Chapter 1

Introduction: Discourses of Anger in the Early Modern Period

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‘It seems fair to say that “being angry” is in many respects like “having mumps”,’ writes J.L. Austin, best known for his theory of the performative speech act, in response to the question ‘How do you know that a man is angry?’ ‘It is,’ he continues, a description of a whole pattern of events, including occasion, symptoms, feeling and manifestation, and possibly other factors besides. It is silly to ask “What, really, is anger itself?” as to attempt to fine down “the disease” to some one chosen item’.1

Austin’s judgement holds all the more true for the early modern period, when anger was regarded as a social emotion, one that consisted of physical symptoms as much as of psychological emotions, of conscious action as much as spontaneous reaction. Various discourses in the early modern period were interested in different aspects of anger, some more in its roots and its psychology, others more in its social consequences, thus construing notions of anger that were tied to a palette of religious, political, and cultural concerns. It is against this background that the contributions in this volume aim at mapping perceptions and expressions of anger in the early modern period by describing and analysing the specific notions of anger that were brought about by discourses such as law, theology, politics and diplomacy, medicine, the arts, and literature.

While there has been an international upsurge of interest in the historical study of emotions in recent years, the phenomenon of anger in the early modern period has not yet received the attention the complexity of the phenomenon would merit. What is more, anger, which has traditionally been described as being informed by a tension between emotion and rationality, is not a perfect fit with the focus on the psychology of emotions (as reason’s counterpart) that has prevailed in recent years.2 Current research into the emotions mainly

2 Cf. e.g. Demmerling C. – Landweer H., Philosophie der Gefühle. Von Achtung bis Zorn (Stuttgart: 2007).
aims at revaluating the field of affects and emotions vis-à-vis the traditional philosophical focus on rationality. Influential new theories, such as that put forward by António Damásio, take a post-Cartesian notion of emotion as their starting point, only to counter it by citing recent neuro-physiological insights that vouch for a connection or even mutual dependence of emotionality and rationality. What approaches in this vein do not acknowledge is the fact that it was precisely the intertwining of rationality and affect that informed notions of anger from antiquity to the early modern period. The notion of anger, however, has since been subject to a fundamental process of transformation, and modern anger is but a homonym of its early modern counterpart. It may well be argued that no other psychological concept has been subject to such a drastic change as that of anger.

Some Milestones in the History of Anger

While they may have been contested by later commentators, it is Aristotle’s influential definitions, given in the Nicomachian Ethics and the Rhetoric, that serve as the point of reference for most later developments. Aristotle construes anger as the desire for revenge for a perceived slight (oligoria). Conceived thus, anger joins pain and pleasure together, as it roots in pain suffered, but results in the pleasurable anticipation of sweet revenge. This is combined with a complex model of social roles because anger can only be sensed and acted upon by those who are slighted by a lower ranking person. The sensually perceived agitation that results from the suffered slight depends on an instantaneous judgement of the social status of the people involved: being insulted by a higher-ranking person is not a (legitimate) reason for anger. Also, anger depends on the other’s intention to insult. The insulting person needs to be someone who is not entitled to insult, and the act needs to be intentional. Anger is always directed towards a specific person, and the revenge it involves is nothing but the re-establishment of a perturbed hierarchical order. Pleasure results from the hope to be able to get revenge; it is, as Aristotle says, pleasurable to imagine the accomplishment of what one desires (cf. Aristotle, Rhetorica, 11, 2, 1). Revenge is sweet, but it is not limited to personal satisfaction, but rather serves a greater good.

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While anger is characterised by at least two inner tensions in Aristotle’s concept—in that it unites pain and pleasure as well as emotional agitation and complex judgement—it is generally seen in a positive light. Other philosophical schools of antiquity, however, rejected anger radically. Whereas Aristotle stressed that anger is a just reaction to social misbehaviour that threatened the social order, other schools did not welcome it as acceptable social behaviour. Epicurus and his school held that anger, just as sorrow and fear, could not be reconciled with the pursuit of a happy life. Only insofar as man gets rid of these weaknesses is he able to be on par with the gods and live his finite life as happily as the gods live theirs in eternity. The Stoics insisted that anger had to be suppressed at the smallest hint of emotional disturbance in order to liberate oneself from the perturbation by affects, the first and most important tool for achieving the good life (apatheia).

