China-‘Pakistan’-Russia Triangle – A Counter Wave of Obama-Modi Nuclear Deal

von Umer Khayyam

“The enemy of my enemy is my friend”

(Proverb)

The US-India nuclear deal and resultant Indian fissile production in significant quantities from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors, cited elsewhere, unmasked Modi’s hawkish adventurism approach of military doctrine has left negative impacts on the nuclear deterrence and overall stability of South Asia. The treaty brought anxiety in Islamabad and it has compelled Pakistan to develop same advanced nuclear weapons to balance the strategic regional environment. Thus, Islamabad started moving for even more massive retaliation – raising the potential and possibility of accidental use, besides creating alarm in enemy’s lines.
Pakistan, in the aftermaths of Obama-Modi nuclear pact early this year 2015, cooperated attentively with her old ally China and also started looking for other durable options like, Asia’s other influential power Russia, to acquire more advanced nuclear technology for minimum deterrence in the region, likewise to counter the 3:1 conventional power of India. The point of concern remains the best offer(s) for Islamabad to counter the enemy’s recent emerging nuclear cooperation, inflamed by a gradual increase in nuclear arsenals, despite 3% global decrease in arms’ accusation. It has already been confirmed that India has expanded not only her nuclear weapons’ production capabilities but also developing new missile delivery systems (sipri.org/yearbook).

It has rotated a new wave of diplomatic and defence relations for: a) Look-for and strength ‘co-operators’ for advanced nuclear technology. b) New customers under ‘producer-consumer-PC’ model, at the regional level, in the eve of countering the disturbed strategic environment of South-Asia.

A). So, under the ‘co-operators model’, the arena of bilateral cooperation has changed and is still changing gradually from ‘producer-consumer-PC’ to partial, if not advanced, a ‘joint cooperation and production-JCP’ of arms’ at international level. Under the JCP, the immediate attempt made by Pakistan has been to get six new nuclear reactors from China. It is done to endorse the already established nuclear link with China. US violation of NSG guidelines – no export of nuclear technology to a second party, actually forced China to openly transfer and Pakistan to acquire the advanced sensitive technology (six nuclear reactors). This offer, however, was justified as next phase of already planted nuclear reactors with a total installed capacity of 3.4 million kilowatts’, established and financed with $6.5 to $9.59 billion by China (Routers.com). Meanwhile, China has further unveiled its plans for new guidelines for Chinese nuclear technology exports to Pakistan. The Sino-Pakistan nuclear link has been well-known even though some specifics are often shrouded in secrecy. But this is reportedly the first time that top officials in Beijing publicly admitted the large scale of Chinese cooperation with Pakistan in nuclear technology.

B). Under the PC model, with intensive shift in East-West power and particularly, after Indian attempt of cooperation with US, Pakistan’s chances of engaging old international rivals became certain. Pakistan after 1969 successfully
lobbied Moscow for joint defense cooperation and nuclear research. It is being the first time after Cold War era between Pakistan and Russia that both the states normalized their political and military relations and came forward for joint ventures. Russia, due to increased tension in its relations with US and European nations, losing share in the western market, sanctions on Russian products and decisive strategy of finding new friends finally considered Pakistan for nuclear technology and arms cooperation. It is followed by the civil nuclear technology to meet the Pakistani demands.

On the eve of finding ways for survival, Moscow has looked at Islamabad for fresh alignments for its interest in South Asian and Middle East. So, to be a strong power in the South-Asian region, Russia started transferring of finished nuclear power plants that were earlier denied due to NPT’s restrictions of not transferring any nuclear power plant from international producers. Ultimately, the transfer of lethal military equipment with Islamabad became the point of discussion and it has entered in the pipeline for achievement. The consecutive deal of lethal MI-35 helicopters is an example of JCP, which was finalized after Pak. Army General’s visit to Moscow in June 2015 (tribune.com.pk). Under the shadow of joint cooperation, the Russian under Rostekh Corporation agreement is also making preparations to build another 680-mile gas pipeline in Pakistan until 2017, with the estimated cost of $2.5 billion (asia.rbth.com).

