated on a daily basis, it is clear that it will slow down, and ideally stop, the impetus, the force that leads to an attack of anger. This is facilitated already by its focus on rational and analytical processes; more specifically, it leads to thought patterns that prevent ira through typically Stoic “pre-meditation”/praemeditatio techniques. This method tries to generate thoughts that prepare the mind for “emergency cases”, or even, more generally, for possible future “choices”, by focusing on the results of bad choices. The pre-meditative mental exercises as prescribed in part 5 play an important part in Seneca’s De ira, where they appear passim. In a long section in the third book, Seneca compares anger with the other passions and emphasizes that it

117 Ibidem: ‘Quanto plus irascendo quam id erat, propter quod irascebatur, perdidit?’.
is the worst and most dangerous of them all. In this, Weyer was clearly inspired by Seneca.\textsuperscript{118}

The sixth part, the exercise of the “mirror meditation”, has a special character: it prescribes a process of profound self-reflection and prescribes it to be performed on a daily basis. If one suffers from an attack of anger, one must go immediately to a mirror, sit in front of it, and carefully study the deformations of one’s face, its ugly and strange features, similar to the expressions of madmen or wild and savage animals such as lions, wild boars, and bulls. The description of the ugly outward appearance of anger also plays an important part in Seneca’s \textit{De ira}, since it appears at the very beginning of the treatise, where Seneca compares the angry man with a madman: ‘[…] likewise are the marks of the angry man; his eyes blaze and sparkle, his whole face is crimson with the blood that surges from the lowest depth of the heart, his lips quiver, his teeth are clenched, his hair bristles and stands in the end, his breathing is forced and harsh, his joint crack from writhing, he groans and bellows, burst out into speech with hardly intelligible words, strikes his hands together continually, and stamp the ground with his feet […]’ (I, 1, 3–4).\textsuperscript{119}

In this vivid description in I, 1, however, Seneca did not advise a “mirror meditation”. One may suppose that Seneca might have already been sceptical about its sense because ancient Roman mirrors only produced rather vague and imprecise images—comparatively, the mirrors of the 16th century were much better. Nevertheless, the advice to the angry man, that he should look into the mirror, went back to the Roman Stoic philosopher Sextius, as Weyer very well knew.\textsuperscript{120} And, moreover, it was Seneca who transmitted Sextius’s “mirror therapy” in \textit{De ira}: ‘As Sextius remarks, it has been good for some people to see themselves in a mirror while they are angry; the great change in themselves alarmed them; brought, as it were, face to face with the reality that they did not recognize themselves.’\textsuperscript{121} Seneca himself was not much impressed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} And more often, for example in \textit{De ira} I, 35, 3 ff. ‘Nothing, however, will prove as profitable as to consider first the ugliness and deformity of the matter (i.e. anger) […]’.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Weyer, \textit{De ira morbo}, ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 68: ‘Quum autem Sestius asserat iratis mire speculi inspectionem profuisse […]’—‘Since Sextius affirms that angry people profited enormously from looking into the mirror’.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Seneca, \textit{De ira} I, 36, 1: ‘Quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit aspexisse speculum; perturbavit illos tanta mutatio sui; velut in rem praesentem adducti non agnoverunt se’ (transl. Basor).
\end{itemize}
by Sextius’s advice. According to Seneca, to look into the mirror when suffering from an attack of anger did not make much sense, because the affectus had already broken through and had overmastered the person; if a person in such a state of mind looked into the mirror, Seneca argues, he would only be pleased. Seneca regarded Stoic praemeditationes on the horrible effects of anger, such as suicide and other forms of self-destruction, much more effective.

Weyer, however, in a marked difference with Seneca, constructed a special “mirror meditation” as a means of therapy of anger. He incorporated and transformed the elements of Seneca’s descriptions of the outward appearance or bodily effects of anger, partly by cut and paste, into an impressive “mirror meditation”:

Si [...] ipse ira percitus speculum adieris et te ipsum contempleris, experieris ipsa re nihil deformius, tetrius aut foedius quam ab ira superari. [...] Enimvero, si formam externam [...] intueris: quam varius vultus, quam anxius, anhelus, truculentus et horridus? Quam turpis haec mutatio? [...] Color terret insolitus, a nativo immutatus [...]. Venae extumescunt, [...] fervens oculis dat ira ruborem; [...] quam ridiculi, quam truces nictus? Horrent subrigunturque capilli; corrugatur frons; strident dentes [...]; lingua sui impotens, dissoluto freno minitabunda, titubans, in quacumque iniuriam profusa; sermo varius, inconstans, praeruptus, non sani hominis; hiulcus, mutilus, clamoribus pudendi nunc raucus, nunc turbatione interceptus; fremit vox [...]; spiritus incensus, coactus, nec ordinatus; crebra et vehementius acta suspiria;

122 Cf. his comment, ad loc.: ‘And how little of the real ugliness did the image reflected in the mirror disclose [...]’.
123 Ibidem 11, 36, 3: ‘For people taken away by the passion of anger no image is more beautiful than the one that is fierce and savage, and that is exactly the way the wish to look like’.
124 Ibidem 11, 36, 4.
126 Cf. Seneca, De ira 1, 1, 3 ‘color versus’.
127 Cf. ibidem 11, 35, 3 ‘tumescunt venae’.
128 Cf. ibidem 1, 1, 4: ‘horrent ac surriguntur capilli’.
129 Cf. ibidem 1, 1, 3 ‘tristis frons’.
130 Cf. ibidem: ‘parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus’.
131 Cf. ibidem 11, 35, 3: ‘rabida vocis eruptio’.
132 Cf. ibidem 1, 1, 4: ‘spiritus coactus ac stridens’.
altius tracti gemitus; subdultans citato inaequaliter ateriae motus; cor velut prorupturum, extra palpitans [...].

