

Focus and Tune in Discourse

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We use data involving two distinct *tunes* to argue that received notions to analyse information structure (IS), e.g. givenness, alternative semantics, or question-under-discussion (Schwarzschild, 1999; Rooth, 1992; Roberts, 2012), are insufficient. Based on the confounding data we propose a discourse model for IS.


The following utterance is, in a fixed context, felicitous with a fall-rise tune, but infelicitous with a falling tune.¹

- (1) a. A: Does Paula like Bach?
b. B: She likes Wagner.



audio: <http://jjsch.github.io/audio/wagner-b.m4a>

- (2) a. A: Does Paula like Bach?
#b. B: She likes Wagner.




audio: <http://jjsch.github.io/audio/wagner-b1.m4a>

According to standard theories of IS (see Ishihara and Féry (2016)), *Wagner* is focal in both tunes. But those same theories are not sensitive to tune, so they cannot explain the difference in felicity.

A desideratum for a theory of IS is the prediction that an utterance can only answer *congruent wh*-questions, i.e. questions obtained by substituting a *wh*-element for the focal constituent. That is, annotating focus by underlining, (3b) should be felicitous, but (3b') should be infelicitous. However, we find felicitous intonations of (3b'), e.g. (4b).

- (3) a. A: Who likes Michael?
b. B: Nobody likes Michael.
b.' B: Nobody likes Michael.

- (4) a. A: Who likes Michael?
b. B: Nobody likes Michael.



audio: <http://jjsch.github.io/audio/nobody-b1.m4a>

Moreover, it has been claimed that focus under negation leads to a pragmatic entailment that in the following examples can be paraphrased as *someone (else) does live in Paris* (Kratzer, 1989; Geurts and van der Sandt, 2004). However, this is only the case for the fall-rise tune (5b), but not for the falling tune (6b').

¹All judgements reported here have been verified with both expert and non-expert native English speaker informants.

- (5) a. A: Does Paula live in Paris?
b. B: Paula does not live in Paris.



audio: <http://jjsch.github.io/audio/paula-pitch2-b.m4a>

- (6) a. A: Does Paula like Bach?
b. B: Paula does not live in Paris.



audio: <http://jjsch.github.io/audio/paula-pitch2-b1.m4a>

It seems mistaken to study IS without tune and a rich notion of context. We therefore propose to model focus and tune *jointly* in *discourse*. Briefly, our proposal is as follows:

- The grammar produces a foreground–background pair $\langle f, \varphi \rangle$, where φ features a free variable x of the same semantic type as f , where f is the (unique) focal constituent. E.g. for *Paula likes Wagner* φ is $\llbracket \text{Paula likes} \rrbracket(x)$ and f is $\llbracket \text{Wagner} \rrbracket$ such that x and f have type e .
- φ is interpreted in context as a presupposition, i.e. x is either bound or accommodated as $\exists x$ (van der Sandt, 1992).
- Then, the context is updated with $(\lambda x.\varphi)(f)$, such that:
 - if the tune is fall-rise, this attaches with the discourse relation *Contrast*.
 - if the tune is falling, this attaches with the discourse relation *Elaboration*.

In short, this explains the relevant data as follows.

- The implicature of (5b), *someone lives in Paris*, arises from the semantics of the relation *Contrast*, which is absent from (6b).
- In (4), the *wh*-question triggers a presupposition *someone likes Michael*. The background of (4b) triggers the presupposition x likes Michael with x of type *quantifier*; thus x can be resolved to *someone*. The *Contrast* is validated as, paraphrased, *you think someone likes Michael, but nobody likes him*.
- However, (3b) with a falling tune is infelicitous (as desired), since the *Elaboration* relation cannot be verified: *you think someone likes Michael. ?? In particular, nobody likes him*.
- Similarly, (1) is felicitous while (2) is not, since *liking Bach* and *liking Wagner* can contrast, but cannot elaborate on one another (see Asher and Lascarides (2003)).

In the talk, I will present additional data and expand this account to cover these more fine-grained distinctions.

References

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