Christianity integrated Stoic teachings from very early on, yet had to reconcile them with an Old Testament God who let humanity suffer his anger, as well as a New Testament Son of God who, in the Sermon on the Mount, taught his disciples to turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:39) but who also gave in to violent rage when faced with the money changers in the temple (Matthew 21:12). Homogenising and synthesising these contradictory aspects proved an almost insurmountable challenge for the Church Fathers. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Lactantius struggled to explain how God’s anger could be reconciled with his perfection. Philo of Alexandria is credited with the solution that God’s anger was free from affect: ira Dei was construed as essentially different from human anger in that it was generally just and free from affective perturbation. This notion of godly anger became so widely accepted that, in the Middle Ages, the day of judgement, thus the final act of divine justice, could be termed dies irae without any sense of contradiction. Human anger was in turn discussed with a view to its regulation. Basil the Great described human rage as a type of mental incapacity and developed a programme of anger management that echoed Stoic positions—only that it was not reason

that was supposed to tame anger, but faith. At the same time, Basil describes anger as a pharmakon to be employed against sinners: in this one regard man was encouraged to mirror divine anger. But the Fathers were not unanimous: Gregory Nazianzen, for example, disapproves of anger as an obstacle on the way to God.9

Under Pope Gregory I, anger was ranked among the capital sins, yet the chief theological work of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologica, largely avoids the discussion of anger as a sin and focuses on anger as an affect (Ia–IIae, q. 46–48). Thomas actually follows Aristotle so closely that his discussion has been characterised as an ‘apologia pro ira’.10 Of crucial importance to his position is that anger requires an act of reason, that it is a natural behaviour of man, that it resembles the good more than hatred, and that it reflects a natural need for justice.

This very brief summary of some influential positions is indicative of how contradictory Christian notions of anger were—and to what degree they required interpretation: ‘a conceptual dilemma for anyone who thought about it’, as Barbara Rosenwein has put it.11 Yet it was these diverse and contradictory traditions that formed the normative grid to which early modern notions related and into which they needed to fit. The delicate distinction between just and sinful anger is encapsulated in the oft-quoted exhortation by the Apostle Paul to the Ephesians: ‘In your anger do not sin!’ (Ephesians 4:26–27). Thus interpretation and judgement are called for, but the question of where just anger ends and excessive rage begins could never be definitely solved.

Early modern anger is thus informed by fundamental paradoxes: first, anger motivates the seeking of revenge in the service of restoring social order; at the same time, the fight against one’s own anger is perceived as exceedingly difficult. Second, the primary function of anger is the defence of an individual’s social position; at the same time, it is seen as a self-destructive force. Thus while anger is credited with a systemic value with a view to society as a whole, it was the individual’s wellbeing that was under threat, and the identification of techniques and instruments for placating, moderating, and taming anger became an issue of utmost concern to many commentators.

This complicated notion of anger was even further complicated by long-term transformations that affected the intellectual framework of the early

modern period. It was shaped by long-term transformations of received traditions and philosophical systems: Aristotelianism was attacked as a philosophical system, first and foremost in conjunction with an attack on scholasticism; at the same time, Aristotelian positions gained normative force in the field of poetics. Religious factioning engendered concurrent theologies and, in their vein, competing doctrines of moral philosophy; the rediscovery of classical philosophical doctrines, first pushed by the humanists, had to reconcile diametrically opposed positions (such as the Stoa and Scepticism), but these positions were also creatively transformed and connected with existing Christian teachings in partly surprising ways. Against this background, anger became the object of new processes of negotiation which were not limited to learned debates. Rather, anger was conceived and discussed in specific ways in politics, pastoral care, medicine, art, and literature, giving rise to powerful concepts and norms.