If [...] you yourself get an attack of anger you shall go to a mirror and look at yourself, and you shall experience that there is nothing more ugly and disgraceful than to be overmastered by anger. [...] Because, if you just look at the outward appearance [...] how often does the expression of your face change, how anxious, hastened, savage, and horrible does it look like? How ugly is this changing expression? [...] The strange colour of the face, much different from its genuine one, is frightening. [...] The blood vessels are swelling up; because of boiling anger the eyes get red; [...] how ridiculous, how savage does the shaking of the head look like? The hair bristles; the forehead becomes wrinkled; the teeth are clenched [...] the tongue loses control, and having lost control it emits threats, swaggers, and utters all kinds of words of abuse; the speech becomes uncontrolled and chaotic as well, totters, breaks off all of a sudden, and does not resemble that of a sane person; it is not well connected anymore, and gets mutilated; sometimes it groans and breaks out into shameful screams, sometimes it breaks off in confusion; the voice sounds horrible [...] the breathing becomes accelerated, difficult, irregular; often it breaks out into heavy, sometimes long and deep sighs; the pulse becomes quick and irregular; it seems as if the heart is about jumping out of the body [...].

Interestingly, in his description of the angry person’s mirror image, Weyer included a number of features that cannot be seen, for example audible elements, such as groans, screams, tottering, words of abuse, sighs, etc., and physiological processes that take place in the interior body, such as abnormalities of the pulse and the “jumping” of the heart. I think that this is due to the fact that Weyer conceived his “mirror meditation” essentially as an inner process in which the inner self is able to observe all kinds of its own features, and to meditate on them. The senses certainly partake in this complex process, but bodily experience is from the very start always mixed with the intellect’s interpretations and reflections.

“Look into the mirror” in this exercise does not only mean to physically look into a mirror, but to engage in a complex self-reflection that takes into account as many of the bodily aspects of anger as possible. Weyer advises frequent engagement in this kind of self-reflection, which implies, of course, also

134 Cf. ibidem, I, 1, 4: ‘gemitus mugitusque’.
conducting it at times when one has no access to an actual mirror. It is a telling
detail that Weyer says in the introduction of this exercise also that one should
‘constantly’ (assidue) meditate on the image of the iratus ‘as if one were look-
ing into a mirror’.135

In fact, this part of Weyer’s therapy seems to include a kind of double “inner
meditation”: first, on the “inner self” in its mental constitution, i.e. on the state
of the animus (mind and soul), and second, on the processes of the interior
body. As both a Stoic and a Galenian physician, Weyer emphasized the inter-
connectivity of mind and body, and thus parallelized the relevant processes:

Porro si ad internarum partium viscerumque anatomen progredi lubet,
Deus bone, qualis intra animus, cuius imaginem tam foedam, tumultuo-
sam et execrabilem cernis? Quanto illi intra pectus facies terribilior, impe-
tus intensor, rupturus se nisi eruperit? Quantus universi sanguinis fervor,
quam halituosa spirituum lucta, quanto cor incendio flagrat, quam hepar
turget vindictae desiderio, quam ventriculus in vomitum proclivis, quam
nervi agitatione multiplici convelluntur? […] Quam facultas vitalis
labefactatur, quam virtus animalis quassatur? Quam potentia naturalis
laeditur?136

Furthermore, if one wishes to proceed to the interior parts of the body
and its anatomy, my God, how does the mind (animus) look, whose out-
ward appearance you see in such an ugly, confused, and abominable
state? How much more terrible is his inner face, how much stronger his
impetus—his impetus that is about to explode if it did not yet burst out?
How hot is the boiling of all the blood in the body, how heavy the strug-
gling of the various spirits, how heavy does the heart burn, how much is
the liver swollen because of the ardent desire to take revenge, how much
is the stomach inclined to vomit, how much are the nerves torn by mul-
tiple agitation? […] How much does the power of life137 decrease, how
much is it shattered, how much damaged?

