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Lennart Gilhaus (lennart.gilhaus@hu-berlin.de), Patrick Sänger (saengerp@uni-muenster.de), and Marian Helm (helmm@uni-muenster.de)

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Desertion, Emotions and Intelligence-Gathering in the Second Punic War – Jorge Barbero Barroso (Autonomous University of Madrid, jorge.barbero@uam.es)

The range of motivations preceding any act of betrayal within the ranks of an army can be remarkably diverse. Greed, resentment, or, more simply, the pure instinct for survival as a means of preserving physical integrity in the face of imminent threat are just some of the factors underlying episodes of desertion and defection that have fueled dissent within the military sphere throughout History. These phenomena carry a dual dimension that renders them particularly perilous for those affected: they not only result in a *de facto* quantitative reduction of an army's forces but also create the risk of sensitive information falling into enemy hands — whether willingly, if the traitor cooperates, or forcibly, through violence, if they do not.
Throughout the history of Rome, and especially during its period of Mediterranean expansion in the Republican era (3rd–1st centuries BCE), the use of deserters and defectors as a means of gathering intelligence was a recurring practice. This is reflected in a wide range of sources from different periods. In the time of the Second Punic War, the use of deserters by both sides was frequent and accounted by different sources, such as Polybius (2nd century BCE), Livy (1st century BCE – 1st century AD), Appian (2nd century AD), or Cassius Dio (2nd century AD – 3rd century AD), to name a few. Our proposal is based on a twofold objective: first, to outline the causes cited in the sources for desertion to enemy forces, contextualizing them within their specific historical settings and addressing aspects that range from strategic decision-making to the emotional pressures placed on individuals subjected to the intense political and military pressure of the war. Second, we aim to analyze these phenomena as sources of information utilized by the various political entities operating within the context of the conflict. At times, these entities employed strategies of coercion or appealed to ideological claims of legitimacy to secure the loyalty of enemy defectors, within a multipolar context marked by the diverse political agendas of the participants.

Spithridates of Phrygia: Mutiny and Defection in Achaemenid Anatolia – Orestis Belogiannis (University of Strasbourg, mpor@hotmail.gr)

The internal structure of the Achaemenid Empire (559 – 329 BC), extending from the Aegean and Egypt to Central Asia and India, has recently become a prolific field of study, as Aramaic, cuneiform and demotic documents coming from the empire itself are being published. Dealing mostly with administrative, social and economic matters, their impact on political history is more limited. However, when supplemented by narrative sources, including classical literature, they can help illuminate the socio-political dynamics that solidified the cohesion of the empire, but also threatened it with disintegration in times of crisis.

One such case is the affair of Spithridates, a Persian dignitary in north-western Phrygia under Darius II and Artaxerxes II (424 – 359/358 BC). Spithridates makes his first appearance in the sources as a stalwart defender of the interests of the Great King in a victorious struggle against a seditious satrap. However, a few decades later, when Achaemenid Anatolia was invaded by a foreign power, Spithridates not only refused to contribute to the effort to repulse the attackers, but even deserted the Persians, joining their enemies instead. Only for a short time, though, as Spithridates defected yet again, trying to integrate himself back to the Achaemenid imperial system.

The aim of this proposal is to examine the case of Spithridates through a critical and comparative study of the available sources under the socio-political circumstances of Achaemenid Phrygia, in an effort to detect the factors that determined Spithridates' fluctuating loyalties in periods of conflict and crisis. Attention will also be brought to the origins and later history of Spithridates' aristocratic house, in order to determine whether similar phenomena of defection and disloyalty can be diachronically observed amidst the Iranian nobility of Persian-dominated Anatolia or whether Spithridates was an isolated case.

'An Adversary is More Hurt by Desertion than by Slaughter': Reconsidering Desertion in Late Republican Warfare – Fabrizio Biglino (University of Turin, f.biglino@unito.it)

The Roman army is one of the most famous and successful armed forces in human history, and its discipline is an element for which it is well-known and proved crucial in many victories. Greek historian Polybius strongly emphasizes the ruthless discipline of the Roman war machine while, by the time of later authors such as Sallust or Livy, the official version claimed that roman soldiers never surrender. After all, it was this martial ethos that led Rome to conquer the whole Mediterranean world. Nevertheless, being a war-faring nation, Rome was no stranger to military setbacks and, just like any other army in history, had to invest considerable energies in preserving the discipline of its soldiers particularly against the issue of desertion.