While the early modern period was characterised by an attempt to deal with doctrinal tensions through subtle adjustments and continuous debate, the eighteenth century saw a radical transformation of notions of anger. The desire for revenge was definitively discarded as a *movens* for anger and replaced by concepts that focus on the disturbance of the ego, as Johannes F. Lehmann has shown in his comprehensive study. Anger became, for the first time, a purely psychological problem. It was no longer a social phenomenon, but rather an inner experience of the individual. This ‘inward turn’ of anger marks end of an era, and the end of the time frame covered in this volume.

**The Contributions in this Volume**

Despite a markedly increased interest in the history of emotions in recent years, anger in the early modern period has not yet been studied in interdisciplinary collaboration. While several ground-breaking studies and collective volumes on Greek and Roman antiquity and also a series of works on the Middle Ages

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exist, the early modern period has not been awarded the attention it deserves. This is all the more surprising given the wealth of materials (admittedly, the host of unedited sources may well be an obstacle) and the fact that modern lines of thinking on the nature of the emotions emanated from early modern positions.\textsuperscript{15} Recent volumes have put together chapters on a range of affects and emotions without acknowledging the particular nature of anger;\textsuperscript{16} others operate with an anthropologically generalised notion of anger that does not do justice to early modern lines of thought.\textsuperscript{17}

The contributions in this volume investigate the transformations of anger with a view to the specific discursive fields in which the notion figures in the early modern period. These discourses include philosophy and theology, poetry, medicine, law, political theory, and art. The contributions converge in the aim of mapping out the discursive networks in which anger featured and how they all generated their own version, assessment, and semantics of anger. They investigate how literary and non-literary texts, religious practice, and scholarly controversies themselves contributed to shaping the notion of anger.

The following overarching questions have guided the contributors’ approach to the topic:

- Notions of anger: Which philosophical and theological traditions inform particular notions of anger? Which concepts of anger are presupposed by specific texts or images? Do these texts and images integrate competing notions of anger or do they betray preferences for certain schools of thought? Are different approaches valued differently, resulting in new hierarchies?
- The morality of anger: How is anger judged with a view to moral precepts in different contexts? How and with regard to which aspects is anger denounced as a sin? How grave is the sin of anger and where does it rank in the hierarchy of sins in various religious denominations? Which problems and cases are characteristically discussed in which discourse?

• Social consequences of anger: Which social functions are attributed to anger in different contexts? Did authors of the early modern period defend positive effects of anger in and for society? What is the relation between anger and the social order? Which expectations and fears were linked with anger?

The End of Early Modern Anger

The volume opens with a contribution by Johannes F. Lehmann on the transformation of the concept and the discourse of wrath and anger that took place in Germany in the eighteenth century. The definitions of anger that prevailed from antiquity (Aristotle, Seneca, etc.) to the early modern period (Descartes, Bacon, Thomasius, etc.), conceive of anger as the result of pain or suffering inflicted by way of an injury and therefore as a pleasurable desire for revenge. In the eighteenth century, this concept was fundamentally transformed. The core element of the Aristotelian definition—desire for revenge—was replaced, or at least displaced, by the individual’s feeling of being blocked or hampered. Instead of lusting for revenge, the resulting energetic impulse is now directed toward resisting frustration. For Kant, anger is a fright that all of a sudden incites all forces of resistance. One of the main reasons for this change is the concept of feeling (Gefühl), which became a key concept of human psychology during the last third of the eighteenth century. In the course of this development, anger was partially removed from the social sphere and came to be primarily located in the individual’s interiority.

Anger Management in Early Modern Philosophical Discourses

The early modern period ascribed eminent importance to the mastering, moderating, and managing of anger and dedicated a lot of space to the topic in philosophical and theological debates. Many commentators have linked this to the severe religious and political tensions that informed the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The sixteenth century in particular saw a marked interest in Stoic philosophy. Several twentieth-century scholars such as Gerhard Oestreich, Günter Abel, and Mark Morford saw this as evidence for a coherent philosophical movement that was termed “Neostoicism”, allegedly founded, masterminded, and headed by the Dutch humanist Justus Lipsius.