Furthermore, the mental exercise of the “mirror meditation” implies an arti-
ficial and systematic identification of the self with the iratus. The meditator

contuearis […]’.
137 Weyer seems to have used facultas vitalis, virtus animalis, and potentia naturalis as
synonyms.
should imagine as many symptoms of anger as possible, even symptoms he never experienced himself; he should place those symptoms in the “mirror of his mind” and look at them carefully. The same goes mutatis mutandis for the last part of the exercise—the imagination of the features of a composed person in the “mirror of the mind”. One should imagine the look of a person with a serene and peaceful mind, and compare it with the one of the angry man.\textsuperscript{138}

In fact, the seventh item of Weyer’s philosophical therapeutic programme contains two different parts.\textsuperscript{139} The first one is designed as a kind of pragmatic and common-sense psychology, the second as spiritual exercises. The first advises avoiding outward occasions of irritation and anger.\textsuperscript{140} This means avoiding all people who might cause irritation in the first place, especially the contentious (‘litigiosi’), provocative (‘qui in iram […] provocant’), and irascible (‘qui […] in iram propendent’).\textsuperscript{141} One should carefully choose one’s companions. Weyer advises looking for plain, frank, straightforward, sincere, easy, good-natured, compliant, affable, yielding, temperate, moderate, modest, humble, mild, gentle, pleasant, delightful, and caring persons.\textsuperscript{142} With respect to this advice, Weyer closely follows Seneca, \textit{De ira} III, 8, 3–5, with a number of verbatim quotes.\textsuperscript{143} Furthermore, one should have also keep an eye on material objects, i.e. one should avoid the possession of precious and expensive objects, especially fragile ones, such as sophisticated glasses, vessels, sculptures, stones, and works of art that may cause anger if they get broken or lost.\textsuperscript{144} Weyer brings, among others, the example of Emperor Augustus, who saved the life of Vedius Pollio’s servant, who had broken an expensive crystalline vase.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{138} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 70: ‘Iam si ex adverso illius, qui ab hoc irae morbo liberam degit vitam, imaginem contempleris, faciei intuearis decorum, oculorum venustatem, sermonis venustatem, compositos uniuscuiusque motus, morum comitatem, universi denique corporis actiones mire placidas, quis non abacto mordicus illo monstro hanc omnium gratissimam amplectatur formam?’


\textsuperscript{140} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 71: ‘Septimo praeventetur hoc malum, si omnes irae occasiones quo-cunque studio caveantur et fomites auferant[…]’.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibidem: ‘elige simplices, faciles, moderatos, submissos, humanos, suaves, pios quibuscum verseris quibusque familiariter coniunctiusve utaris[…]’.

\textsuperscript{143} E.g. Seneca, \textit{De ira}, 111, 8, 5: ‘Elige simplices, faciles, moderatos, qui iram tuam nec evocent et ferant. Magis adhuc proderunt sumissi et humani et dulces, non tamen usque ad adulationem, nam iracundos nmia assentatio offendit’.


\textsuperscript{145} Weyer took the story from Seneca’s \textit{De ira} 111, 40, 2–4; in Weyer’s text, however, ‘Vedius Pollio’ is called ‘Atidius Pollio’), cf. ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 73; \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 812. Vedius Pollio
Vedius had gotten so angry that he had ordered the clumsy servant to be fed to his murenas.

The second part (of item seven) is devoted to the Stoic exercise of the “innere Rückzug” (“retraite spirituelle”) the philosopher engages in deliberately ignoring all outward influences, especially sensual impressions, and in concentrating on his inner self and the essentials of the Stoic doctrine. He should be able to do so also in difficult circumstances, e.g. in the middle of a noisy crowd at the marketplace, or in a noisy bath or a fitness studio. Seneca makes Lucilius attentive to this exercise in Letter to Lucilius 56: ‘So imagine all kinds of sounds you may hate: when the bodybuilders, for example, are exercising themselves by lifting heavy leaden weights; when they grunt and sigh during their workouts, or pretend serious workouts by grunting and sighing; or when they produce wheezy and high-pitched tones after having retained breathing; or when a lazy fellow, [unwilling to work out and] content with a vulgar massage, gets rubbed, and one hears the crack of the pummeling hand on his shoulder, varying in sound according as the hand is laid on flat or hollow; the bloody limit is, when a ball player comes along and shouts out the score; and add to this uproar when a pick-pocket gets arrested, and the racket of a man who loves to hear his own voice [. . .].’ Seneca shows Lucilius how he himself successfully exerts the “retraite spirituelle” under these terrible conditions: “But I assure you that this racket means no more to me then the sound of waves or falling water [. .]. [. .] this time I have toughened my nerves against all that sort of thing, so that I can endure even a boatswain marking the time in high-pitched tones for his crew. For I force my mind to concentrate, and keep it from straying to things outside itself; all outdoors may be bedlam, provided that there is no disturbance within. [. . .] For what benefit is a quiet neighbourhood, if our emotions are in an uproar?” Similarly, in his prophylactic therapy of anger Weyer advises training the senses in ignoring impressions; and, differently from Seneca’s letter, he addresses all senses. However, he gives special attention to sounds that may cause irritation, which appears from the fact that he makes a detailed list of them: laughter, weeping, flattering, quarrels, outbursts of joy and disappointment, human voices and shouting, the voices of animals

was a good friend of Augustus. For the story cf. also Pliny, Naturalis historia IX, 77, and Cassius Dio, Roman History LIV, 23, 2–5; for Vedius Pollio cf. art. in Der Neue Pauly (2002), XII.1, col. 1154.