While this is something traditionally not associated with the Roman army, as said due to its historical reputation, it is something that its commanders actually had to deal with on a rather constant basis, to the point that instances of desertion and punishment inflicted to contrast and prevent this issue are reported rather often in the sources.

Through this paper, it is my aim to examine the overall portrayal of desertion within the Republican army, and particularly its perception during the conflicts of the first century. It is no coincidence that during this period soldiers are portrayed at their worst by the literary evidence: lacking the discipline and virtues of their forefathers and being motivated primarily by greed. By examining case studies from the Sertorian War and the civil war, it is my intention to highlight how desertion became so common, even expected, that Roman commanders started to use it as a tactic against their enemies.

DOUBLE-DEALING, DESERTION, OR PLANS FOR LOCAL POWER? A 'Dynasty of Traitors' across the Troubled Mediterranean Satrapies of the Achaemenid Empire in the Early 4th Century B.C. – Vittorio Cisnetti (University of Bologna, vittorio.cisnetti2@unibo.it)

In the year 400 B.C., the Persian King, Artaxerxes II, had to face the attempt to the throne of his brother, Cyrus. Shortly afterwards, he strived for years to quell the ongoing unrests along his Mediterranean possessions.
According to the Greek sources, shifts of allegiances and alliances appear to have been regularly on the agenda at that time. A substantial case was that of Tamos, who, according to Thucydides, had been an adjoint of Tissaphernes in Ionia during the final years of the Peloponnesian War. Lately, Xenophon reports that the same Tamos acted as a naval commander under Cyrus, trying unsuccessfully to avert Artaxerxes' punishment after Cunaxa.
Tamos' son, Glos, fought for Cyrus, too, but then immediately switched to Artaxerxes. Years later, Diodorus Siculus mentions Glos' feats during the «Cypriot War» of the 380s, in which he featured prominently as «admiral» of the King's fleet under Tiribazus. Yet, fearing the latter's decline in the King's favours, Glos is said to have ultimately fled the Persian camp at Cyprus and gathered money and ships towards his 'homebase' in Ionia, while «allying» with Egypt and Sparta.
Still, after his murder, another man named Tachos (probably his son) held on with Glos' naval forces in Ionia, at least until the early 370s.
Looking at these figures' careers and (dis)services to the Persians may, therefore, contribute to show how the distinctions between treason, desertion, and 'double-dealing' are a blurred matter in ancient military history. Indeed, the longstanding aims and means of Tamos' family met strategic criteria: they were passed down from father to son and were firmly rooted in a specific territory (the Ionian coast) and in specific posts (high naval offices).
Besides, this 'dynastic' sequence sheds light on the troubled sceneries of the Western satrapies and on the functioning of the Persian navies.

Rebel Soldiers: Septimius Severus and Military Policy – Giovanni Esposito (University of Turin, giovanni.esposito@unito.it)

From the end of the 2nd century A.D. the conflict between senatorial power and military authority intensified. The events following the assassination of Pertinax marked a turning point,