Several contributions in this volume are concerned with debates about anger management and the renewed interest in the Stoic doctrine of affects.
Karl Enenkel studies the case of the treatise *De ira morbo* (1577) by the German physician Johann Weyer. According to Weyer, anger is one of the most urgent problems of his age. Thus he dedicates his treatise on *ira* entirely to anger management. As a physician, he combines medicine with philosophy, viz. Galen’s doctrines with an intensive reception of ancient Stoic thought, especially Seneca’s *De ira*. Nevertheless, the philosophical, psychological, and theological parts of his work turn out to be much more important than the medical part. Most interestingly with respect to the management of emotions, Weyer developed ideas very similar to Lipsius’s *De constantia*, but some eight to ten years earlier. Compared to Lipsius’s *De constantia*, Weyer’s *De ira morbo* is at least as “Neostoic” or Stoic as are Lipsius’s teachings. However, so far this has not been noted in the discussions on Neostoicism, on Neostoic views of the emotions, or Lipsius’s *De constantia*. This indicates that the conventional image of the Neostoic movement, founded by Lipsius, may be in need of revision.

The evidence suggests that the reception of the Stoa happened on a much broader basis and was not as homogenous as has been claimed. Also, Lipsius’s role as a trailblazer may have been overestimated. What have been considered the basics of Neostoicism—the reconciliation of ancient Stoicism with determinism as the denial of free will, Fate’s superiority to God as the principle of natural and everlasting order, materialism, and the denial of contingency—turns out to be less specific, less homogeneous, and, in part, even less relevant.

On the one hand, similar attempts at synthesizing Christian with “Stoic” concepts can already be found in the Church Fathers; on the other, the answers given by the so-called “Neostoics” do not always address the above-mentioned concepts and problems. The case of anger exemplifies this. The Stoic idea of radically “killing” the emotion of *ira* based on a one-sided emphasis on *ratio* differs considerably from Christian positions. However, as Karl Enenkel and Jan Papy demonstrate in their contributions, while both Lipsius in *De constantia* and Weyer in *De ira morbo* focused on reintroducing and adapting the radical Stoic doctrine of killing the emotions, both departed from Seneca’s therapy of the passions, and both regarded control of the emotions as a major remedy against the public calamities of their times.

As Jan Papy’s contribution shows, it is rewarding to take into account the Jesuit approach to anger, in particular the ideas of Lipsius’s close acquaintance Martin Antonio Del Rio. What is the early modern Christian view adopted by the Jesuits when dealing with ancient Stoic ideas on anger and the passions, and how does Lipsius react to it? So far, modern scholarship has focused on Lipsius’s reception of ancient Stoicism, but less so with the early modern reactions Lipsius’s ideas provoked. Michael Krewet’s paper deals with Descartes’
reaction by tracing the premises of his doctrine of anger back to ancient Stoic doctrines as well as to Lipsius’s Neostoic concepts, and shows how Descartes construed his own notion of anger within this Stoic framework.

Michel de Montaigne appears to be relying on Plutarch in his essay “De la colère” (II, 31), but his take on anger management is equally informed by Senecan concepts. As Anita Traninger shows, Montaigne chooses an unusual angle for his reflections on anger in that he contemplates his role as the head of a household, suggesting that anger is almost inevitable when dealing with the subordinate members of a maison. While this differs from his contemporaries’ predominant focus on princely anger, Montaigne is still very much in line with mainstream views that advocate the bridling of one’s anger as an absolute necessity.