147 Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 56, 1–2.
such as the lowing of cows and the bellowing of dogs. Interestingly, Weyer’s list has a typically Stoic flavour, since it contains primarily sounds that display emotional reactions: it was the Stoics who especially hated emotions. One may read Weyer’s list as “sounds a Stoic dislikes”.

Interestingly, in the same passage Weyer extended the “retraite spirituelle” to a prophylactic technique that aimed to ignore possible irritations caused by words on a larger scale, thus including written texts (comprising insults or slander) and words one actually cannot hear, such as those of absent people. In doing so, he praises Caesar, who refused to read the correspondence between senators and Pompey that he had at hand, which surely contained many offences and expressions of slander (‘multa contumeliosa verba’). Instead, Caesar ordered the letters to be burned. Weyer highly estimated this as a major achievement of anger management, closely approaching the highest goal of the ‘seipsum vincere’: ‘Nam seipsum vincere, maxima est et laudatissima victoria’. Pompey is said to have done the same thing with the correspondence of Sertorius.

The eighth section is probably the most comprehensive, complex, and demanding part of the prophylactic spiritual exercises. It contains the repetitive reading of advice, sentences and writings of wise men with respect to anger and its careful internalization by meditation. These repetitions should take place very frequently, or as Weyer puts it, ‘constantly’ (‘assidue’); they include learning advice by heart (‘admonitiones’, ‘consilia’), and exercising it, as it were, in a physical training. Of course, short or sententious texts especially suit this kind of exercise, texts such as

Iracundia nihil amplum decorumque molitur. (Anger does not bring forth anything great or decent)—SENeca

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152 Ibidem.


Pusilli hominis et miser est, repetere mordentem.\textsuperscript{156} (It is characteristic for fainthearted and miserable people to respond to verbal attacks)—SENECA

Magni animi est, iniurias contemnere.\textsuperscript{157} (It is characteristic for great minds to despise attacks)—SENECA

Nullum est argumentum magnanimitatis certius quam nihil posse, quo instigeris, accidere.\textsuperscript{158} (There is no surer proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can possibly happen to disturb you)—SENECA

Hominem homini nocere non posse [...] nisi in externis bonis. [...] Nemo itaque laeditur nisi a seipso.\textsuperscript{159} (A man cannot be damaged by his fellow man, except with respect to external goods. [...] Thus, nobody can be damaged except by himself)—CICERO

Melius non agnoscere quam ulcisci.\textsuperscript{160} (It is better not to notice something [an injury] than to take revenge)—CATO THE ELDER

An quicquam similius insaniae quam ira?\textsuperscript{161} (Is there anything more similar to madness than anger?)—CICERO

Ira initium insaniae.\textsuperscript{162} (Madness starts with anger)—ENNIUS

Nulla est tanta vis, tanta copia, quae non ferro ac viribus debilitari frangique possit; verum vincere animum, iracundiam cohibere, quae semper est inimica consilio, victoriam temperare [...] haec qui faciat, sed deo simillimum iudico.\textsuperscript{163} (There is no power, no number of soldiers that cannot be destroyed by iron and force; but to conquer one’s own mind, to stop anger, which is always opposed to reasonable behaviour, to moderate victory [...] him who is

\textsuperscript{161} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 80; \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 816; Cicero, \textit{Tusculanae disputationes} 1IV, 52.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibidem; Ennius in Cicero, \textit{Tusculanae disputationes} 1IV, 52.
able to act this way I do not only count among the most outstanding men, but regard him as very similar to God)—CICERO

These sententious texts were not only written by Stoics, but stem from a number of Greek and Roman philosophers, authors of philosophical works, or wise men, such as Chilo, Bias of Priene (6th century BC), Zeno of Elea the dialectician (5th century BC), Phocylides of Miletos (6th/5th century BC), Plato, Aristotle, Pyrrhus, Epicurus, Plutarch, Cato, Cicero, etc., but also from poets and other writers, for example Homer, the comedy author Menander, Ennius, Lucretius, Horace, Melanthius of Athens, Publilius Syrus, and so on. The broad spectrum of authorities does not imply that Weyer’s mental exercise lost its Neostoic character. Conducting exercises with the sententious text of non-Stoics is not in contradiction with Stoic practice, as one can see from Seneca’s letters. Many of the *sententiae* Seneca offers Lucilius to meditate on stem from non-Stoics as well, such as Epicurus and Virgil. In Weyer’s collection, however, Seneca nevertheless plays a very important part. The first four of the above-quoted sentences, and a considerable number of the total amount, stem from Seneca’s *De ira; De ira* is clearly a major, if not the main source of the collection, and it is therefore no surprise that the collection starts with excerpts from Seneca’s treatise. The sentences from other philosophers and writers are of a kind that they can very well be applied for the internalization of the Stoic views on anger. This even goes for the *sententiae* taken from philosophical opponents with respect to the theory of emotions, such as Aristotle or Epicurus.