with a delegitimization of the Senate in the choice of the new emperor, in favour of the predominant role of the armies in the different parts of the empire.
The rise of Septimius Severus during the civil wars of A.D. 193-197 was mainly determined by the support of the Illyrian and Danubian troops that ensured his triumph. However, a closer analysis of the ancient sources shows that the support of the armies towards Severus was not always unconditional. On the contrary, the soldiers displayed opportunistic, mercenary-like attitudes, subordinating their loyalty to continuous demands for donations, accompanied by the threat of abandoning the battlefield.
With Severus's first entry into Rome came the supremacy of the army, witnessed using the term *seditio* by the biographer of the *Historia Augusta* in the *Vita Severi* (7:6-7; 8:9) meaning 'tumult' or 'insurrection'. Episodes of military insubordination are documented on several occasions: during the battle of Nicaea (A.D. 194), soldiers abandoned the camp at the sight of Pescennius Niger (Dio Cass. 74,6,6); similar behaviour occurred at the battle of Lyons (A.D. 197), where troops retreated in the face of Clodius Albinus' armies (Dio Cass.75,6,7). Finally, during the second siege of Hatra (198 A.D.), the soldiers refused to attack the city wall, which had been repaired during the night by the Hatreni (Dio Cass. 75,12,3).
These episodes of insubordination contrast with the idealised image of *Concordia militum* celebrated on monetary issues. This contribution, in summary, aims to analyse the riots that characterised Septimius Severus' troops, relating them to the prince's military policy, based on the concepts of *Concordia* and *Fides*.

On the Desertion of the Macedonians at Thucydides 4.124.4 - 128.5 – Edith Foster (The College of Wooster, edithmfoster@gmail.com)

In the summer of 423 BCE the Spartan commander Brasidas was assisting his Macedonian ally, king Perdiccas, in a campaign against neighboring enemies, when the Macedonians fled from their camp, leaving Brasidas and his Greek forces to defend themselves against superior numbers of Thracian and Illyrian attackers.
Thucydides describes the causes of the Macedonian panic and flight, relating on the one hand that the supposedly friendly Illyrians had unexpectedly defected to Perdiccas' enemies and on the other that Perdiccas and Brasidas were at that same time quarreling (4.125.1). The large Macedonian force was therefore at this point both frightened of their new enemies and lacking in clear orders. Believing that large numbers of Illyrians were all but upon them, they panicked and fled when night fell, forcing Perdiccas to follow their flight.
In Thucydides' account the panicked Macedonians were in error: their enemies were not as close to them as they feared. Moreover, they pay a double penalty for their flight, since the Illyrians attack and kill many from the Macedonians' disordered ranks when they do arrive on the next day (4.127.2) and the angry Greeks destroy or seize the materiel and animals that the Macedonians have jettisoned in their flight (4.128.4). This destruction of property causes Perdiccas to hate the Spartans, and a political rift between Macedon and Sparta ensues.
This paper will first review Thucydides' complex narrative of this desertion, and then ask what evaluations of actions and persons this desertion narrative provokes. For instance: Are the

Macedonians 'typical barbarians', a foil for the discipline that allows the Greeks to survive? And why does Perdiccas hate the Greeks who destroyed his property, rather than the Illyrians who defected to his enemies and killed his men?

The Men of Phyle: Building a Rebel Army in Classical Greece – Roel Konijnendijk (University of Oxford, roel.konijnendijk@lincoln.ox.ac.uk)

One of the most intriguing aspects of Thrasyboulos' insurgent campaign to bring down the Thirty at Athens (403 BCE) is the light it sheds on force generation in times of civil war. Literary accounts provide a great deal of interesting information on the way Thrasyboulos cobbled together his rag tag army - the so-called 'Men of Phyle' lionised by later tradition. Who were these men, who took up arms against their own state and threw in their lot with the insurgency against overwhelming odds? This paper re-examines questions about how many they were, where they came from, and how they were armed and supplied. These questions are bound up with pragmatic considerations of tactical utility - what sort of army did Thrasyboulos want to put together? - as well as wider questions about the extent to which an armed uprising relied on free citizen deserters from the regime, as opposed to mercenaries and opportunists.

Adakrys Thaptein: Spartan Tresantes and Their Mothers' Exemplary Agency – Giorgia Oggiano (University of Campania *Luigi Vanvitelli*, giorgia.oggiano@unicampania.it)