Anger management was also a core concern in the field of religious didactics. What is interesting here is the question of how medical approaches to regulating anger relate to meditative or spiritual practices that aim at calming the agitated spirit. Prayer had been appreciated as a remedy for anger since Gregory Nazianzen, and pastoral care was particularly concerned with the treatment of excessive anger. In this vein, the above-mentioned Weyer not only joined Stoic with Christian practices of meditation, with, e.g., a view to the daily examination of one’s conscience (examen conscientiae), but also designed his own theological anger therapy that clearly shows some Catholic traits. This is all the more remarkable as Weyer has been labelled a Protestant by some historians.

A pastoral concern with anger is also evident in the work of William Perkins, one of the most influential figures in Puritanism. Perkins developed a taxonomy of the different types of anger that ranged from sinfulness to virtue in some social situations, as shown by David Barbee in his contribution. To date, most of the scholarly work related to Puritanism and the expression of emotion has revolved around Puritan religious experience, particularly conversion. Although anger posed a very real question in the exposition of Puritan practical divinity, it has received scant scholarly attention. This is not because Puritans neglected to discuss anger. In fact, the Puritans saw anger a multifaceted issue that demanded analysis from a number of perspectives. Discourses of anger functioned on three levels in Puritan thought and practice. First, the question was broached by considering the expression of divine anger. Christological doctrine gave the matter a finer point by compelling Puritans to discuss the question of Christ’s perfected human emotions. This foreshadows the final layer wherein Puritans addressed anger as a concern for spirituality. The topic of anger provides a different perspective on traditional Puritan concerns related to soteriology and the assurance of salvation.
Learned Debates About Anger

Early modern learned debates about anger were informed by bigger patterns of intellectual transformation. Humanists, for example, argued against scholastic notions of anger, sometimes by stressing sensuality over rationality. This is the topic of John Nassichuk's case study of the philosophical treatises of the Neapolitan Humanist, Neoplatonist, and Neoaristotelian Giovanni Pontano, which focuses in particular on the works *De fortitudine* and *De immanitate*. By presenting a general account of the Neapolitan humanist's treatment of anger, one that remains directly related to the Quattrocento theories of human misery and dignity, Nassichuk further examines Pontano's recurrent use of the theme in his description of the final limits separating “human” and “animal” behaviour.

Humoural pathology was at the centre of a debate among Scandinavian scholars about berserkers which covered antiquarianism, psychology, and an assessment of the pagan. Bernd Roling's contribution deals with the fascinating Nordic Saga literature that confronted early modern antiquarians with the strange phenomenon of the berserkers. How could their extreme anger be explained? Were the heroes of the “Egils saga” or the “Hervarar saga”, as some early editors like Olaus Verelius in the seventeenth century suggested, obsessed by demons? Was the devil responsible for the extreme rage of the northern warriors? In the early eighteenth century, different and more naturalistic explanations were brought forward: maybe berserkers were suffering from a strange mental disease, as Jon Eiriksson suggested. The knowledge of Lapponia and the religions of Inner Asia finally made another model attractive for Scandinavian scholars: berserkers were taking extracts of toadstools or mushrooms to become ecstatic, as Samuel Oedmann, a student of Linné, proposed. Roling's paper reconstructs the early modern debate on berserkers as a part of the history of early demonology and medicine.

Writings on anger by Scottish philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are testimony to the intertwining of natural and moral philosophy, and these two fields in turn form a bridge to the physiology of anger. By exploring various theoretical discourses on anger in Enlightenment Scotland, Tamás Demeter demonstrates that various branches of theoretical inquiry were intertwined in such a way that different layers of discourse exerted influence on each another: physiological discourses were filled with hidden moral meaning and religious content, and vice versa. Thus discourses on the natural, psychological, social, and transcendent aspects of human beings exhibited a remarkable conceptual unity in this period, just before they started to develop into specialised fields of knowledge.
Anger in Literary Discourses: Epic and Drama

The *Iliad’s* central narrative of Achilles’s anger established this passion as a powerful *mover* in epic narrative. Is it possible to identify genre-specific notions of anger in early modern literature against this backdrop? Betül Dilmac discusses this question with regard to the Italian debate about the relation between epic and *romanzo,* Christian Peters with a view to Neo-Latin epic.