Whereas the eighth part deals with the meditation on philosophical *sententiae*, the ninth prescribes the meditation of historical examples: first of “negative” ones, i.e. of rulers and princes who were seized by anger, with the most terrible results (mostly killing, torture, and other cruelties), and ending with a final section on ‘tyrants’, and second of “positive” ones, i.e. of clement rulers who succeeded at suppressing anger and VINCERE SE IPSUM. The
examples stem from European, Asian, and African history, from antiquity up to the 16th century, and were collected from various sources accessible to Weyer, especially from Greek and Latin historiography. Contemporary examples of special importance are De immanitate, a treatise of the 15th-century humanist Giovanni Pontano on cruelty, and Marcantonio Sabellico’s *Ennæades sive Rhapsodia historiarum.* Although Weyer describes Italian (and other foreign) acts of cruelty in detail, he remains rather vague and general on those of closer regions, such as northwestern Germany or the Low Countries.

How should the reader meditate on (negative) historical examples? If the reader is himself a politician or ruler, he may use them “directly”, so to say, in the sense of a *mirror of princes.* If not, he must engage in a different and more demanding mental exercise. In almost all examples Weyer has emphasized the cruelty and lack of justice of the *irati.* He wants the reader, in a first step, to focus on precisely this aspect: the reader shall linger on the examples of cruel behaviour and be filled with awe, abhorrence, surprise, and repulsion; he shall become emotional over all those horrible images of bloodshed, torture, and senseless killing. In a second step, the reader shall apply the images to himself in the sense of the “mirror meditation” described above. As the ugly face and voice distorted by anger in the “mirror meditation”, the reader shall transfer the ugly features of outrageous cruelty to himself; he shall imagine that it is *he himself who commits* the disgusting acts of violence. *Mutatis mutandis,* this is the same process as Luther’s meditation on the Passion: the meditator is supposed to identify not with Christ, but with the culprits, the Jews. The result envisaged by Weyer is not that the reader shall condemn cruel rulers from a moral or religious point of view, but that *he condemns himself,* is repulsed by himself, and shows repentance. *Moral victory,* Weyer says, will be achieved by *repentance (resipiscencitaria).* Weyer wants it so that the reader, when he looks at all the cruelties described in detail, ‘spits on his own breast’, i.e. detests and loathes himself, and ‘finds in himself of what he accused his fellow man’, i.e. puts his “hand inside his cloak”, as the Lord ordered Moses to do. Repentance is

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173 Cf. e.g. ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 104; *Op. omn.*, § 66, p. 830; Sabellico’s work appeared in 1498 in Venice (Bernardo dei Vitali), and again, in the Collected Works, in Basel in 1560; Pontano’s appeared in the same town, 1518, edited by Pietro Summonte.


crucial for living a good life in a Christian sense, to ‘run the curriculum of this world in a pious, just, and chaste way’,\textsuperscript{176} and of course, \textit{eo ipso}, to control anger.

And it is also in this sense that the reader should meditate on more recent examples, e.g. Sultan Mehmed the Great or Italians. Mehmed (Mahometes Othomanus) is presented as a homosexual who used to walk around for pleasure in the secret garden of his residence in Constantinople, always accompanied by his two dearest boy lovers.\textsuperscript{177} When he discovered once that two cucumbers were missing, he accused the boys of having eaten them, and after they denied it he got so furious that in his rage he opened up their bellies with his sword in order to prove that at least one of them was lying. After the terrible bloodshed it turned out that neither of the boys had eaten the cucumbers. Maybe even more cruel are the acts of violence exerted in faction or family wars in contemporary (or near contemporary) Italian towns, such as those described by Marcantonio Sabellico: persons burned alive, little children slaughtered in their cradles, pregnant women stabbed in their bellies, persons thrown down from towers, and other persons disembowelled (‘exenterati’);\textsuperscript{178} or such as those acts transmitted by Giovanni Pontano, who tells of a certain person who was caught and cut into little pieces; so was his liver, which was roasted and offered as a snack to the person’s relatives.\textsuperscript{179}

Thus Weyer unfolds a remarkably elaborate, carefully constructed, and detailed meditative programme of some 50 folio pages. Its major parts consist of exercises that can be called Stoic, or stem from Stoic pedagogy as described in Seneca’s \textit{Letters to Lucilius} (such as the personal coach; the \textit{retraite spirituelle}; the systematic internalization of sententious texts designed by wise men). Some of the typically Stoic exercises or prophylactic devices are borrowed from or inspired by Seneca’s \textit{De ira} (such as the daily \textit{examen conscientiae} or the \textit{prae-meditatio} of the harmful and destructive effects of anger). Given its sources, the whole programme is correctly labelled as ‘philosophical’ by Weyer, while it hardly comprises elements that are in contradiction with Christian religion. The \textit{examen conscientiae} is also part of Christian exercises, and it looks back on a long, especially monastic tradition. The meditation on historical examples of cruelties, on the other hand, has a Lutheran touch and uses affecting images as a means to bring forth self-repulsion and repentance.