That Spartan deserters, the so-called *tresantes*, constituted a specific institutional category in Sparta is documented by various sources. When Herodotus told the story of Aristodemus, *tresas par excellence* (7.230-231), Tyrtaeus had already mentioned the unfortunate fate of Spartans who turned their backs on enemies (F11 West, 14-16). Several studies tried to explain the sources' unclarity on the nature and duration of the punishment – a sort of *atimia* – as well as on its actual causes (Ehrenberg 1937; Loraux 1977; Ducat 2006).
Following the renewed interest in Sparta's history and representations, this paper aims to analyze some of the passages where Spartan *tresantes* are immortalized with their mothers. Emblematically, this happens in the Suda (τρέσας τ 926 Adler), but also in *Lacaenarum Apophthegmata* (*Mor*. 240C-242D) and in selected epigrams from the *Palatine Anthology* (*e.g.* VII.230), where Spartan women not only severely reproach their coward sons, but they also punish them – even with death – and bury them *adakrys*. Albeit late, these sources reconstruct a didactic program, where each mother is depicted as the one who accompanies her children in the crucial moments of their military career, *e.g.* by giving them the shield with which they must fight and return from war (Ἢ τὰν ἢ ἐπὶ τᾶς), by suggesting them the right attitude to be kept in combat and by checking the location of the wounds they received on the battlefield.
The re-reading of these passages will also allow to examine the effects of Spartan deserters' and their mothers' exemplary agency either in the civic context of the *polis* and in the more 'cellular' setting of each family nucleus, finally pondering what aspects of these representations

are result of *intentional history* and what instead corresponds to the historical truth, to the extent possible.

"So that No One Could Accuse Me of Deserting My Post or Letting My Ship Be Useless to the State" ([Dem.], 50, 63). Athenian Military Disengagement in the 4th Century BCE – Han Pedazzini (University of Turin, han.pedazzini@unito.it)

The lack of participation in the democratic practices of the *polis* is considered by historiography as one of the signs of Athens' crisis in the 4th century BCE. The disconnect between collective ideals, where each citizen is called to fulfill their duties for the benefit of the community, and actual practice, characterized by individualism and economic fatigue, affects both the political and military spheres. Clear indicators of this include the increasing reliance on mercenary troops and the lack of financial contributions to Athenian expeditions.
This disaffection is also evident in the liturgies, particularly in the trierarchy. Although 5th-century sources regard the heart of the democratic *polis* as residing in the hulls of the triremes (even for the *Old Oligarch*), the 4th century reveals numerous cases of poor management in the arming and operation of ships by liturgists. Cases of misconduct, disobedience, non-payment, and desertion paint a picture of a weakened liturgical class and, consequently, a decline in Athenian military effectiveness during the hegemonic efforts of the Second League.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the phenomenon of non-participation in naval military duties through two speeches from the Demosthenic *corpus*: *Against Polycles* (Oration 50), a *blabē* delivered by Apollodorus for compensation during a trierarchy; and *On the Trierarchic Crown* (Oration 51), likely by Demosthenes, a *diadikasia* with strong political undertones directed against his expedition colleagues. These sources, given their nature—where the primary voices are those of citizens obedient to orders—must be examined to provide proper consideration to the accused parties and understand their motivations. Only in this way can we revisit the issues of the liturgical system and Athenian military and economic management during the 4th century, particularly in the context of Athens' involvement in Thrace in the years leading up to the Social War.

Deserter in Roman Warfare – Gaius Stern (University of California, Berkeley**,** gaius@berkeley.edu)

The range of motivations preceding any act of betrayal within the ranks of an army can be remarkably diverse. Greed, resentment, or, more simply, the pure instinct for survival as a means of preserving physical integrity in the face of imminent threat are just some of the factors underlying episodes of desertion and defection that have fueled dissent within the military sphere throughout History. These phenomena carry a dual dimension that renders them particularly perilous for those affected: they not only result in a *de facto* quantitative reduction of an army's forces but also create the risk of sensitive information falling into enemy hands — whether willingly, if the traitor cooperates, or forcibly, through violence, if they do not.