For the panegyric Latin poet of the fifteenth century, writing an epic poem meant fashioning himself as an imitator of Virgil. Imitating Virgil, in turn, meant having to deal with the depiction of the hero’s anger as well as with the debates and criticism it elicited among humanists, a discussion to which Maffeo Vegio’s supplemental thirteenth book of the *Aeneid* bears particular witness. While the adoption of the Virgilian model to celebrate the person who was both the hero and addressee of the panegyric epic provided a suitable means for the poet to lift his patron and his achievements beyond the scope of contemporary history, he still had to be careful not to draw too close a connection between the humanist assessment of an angry and vengeful Aeneas and the contemporary hero. Christian Peters analyses the depiction of anger and its agents in three major Neo-Latin epics and shows how poets were not only aware of the ambivalent nature of epic anger, but were also able to turn this ambivalence into a powerful literary device for marking the patron-heroes and their enemies as, respectively, deserving winners and losers, thus commenting on contemporary events through epic discourse and the role of anger therein.

Betül Dilmac addresses Tasso’s monumental epic *La Gerusalemme liberata.* The narrative centre of this text is the representation of a historical event that, as such, is worthy of the epic. The choice of title opens up the thematic field of battle and enmity; this field is not only constitutive for the text, but above all defines the domain in which anger as a historical phenomenon and subject of artistic treatment has been located since antiquity. Dilmac shows that *La Gerusalemme liberata* depicts anger on the one hand as a destructive power opposed to rational action, but on the other as a positive force, embedded in reflections on warlike as well as reproductive manhood.

Barbara Sasse Tateo analyses early modern literary representations of anger by pointing out the specific connotations of gender and the specific characteristics of different literary genres. She focuses on the secular dramas of the Nuremberg author Hans Sachs, composed in the mid-sixteenth century, in which an increasing number of angry characters appear. Sasse shows how the

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specific patterns of the dramatic representation of anger reflect notions that are reminiscent of the contemporary discourses of gender. For example, the staging of anger is informed by the misogynist discourse of early bourgeois culture, thus confirming the contemporary gender order. But this construction also undermines the prevalent idea of anger as a typical male characteristic that contrasts with the fundamental passive nature of woman. Both kinds of angry characters receive a pathological connotation: while angry male characters are generally coupled with impulsive rage (prototypical is the “wüterich” Herod), female anger is coupled with the vice of sexual lust (“Geilheit”). As deviant behaviour, anger—and especially female anger—always reveals a failure of the regulative forces of the patriarchal order.

Visual Representations of Anger

There are few mythological characters in the Western cultural tradition who could more aptly represent the quintessence of anger than does Medea. Maria Berbara’s contribution addresses the question of how Medea was represented in the visual arts during the early modern period, and how these representations were connected to traditional discourses on anger. She also explores the ways in which Medea’s iconography relates to ancient literary sources—especially Ovid and Seneca—with a special emphasis on the varying interpretations of her anger.

Anger in Political Discourses

Anger plays a recurring role in the great political and religious conflicts in early modern Europe. Little attention has so far been given to what was supposed to happen after the conflicts subsided. Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen thus looks at how the early moderns understood the nature of reconciliation. Early modern diplomats, who may have been expected to act in a conciliatory manner, had a surprisingly complex relationship with anger. While instruction manuals taught the *art de plaire*, as was to be expected, they also taught the intentional provocation of anger in order to tempt high-ranking officials to reveal precious secrets while in a state of excitement and loss of control. Anger is thus used as a generator of truth, and in turn diplomats were advised to consciously employ anger if it helped them in accomplishing their mission, as Tilman Haug shows in his contribution. And anger was certainly an issue at the highest echelons of society as well: taking the cases of the sultans Süleyman I and Selim as examples, Zeynep Yelçê discusses the legitimacy of princely anger in the Ottoman Empire.
INTRODUCTION: DISCOURSES OF ANGER