In general, Weyer’s programme of prophylactic exercises is much more elaborate and systematic than the advice given in Seneca’s \textit{De ira}. One may wonder

\textsuperscript{176} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibidem.
why Weyer has chosen this approach. Of course, it could be that he simply wanted to surpass his antique predecessor, or that he intended to systematize the thoughts of a Latin text that was regarded by some modern readers as ill structured, confused, full of repetitions, and unedited,\textsuperscript{180} and by others, such as Marcantonius Muretus, as mutilated and incomplete, and thus disorderly and imperfect in that sense.\textsuperscript{181} But I think that there is also something else. In a marked difference from Seneca and other Stoics—but in accordance with Christian theologians, Galen, and Neostoic philosophers, such as Justus Lipsius—Weyer did not believe that it was possible to radically ‘kill’ or ‘eradicate’ emotions, but only to strive against them, to lower and dampen them. In Weyer’s view, the individual will never succeed with breaking completely free of passions, but it may well succeed with preventing emotions from breaking fully through, and with avoiding the most terrible and dangerous results of anger, i.e. killing other people. In Seneca’s \textit{De ira} the destructive action, i.e. revenge, is part of the definition of anger; for Weyer it is not. For Weyer, the element between anger and destructive action is \textit{ratio}, rational thinking. \textit{Ratio} is for him a kind of lifeline: a means of rescuing the individual in difficult situations. He does not say so, but implicitly he does not agree with the way in which Seneca described the process of getting angry: a sequence of conscious, quasi-rational ‘assents’ by the \textit{animus} to wrong and harmful impressions, with the last, explicitly conscious assent leading directly to revenge.\textsuperscript{182} As a physician, and especially because of his Galenic background, Weyer also acknowledged physical reasons for anger, such as disharmonies in the \textit{temperamentum} of the humours, especially an exuberance of yellow or black bile; diseases of the liver and the gallbladder (including stones); problems of digestion; and so on.\textsuperscript{183} If there are natural reasons for anger, it is clear that it is impossible to banish

\textsuperscript{180} Cf. Lipsius’s introduction of \textit{De ira} in his Seneca edition (“argumentum et ordo”) (Antwerp, Moretus: 1604), p. 1: ‘Libri [sc. \textit{De ira}] in partibus pulchri et eminentes sunt, in toto parum distincti, et repetitionibus aut digestione confusi’. Lipsius thought that \textit{De ira} was Seneca’s first moral treatise, written in the time of Caligula, but that it either remained unedited or had been edited by him only superficially shortly before his violent death. Cf. ibidem: ‘Scripsit tunc igitur, sed non edidit […], etsi statim, opinor, ab eius morte’. Weyer, however, in all probability did not react on Lipsius’s judgement, because the above-quoted introduction appeared only many years after \textit{De ira orbo}.

\textsuperscript{181} Cf. E.g. Seneca, \textit{Opera omnia quae extant […] cum omnium selectioribus commentariis hactenus editis […]} (Geneva, Alexander Pernetus: 1628) 507: ‘Hi libri […] ita mutili decurit atque sunt, ut iusta prope causa fuerit graviter ii irascendi, quorum id negligentia con-tigit, nisi ipsimet irasci nos vetarent’.

\textsuperscript{182} Cf. above.

ira; it may come back at any moment. But it is possible to dampen it, and to prevent aggressive action. I think it is because of these differences in thought that Weyer developed his elaborate programme of prophylactic philosophical exercises. One must constantly do his best; one must exercise daily in order to dampen anger and to prevent it from bursting out into destructive action.

4 Weyer’s Theological Therapy of Anger: Catholic Inclinations

These thoughts are also the point of departure of Weyer’s theological anger therapy,\(^{184}\) which is basically a religious supplement to the programme of philosophical prophylactic exercises. The theological therapy contains religious meditations Weyer considered necessary or useful in combination with the Stoic exercises discussed above.

In general, his “remedia theologica” do not have a typically Protestant, either Lutheran or Calvinist, design and outlook. Weyer does not quote a single Protestant author, but he does extensively quote the Church fathers—Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory the Great, Isidore, Bede the Venerable, Basil the Great, and Chrysostomus—as auctoritates on the emotion of anger and as authorities for the interpretation and understanding of the Bible as well. Weyer brings in a number of biblical passages by quoting the commentaries of Chrysostomus, Ambrosius, Gregory the Great, and Augustine. In Protestant theology no such authority is given to the above-mentioned authors. Even more remarkably, Weyer applied a number of monastic authors/authorities, such as Bernard of Clairvaux (Sermons);\(^{185}\) the Cistercian monk Guerricus, abbot of Igny (1138–1156, Collected Sermons);\(^{186}\) Cassiodorus (ca. 485–585),\(^{187}\) the founder of the monastery of Vivarium (which also consisted of a hermitage); Jerome, the lover of solitude; the Greek monk Basil;\(^{188}\) the Eastern hermits Agathon (5th century),\(^{189}\) Pastor de Scythi,\(^{190}\) Ioannes de Scythi,\(^{191}\) and Beno of Thebes,\(^{192}\)


\(^{186}\) Ibidem.