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'The Appeal of 'The Deserter' in Early Christian Discourse (120-350 CE) – Christopher Zeichmann (Toronto Metropolitan University, zeichman@torontomu.ca)

Criticism of war in Roman antiquity was famously compared to "complaining about the weather" – ineffectual tirades against one of life's inevitabilities. As a result, we have little evidence of military desertion or protest told from a sympathetic perspective. The primary exceptions to this lacuna are writings of pre-Constantinian Christians: The Acts of the Military Martyrs, Tertullian, Origen, Lactantius, and others who agree that the soldiering life is incompatible with Christianity. These accounts are commonly read in a credulous manner, as though they were representative of general Christian attitudes about the military, thereby ignoring the ample epigraphic evidence of Christian soldiers before Constantine's conversion. Clearly, there was a range of opinions on the matter.
The proposed paper offers a preliminary step to explaining this deviation of opinion concerning military service between literate Christian intellectuals and the experience of many common Christians of antiquity by attempting to explain the appeal of "the deserter" to early Christian intellectuals. The appeal of such a controversial figure is often taken for granted in contemporary scholarship, as many suppose it fits neatly the church fathers' biblical exegesis or theology. The proposed paper attempts to redescribe early Christian discourse on the military by examining the social interests that rendered this figure appealing. In particular, this paper will look at how this figure fit neatly with the church fathers' interest in cultivating a "maximalist" Christian subjectivity through its rhetoric of persecution: as a figure legally maligned for his adherence to counter-cultural principles, he was a particularly attractive figure for understanding the Christian self-experience of marginalization and persecution.

Iconography of War in the Ancient World – organized by Marta Nicolás-Muelas (mnicolas@icac.cat) / Julio C. Ruiz (julioruiz92@hotmail.es)

Two Men on Joined Horses: Discovering a Forgotten Link in Horse Warfare – Natasha Bershadsky (University of Bonn, nbershad@uni-bonn.de)

The paper aims to offer a new interpretation of pairs of mounted knights and squires, popular in archaic Greek art. It has been argued by P. A. L. Greenhalgh that this pair consisted of a hoplite, who dismounted from his horse to fight, and a mounted squire, who took care of the hoplite's horse while the hoplite was fighting. I propose that the pair of horses can be identified as a synōris, that is, two horses linked at their necks by leathern thongs. This arrangement is well attested in the ancient Near East and has been described by Robin Archer as a "rough terrain chariot." The way in which the pairs of horses are represented in the vase-painting, as two overlapping figures in which the contour of the second horse follows the outline of the first one, is a convention that is expedient for an artist; however, it also communicates the existence of a complete synchrony between the horses. Synōrides are attested already in the Late Geometric vase-painting; they are likely also featured on the Chigi vase, and occur in many regions of Greece. I argue for a centrality of synōris in the self-representation of the aristocratic warriors during the Archaic period. The pairs of linked horses and their deeply mentally connected riders echoed the Iliadic pairs of charioteers and parabatai. The use of synōris in battle can be also connected with later innovations in coordinated performance of cavalry and infantry, such as hamippoi.

Odysseus' Naval Ram?: Exploring Iconography and the Development of Naval Warfare in Antiquity – Stephen DeCasien (Dalian University of Technology, China, decasiens@gmail.com)

The iconic scene of Odysseus lashed to the mast of his ship, resisting the enchantments of the Sirens, has been a popular motif in ancient Mediterranean art across several periods of antiquity. This imagery typically depicts Odysseus and his crew rowing their ship while the Sirens attempt to lure them toward perilous waters. However, each representation varies in significant ways, influenced not only by the individual artist's choices but also by the cultural and temporal context of the work. This paper scrutinizes different depictions of this scene, contending that these variations reveal more about the era of their creation than the mythical "time of Odysseus." Artistic representations of military equipment in these depictions, such as the warship ram, reflect the technological and strategic priorities of their respective times. The warship ram, a naval technology absent in both Homer's Odyssey and Iliad, appears in these depictions, highlighting the development of naval warfare across centuries. Through a focused analysis of these images in comparison with other warship iconography, this study explores how depictions of the Sirens and Odysseus mirror broader trends in naval technology and

warfare, offering insight into the changing military landscape of antiquity and the challenges of using iconography as evidence.