Studying seventeenth-century French diplomats and ministers, Tilman Haug analyses the ways in which anger was perceived as a “political emotion”. Haug shows how displaying anger was on the one hand deemed inappropriate in the light of concepts of negotiation emphasizing politeness and subtle manipulation, while on the other hand provoking anger could be considered instrumental in uncovering true intentions or establishing emotional commitment. Furthermore, early modern concepts of princely representation could, despite the moderate demeanour they demanded, justify anger and even violence, when princely honour was at stake or an ambassador’s personal honour was compromised. Nevertheless, such practices of anger frequently entailed elaborate narratives of justification. Practicing disruptive anger could also be regarded as indicating prospects of lasting cooperation and thus strengthen political relations—provided it was performed by allies and clients towards the representatives of rival powers.

Van Dijkhuizen’s article reflects on the historical origins of the modern preoccupation with remorse-based forgiveness as a road to reconciliation, and asks whether this particular model of interpersonal reconciliation is peculiar to the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and whether its roots can be discerned in earlier historical eras. If remorse-based forgiveness is peculiar to the modern era, moreover, what alternative reconciliation paradigms were available in early modernity, and what transformations were necessary to lend forgiveness its cultural dominance in the modern world? Van Dijkhuizen argues that early modern culture thought of reconciliation primarily in terms of clemency and oblivion. Both are linked intrinsically to the Christian idea of anger control and the suppression of resentment. The role of heartfelt remorse as a starting point for reconciliation, by contrast, was at best limited. At the same time, the idea that remorse can have an important role to play in interpersonal reconciliation was beginning to be explored in literary texts; a brief reading of four Shakespeare plays serves as a case study. Likewise, the origins of the idea that victim and perpetrator share a common humanity, central to the modern idea of remorse-based forgiveness, can be traced back to the early modern era if not even further.

Zeynep Yelçe’s article explores the notion of anger in the Ottoman context of the early modern world. Focusing on the actions of Sultan Mehmed II (d. 1481) and the representations thereof over a period of approximately 150 years, she traces the conditions, manifestations, and expressions of wrath in contemporary chronicles and works on ethics and seeks to explain the role of “wrath” in shaping, reinforcing, and perpetuating the image and the authority of the Ottoman sultan. Issues concerning legitimate causes and manifestations of anger, the relationship between wrath and mercy, and responses to anger in collective memory are among the main points discussed in this contribution.
Transcultural Notions of Anger

With its focus on the Ottoman Empire, Yelçê's contribution prepares the ground for the concluding paper of the volume, a study of anger and rage in traditional Chinese culture. Paolo Santangelo takes the Chinese equivalents of anger and rage (怒, 氣, 怒/憤, 恨) as well as their symbolic and idiomatic expressions as the starting point for a comprehensive survey article.

Santangelo aims at reconstructing an anthropological description of the emotion of anger in late imperial China with a view to both social roles and gender. While anger may be considered one of the basic emotions, common to the affective experience of human beings, it still reflects the cultural background and values of each society and culture. Anger-like emotions are amongst the most frequently described feelings in the Chinese sources, which testifies to a marked interest in the social and individual problems they entail. The descriptions of manifestations of anger demonstrate that traditionally Chinese people were not as self-controlled as some reports tend to state. Rather, anger is portrayed as a psychophysical reaction, involving indignant posture, a stern look, impudent manners, the grinding of one's teeth, and gestures of hands and feet. Anger is also described as entailing various degrees of aggressiveness, from cursing and abusing others to quarrelling and making trouble. Chinese medicine contributes to the representation of anger and its bodily roots and somatisation. Its main ambiguity lies in its contradictory evaluation: anger may be condemned for its disruptive effects on personal health and on social relations, its excessive violence, and loss of human dignity. But it may also be praised as a moral and justified reaction, as a quest for justice (if it is the adequate attitude in a certain the situation), and even the source of inspiration for writing.

Selected Bibliography