\(^{191}\) Ibidem.

plus an anonymous ‘Egyptian monk’ (probably a hermit as well) quoted in the 
*Ecclesiastica historia* of the Byzantine historian Nicephorus Callistus (ca. 1256–
ca. 1325);193 the monastic founding father Bede the Venerable of Northumbria
(673/674–735); and furthermore, a couple of important monastic source texts,
such as Isidorus’s *Soliloquia*.194 Jerome’s letters on the monastic life, such as the
one to the nun Demetrias (“Ad Demetriadem de servanda virginitate”, letter
130), and Gregory the Great’s *Moralia in Iob*.195

The monastic portion of Weyer’s authorities give his therapy a kind of
Catholic flavour. As is generally known, Calvinists and Lutherans despised
monks and were certainly not inclined to accept them as authorities of reli-
gious piety or moral conduct. The authoritative sentences of Weyer’s monks
are often designed after the model of the monastic *contemptus mundi*, com-
prising extreme abnegation of the self and of sensual pleasures,196 and a radia-
cal withdrawal from human society, in order to cultivate a tranquil, quiet, and
peaceful mind. This feature, again, does not go well with Protestant thought.
But there is no criticism of the monastic life on Weyer’s side, only praise. For
example, about the Egyptian hermit Beno Weyer says: ‘Nobody saw Beno, her-
mit of the desert of Thebes, ever in a state of anger. He, who does not get angry
at anybody, enjoys everlasting peace. […] He took everything with a tranquil
mind, and found his peace in the hope for the reward of heaven’.197 In com-
ments such as this, Weyer even seems to subscribe to the ideals of monasticism.

Another Catholic element is Weyer’s denotation of some authorities as
*Saints*, such as ‘Divus Ambrosius’198 or ‘Divus Paulus’.199 To call upon saints,
of course, severely goes against Calvinist rules. But Weyer hails even the
monastic hero Jerome as a saint (‘Divus Hieronymus’),200 as well as James
(‘Divus Jacobus’), the author of the well-known letter—which was damned by
Lutherans and Calvinists alike as ‘Catholic’.201 Another Catholic characteristic

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cur adeo se omnibus corporis volupatibus subtraheret, respondit […]’.
visus est iratus. Qui nemeni irascitur, perpetua fruitur pace. […] ille omnia aequo sustin-
ens animo in spe praemii coelestis conquiescit’.
omnis homo sit tardus ad iram’ (*Letter to James* 1, 19). Cf. below.
is brought forth when Weyer quotes the book *Jesus Sirach* (*Wisdom of Sirach/Joshua ben Sirach*), 202 which was accepted by the Catholics as canonical, and an important authority. 203 whereas it was not acknowledged by the Lutherans and Calvinists: Luther had rejected the book as apocryphal. Weyer, however, did not just quote *Jesus Sirach*, but attached to it a value that came close to the words of Jesus Christ. 204 ‘Sirach says: “Forgive your fellowman his offence, and your sins will be forgiven at your prayer”. 205 This has, in fact, the same content as a famous line in the *Pater noster*, Christianity’s most important prayer. 206 In another passage Weyer quotes the *Letter of James*, one of the *Catholic Letters*, 207 as an authoritative text. 208 While the letter was canonized by the Catholic Church (by Athanasius of Alexandria), Luther listed it among the *antilegomena* because he considered it as contradicting Paul’s doctrine of justification, which was according to Luther ‘sola fide’ (‘by faith alone’). Luther was so offended by *James* 2, 17 ff. (‘faith devoid of charity and good works is a dead faith, and in the eyes of God insufficient of justification [...]’ and ‘by works a man is justified, and not only by faith’) that he called it an ‘epistle of straw’, one that had no evangelical character at all (‘keine evangelische Art’). 209 Weyer, in a marked difference from Luther, quotes James’s views on justification with consent; a person filled with anger against his fellow man is devoid of charity, and such a person will not be justified by

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204 Ibidem. It is a telling detail that both Jesus Christ and Sirach appear in the same paragraph, and that Sirach’s ‘wisdom’ seems to built on the one of ‘our Saviour’ (‘Servator nostrer Christus Iesus’).


206 Cf. below.

207 In the Calvinist Bible, these are the letters of James, two letters of Peter, three letters of John (the Apostle), and the letter of Judas; in the Lutheran Bible, the *Catholic Letters* comprise the letters of James and Judas only. For the letter of James cf. Camerlynck A., “Epistle of St James”, in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (dig., retrieved 16 May 2012).


God: ‘Ira enim viri iustitiam Dei non operatur, teste Iacobo’.210 At another place in the “remedia theologica” Weyer calls a certain piece of advice from James’s letter ‘pious’ (pie).211 Another telling detail is the fact that Weyer has systematically lowered the self-consciousness of his religious meditator. Weyer avoided ascribing to him an independent judgement, or a self-conscious trust in God’s grace, based on the conviction of belonging to the chosen ones (electi). Instead, Weyer returned to the well-known authorities of the Christian—i.e. Catholic—Church, and above all the Church Fathers: with respect to the theory of emotions and their theological therapy, Weyer’s attitudes and sentences are basically identical to those of Saint Jerome, Saint Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory, Basil, and Chrysostomus.