From Side Note to Secret Protagonists: The Depiction of Auxiliary Troops in Caesars De Bello Gallico – Ove Frank (Koblenz University, ove-frank@uni-koblenz.de)

The auxiliary troops of the Roman Empire are a topic that has received significant attention from researchers, with a wide range of sources providing a comprehensive understanding of their role and activities. Emperor Claudius' military diplomas, letters from the military forts Vindolanda and Vindonissa, and numerous archaeological findings offer a substantial body of evidence, allowing for a detailed analysis of the auxiliary troops' life and work within the Roman army. The prominent display of auxiliaries on Trajan's Column suggests that they were held in high regard and recognised as a vital component of the Roman military. However, what about the Republican period? This area is less well researched, with limited explicit source material available – or so it would seem. Propably the most significant source for understanding auxiliary troops during this period are the Commentarii of one Gaius Julius Caesar, offering valuable insights into military interaction, social integration, and the general perception of auxiliary troops at the time. The central issue is to consider how auxiliary troops are depicted in Caesar's works and whether he uses this depiction for propaganda purposes. Determining the target audience of Caesar's work is crucial, as the perspective of the reader, whether military expert or not, can significantly influence the interpretation. By conducting a critical analysis of the auxiliary troops under Caesar, examining both what he says and what he does not say, we can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the later reforms of Augustus, during which auxiliary troops were formally established as a permanent component of the Roman army. This analysis sheds light on the extent of these reforms and whether Augustus created new structured or rather followed a long existing trend. I would love to discuss this topic with international colleagues and experts at the 'War in the Ancient World Conference 2025' in Münster.

Gendered Representations of Warfare in Ancient Assyrian Reliefs: Analyzing the Visual Narratives of Conflict and Aftermath – Zahra Kouzehgari **(**Research Fellow, National Museum of Asian Art, Smithsonian Institution, z.kouzehgar@gmail.com)

The earliest depictions of warfare and conflict in the Ancient Near East coincide with the rise of urbanization, where male rulers and soldiers are prominently represented in combat scenes. These depictions often show male rulers leading their armies and subduing enemy forces, predominantly comprised of male soldiers. The scenes can generally be categorized into two phases: the battle itself and the aftermath, with most figures being male. Notably, the representation of women is absent in early depictions of warfare but emerges in later Assyrian reliefs, particularly in the so-called deportation scenes. A close analysis of Assyrian bas-reliefs,

such as those housed in the British Museum, reveals a stark contrast between the depiction of male and female figures. While the aftermath of warfare is often brutal, with scenes showing the harsh treatment of male prisoners, the women and children are represented differently. Women, often depicted with children, appear at ease, riding on camels or donkeys, and are shown in relatively peaceful postures despite the overall violence of the scene. These depictions suggest a deliberate artistic choice to contrast the roles of men and women in post-war contexts, potentially reflecting gendered societal roles in Assyrian culture. This Research will provide a detailed analysis of these Assyrian representations, focusing on the gender dynamics within these depictions of warfare and its aftermath. By examining the British Museum's collection of Assyrian bas-reliefs, this study aims to shed light on the nuanced portrayals of men, women, and children in the context of ancient Near Eastern warfare, offering a deeper understanding of the visual and social narratives embedded in these works.

Gendered Representations of Peace in Ancient Rome: Iconographic Horizons of War and Aftermath – Carmen M. Ruiz-Vivas **(**University of Granada, Women's Studies Research Group (HUM-603), carmenruvivas@ugr.es)

In Roman mentality, war was closely connected to peace, with constant feedback between victory and pax, the latter serving as both the goal and the justificatory framework for any military activity. Consequently, promises of peace reflected in propaganda were a recurring message during periods of armed conflict, shaping a rhetoric aimed at legitimizing the power of military leaders—the so-called "champions of peace," as H. Cornwell described them. This proposal focuses on a comparative analysis, from a gendered perspective, of the messages of peace disseminated in Rome during the late Republic and the early Augustan Principate, as well as during the Year of the Four Emperors and the first decades of the Flavian dynasty. A closer examination of the various iconographic representations embedded in these narratives reveals the gendered languages employed on a symbolic level to construct these messages in times of war or peace, particularly after the cessation of hostilities. While the realm of warfare and the military was heavily masculinized, the feminine imaginary engaged in an iconographic and visual dialogue with other symbols, elements, and discourses to shape the messages of peace and victory. These narratives were expressed across a wide range of media, from coins to monumental architecture, offering insights into the aspirations and mindset of a society that endured the traumatic and devastating experiences of these wars. Incorporating a gender and peace perspective into the analysis of these issues enriches the scope of New Military History, which explores conflicts, their complexities, and their impacts on human communities. This approach enables a critical examination of those dynamics of the past, shedding new light on how societies conceptualized, communicated and understood peace and war.