So, whether its, China or Russia, for Pakistan, it became a win-win situation; balancing of defense relation with international actors, mutual cooperation and transfer of finished sensitive technology at the same time. With close cooperation with China and Russia, also behind the US wrong policy: ‘halfway trust – half way hate’ forced Pakistan to lineup its strategies and enhance its relationships with other nation states. For Russia, ‘enemy of the enemy is a friend’. Whereas, Russia, like US to India, got magnificent position to use Pakistan under the shadow of mistrust between Washington and Islamabad, has looked for another durable and potential user further an open-market supplier of Russian nuclear technology and arms to other third parties in the region.

The changing scenario in South-Asia and Middle East is a clear indication of transferring/selling of advanced nuclear arms to other nations having weak command
and control system. In this regard, Pakistan has already started working with Saudi Arabia, most probably to counter Iranian threat to the Kingdom. Saudis have finalized to buy nuclear weapons from Pakistan under the sewage of go nuclear. For Pakistan, there exists no option than to comply to the producer-consumer equation, as House of Saud financed the Pakistani nuclear missile program for decades, without any secret but such an act surely poison the strategic environment of Middle East. There are still chances of use of nuclear technology by Saudia against other regional players: Turkey, Egypt, Houthis Yemeni tribes and to counter glowing attacks of ISIS (Daesh) in Saudi kingdom. In the east, another case in the discussion is Burma with million-dollar deal of China-Pakistan JF-17 Thunder air jets, a start of war weapons import from Pakistan, which could most probably go beyond. Whereas, in the southeast, Sri-Lanka has also recently finalized its agreement with Pakistan regarding atomic and nuclear technology (thetribune.com.pk).

On its path to technology transfer process, Pakistan has already succeeded internally to step-up for full spectrum deterrence. Whereas, to speed-up the production at home, Pakistan has started an innovative production and enriched of uranium as well plutonium for nuclear weapons with global fastest growing nuclear weapons program. It is to confront rapid emerging threats from India (thediplomate.com). However, the production and advancement of nuclear technology is given a cover of attaining minimum deterrence for stability in the region.

In the struggle of harmonizing the strategic environment, balancing the Indian nuclear capabilities and import of sensitive technology from US compelled Pakistan, having fragile economy with energy and terrorism problems, again to spend nearly US $7.7 billion on defense, which is 11% increase for the FY 2015-16 (defencenews.com). Interestingly, Pakistan growing relation with China and Russia is based on the desire to control the region, and to counter the Washington’s growing presence and influence in South Asia, like in India. At the Pakistan’s northern boarder, China finally stepped more openly with its advanced strategy of going global, could also be for a new world order, with advanced penetration in the region and whole world while starting from neighboring states.
AUTOR:
Umer Khayyam
Umer Khayyam ist Doktorand am Institut für Politikwissenschaft. Er promoviert zu den FATA in Pakistan.

HERAUSGEBER:
Prof. Dr. Susanne Feske, ifpol
Prof. Dr. Susanne Feske ist Professorin für die Politik Südostasiens am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Uni Münster. Ihre Forschungsschwerpunkte sind China, Japan und Südostasien, Rüstungskontrolle in Asien sowie die Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen.

Katharina Glaab M.A., ifpol
Katharina Glaab hat Politikwissenschaft, Sinologie und Geschichte in Münster und Peking studiert und forscht zu China und Ostasien, Energie- und Sicherheitspolitik.

Björn Goldstein M.A., ifpol
Björn Goldstein hat Politikwissenschaft und Sinologie in Bochum und Münster studiert und promoviert zu „Verwestlichung“ in Tamil Nadu (Indien).

Stephan Engelkamp M.A., ifpol
Stephan Engelkamp hat Politikwissenschaft, Geschichte und Kommunikationswissenschaft in Münster und Straßburg studiert und promoviert an der Graduate School of Politics Münster zu traditionellen Herrschaftskonzepten in Südostasien.

KONTAKT:
WESTFÄLISCHE WILHELMS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNSTER
INSTITUT FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT
Scharnhorststraße 100, 48151 Münster
Sekretariat: (0251) 83 – 29357, Telefax: (0251) 83 - 29356
Durchwahl: (0251) 83 – 25319, Telefon (privat): (0251) 2652068
Email: feske@uni-muenster.de,
Internet: www.ifpol.de