Since Weyer did not believe that it was possible to radically ‘kill’ or ‘eradicate’ anger completely, only to dampen it and prevent it from bursting into violent action, he designed religious meditations that would work in this direction. In these meditations the individual generally displays a more humble and modest attitude than he does in the philosophical exercises. The meditator is not convinced that striving successfully against anger depends on his own decisions and strength. For example, it would have been easy for Weyer to parallelize the Stoic morning meditation with a Christian one, and the examen conscientiae in the evening with a Christian examen. Weyer, however, replaced it with a daily morning and evening prayer (oratio).212 The agent is not man, but God. In the morning we shall pray to God so that he may control our emotions and save us from sinful behaviour. The relevant prayer is the Pater noster. Its line ‘forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive everyone who is indebted to us’ Weyer interprets as a prayer against anger, in the sense of ‘forgive us our offences, for we ourselves forgive everyone who has offended/injured us’.213


211 Cf. above.


213 Ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 154–155; Op. omn., § 2, p. 859: ‘Remitte nos debita nostra, sicut et nos remittimus debitoribus nostris’; the concept of forgiving injuries/offences is central. It is interesting that in this case, Weyer has not quoted the Vulgate, but preferred Theodor Beza’s translation. This is may be a hint as to his Protestant sympathies, but the reading may also have been chosen with an eye on the concept of forgiving injuries/offences
The *Pater noster* (with its special application to anger) should also be repeated each evening. The above-quoted line has an underlying *do ut des* relation: if we want God to forgive us, we are principally not allowed to burst out in anger against our fellow man, viz. to take revenge. Therefore, we must try to avoid situations that might prompt our irritation.

The fifth part of Weyer’s philosophical exercises, which was focused on counting, weighing, estimating and comparing, has now turned into parallel religious meditations. Instead of comparing the small and ridiculous reasons for anger with its most deplorable results, one shall take into account the relationship between the amount of offence we may experience, and the amount of sin God may remit to us (if we do not take revenge). The conclusion of this estimation can only be that it is more than worthwhile not to take revenge, and to forgive one’s fellow men. And, in order to internalize this conclusion, Weyer asks us to meditate on the authoritative sentence of *Joshua ben Sirach*: ‘Forgive your fellow man his offences, and your sins will be forgiven’.\(^214\)

Maybe the most important and powerful exercise among Weyer’s theological remedies against anger is the *meditation on Christ’s Passion*.\(^215\) In a marked difference from Luther’s method, Weyer asks the meditator to identify with Christ and engage in a profound *imitatio Christi*. If Christ was able to take so many and such heavy offences, even torture and a painful death, without getting angry at his persecutors, it should be easy for us to accept much less severe offence. Weyer concludes the exercise with an emotional appeal to ‘take one’s cross each day, and follow’ Christ, just as Jesus had asked his disciples.\(^216\) The fact that Weyer preferred the text as transmitted by Luke indicates that he designed the *imitatio Christi* meditation as a daily exercise.\(^217\) One should vividly imagine each day that one carries the cross (just as Christ did) to the place of one’s execution; i.e. one should imagine that one experiences the most terrible verbal and physical injuries, pain, torture, and in the end even a shameful death. The goal of the exercise is *self-denial* (‘abnegatio sui ipsius’), just as

\(^214\) Sirach 28, 2.
\(^217\) Only *Lucas* 9, 23 has the reading ‘cotidie’ (‘daily’).

(the Latin ‘remitte’—‘to remit’—expresses this better than the *Vulgate*’s reading ‘dimitte’, which most appropriately renders the meaning ‘to release debts’ [*debita*]).
Christ demanded from his disciples. Weyer considered it the most effective exercise in order to strive against anger and prevent one from taking revenge.\footnote{Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 157; Op. omn., § 6, p. 861: ‘In abnegatione suiipsius vincitur inprimis irae motus et vindictae libido, atque crucem ferendo quamcunque adversitatem citra ullum animi rancorem tumoremve patienter toleramus’}

This is a profoundly Catholic exercise, omnipresent in late medieval spiritual exercises, such as Thomas of Kempen’s *Imitatio Christi* (111, 32), and in monastic theology. The meditation on Christ’s Passion was considered the *via regia* of conversion and spiritual progress. It has no real equivalent in Weyer’s Neostoic exercises. Moreover, its design has little to do with Stoic meditations, because it is built on a very strong emotionalization of the self, followed by total self-denial. The meditation on Christ’s Passion, however, is conceived as an antidote against the pride of Stoic autarky and the arrogance of the Stoic sage, who—in absolute control of himself—may feel himself to be a king, as the well-known Stoic paradox indicates. And this is, in general, the sense Weyer attached to his theological meditations: they are meant to serve as a supplement to the philosophical and Stoic exercises, and as a *correctivum* at the same time. Weyer’s theological supplement is a Neo-Stoic instrument *par excellence*: it is designed to merge Stoicism with Christianity.

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