Iconography of War in Roman Pola, Croatia – Alka Starac (Archaelogical Museum of Istria, alka.starac@ami-pula.hr / alkastarac46@gmail.com)

The iconography of the war is abundantly represented on the monuments from the Principate in the Roman colony of Pola, located within the borders of Augustan Italy. It is present on marble statues of military commanders, emperors and members of the imperial family, on the private memorial Arch of the Sergii family, on the pluteus of public building, herm, tombstones, architectural decoration of unknown buildings and on pottery for everyday household use. Tombstones are the most numerous categories with war motifs, but the largest number of individual objects of military symbolism can be found on only one monument, the Arch of the Sergii. The existing classifications of the displayed weapons, military equipment and symbols are elaborated in more detail in order to gain insight into the frequency and chronological representation of certain motifs. Defensive weapons were shown twice as often as offensive weapons, especially shields, among which oval-shaped ones predominate. Among offensive weapons, the spear is by far the most numerous. Military insignia are represented by half as many as offensive weapons. The iconography of war is noticeably more common among prominent individuals, in villas and tombstones of members of the upper classes, and statues of emperors and military commanders. It is also present in public buildings, in the basilica behind the forum temples. The presence of Roman, gladiator, barbarian and historical Hellenistic weapons usually combined on the same monument is analyzed, taking into account the uncertainties of the interpretation and datation. The depicted weapons are compared with other stone sculptures and relief monuments, frescoes, stucco, and archaeological finds of weapons that can help with identification, dating, and understanding context and symbolic meaning.

Representations of the Confrontations with the Persians in Greek Vase Painting (Early 5th – The Middle of the 4th Century BC) – Tatiana Tereshchenko (Independent scholar, tatereshen@gmail.com/tatere@yandex.ruv)

The key characteristics of representations of the Greco-Persian Wars and later confrontations (2nd half of the 5th – 1st half of the 4th cent. BC) were:
1. Syncretism: mixture of the real (historical, ethnographic) and mythological details. This mixture was characteristic for all the Greek thinking and imagination in general: it perceived and represented the historical events and ethnocultural contacts in connection with mythological subjects and characters.
2. Specific realism. In general, the details of the images of Persians corresponded the reality, but had some inaccuracies, conventionalities and generalizations. Thus, battles with the Persians were represented as battles between two warriors standing opposite each other. Also, Persians were represented with just a few or (and) varying details.
Representations of the confrontations between Greeks and Persians have passed three stages:
1. 1st half of the 5th cent. BC.: period of the Greco-Persian wars. Search of the language of representations of Greco-Persian confrontations and differentiating characteristics of Persians. No articulated connection with mythology.

2. 2nd half of the 5th cent. BC. More generalized representations of Persians, more connections with mythology. Representing amazons wearing Persian (or more generalized – Oriental) clothes fighting with Greeks. Representing Greeks in “heroic nudity”.
3. 1st half of the 4th cent. BC. Transformation of representations of the confrontations with Persians. These representations were created or discovered on the territory of Italy. Some new unique mytho-historical subjects with many figures appeared there. Now they represented not the Greco-Persian wars but rather confrontations between Greeks and Persians of the 1st half of the 4th cent. BC. And the conquests of Alexander the Great.

Seated Atop an Empty Cuirass: Two Artistic Representations of Person and Armor – Yael Young (The Open University of Israel, yaelyou@openu.ac.il)

Two similar images, observed in very different contexts (visual art and dramatic play), create a unique assemblage of person and armor. One is of Glaucus, in Polygnotus’ wall painting (Cnidian Lesche at Delphi, ca. 460 BCE). The other is of Trygaeus, the protagonist of Aristophanes' comedy Peace, performed in 421 BCE. In both scenes, the men are seen seated atop metal cuirasses: Glaucus in the scene depicting the Antenor family’s departure from the ruined Troy, and Trygaeus while sharing with his audience his intention to use this object when peace comes – as a lavatory.
The lecture aims to interpret these two images, both depicting an abnormal usage of armor, and to explore the contribution of the appearance and the aesthetic of the metal armor to the meaning of each artistic image, respectively. Though both are centered on the bronze cuirass and its appearance, one image expresses the heroic value of armor and its wearers, while the other is a criticism of war and its participants. In Polygnotus' painting, there is a visual congruency and continuity between the (old?) metal cuirass and the young body of Glaucus seated upon it; they complement each other. The comic body of Trygaeus stands, however, in sharp contrast to the shiny, beautifully designed armor: the gap – verbal and visual – is embodied in the juxtaposition of the padded, fat figure with its dangling phallus and the ideal body shape exhibited by the muscle cuirass. Thus, the appearance of the cuirass is crucial for making the visual pun as extreme as possible for the viewers. Taken together, both images of an unoccupied metal cuirass topped with a living body force the viewer to consider the two entities in relation to one other and to assess their reciprocal visuality.

Law and War – Perspectives on Issues of Law in and around Warfare in Antiquity – organized by Gregor Diez (gregor.diez@uni-graz.at) / Jan Trosien (trosien.jan@googlemail.com)

War and Temporality in Hellenistic Interstate Treaties – Gregor Diez (University of Graz, gregor.diez@uni-graz.at)

The interstate agreements of the classical Greek world have invariably been distinguished by temporal restrictions, which have been observed to range from a few years to agreements for eternity. The underlying motives for these temporal treaty provisions have been subject to divergent interpretations in research, ranging from situation-specific agreements in the context of truces to generational calculations for the establishment of symmachia and eternal states of peace. In the polycentric world of Hellenism, particularly following the advent of Rome, these temporal perceptions underwent a further shift. This paper aims to re-analyze this problem area by considering contract law, while also taking into account the different types of subjects of international law in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC.
The perceived temporality of interstate agreements plays a particularly important role regarding military conflict and war. In particular, the positions of John D. Grainger (Great Power Diplomacy, Routledge, 2016), who accuses the Roman res publica in its age of expansion of brutal methods and regular breaches of international law conventions, will be tested.

Legal Considerations on the Practice of *Decimatio* – Antonio Leo de Petris (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, antonioleo.depetris@mail.huji.ac.il)

The aim of my report is to investigate the subject of *decimatio* in its main legal implications. To this end, the principal testimonies that refer to *decimatio* will be considered diachronically. The practice represents, moreover, a sanction already used in the republican age (albeit not as extensively as the sources would suggest), which is also succinctly defined by Cicero (Cic. *Cluent*. 46.128). *Decimatio*, normally practiced in the event that entire units had mutinied by abandoning their ranks or throwing away their banners, provided for the execution of a part (normally a tenth) of the legionary unit. There will be two legal questions that I will therefore consider: whether *decimatio* fell into disuse following the *de provocatione* legislation and, finally, what specific nature (‘solidaristic’?) should be acknowledged to this practice.

Stilicho, Theodosius I. and the Pantomime Dances. The Legality of the Spectacle as a Causality of Military Failure in Late Antiquity. Source Critical Considerations of a yet Unconsidered Topos in Zosimos – Eric Steilmann (Free University of Berlin, eric.steilmann@fu-berlin.de)

The military-historical substance of Zosimos' work is generally well researched. However, one of the historian's topics has not yet been examined: the pantomime dance in the context of failed military operations. Is it conceivable that military campaigns fail because, in individual cases, Roman generals would rather go to the theatre than fight?
Yes, according to the surprising verdict of Zosimos. For him, the appearance of those dances is almost causally linked to moral corruption and a lack of duty. And it causes great damage in very specific cases, because for example in the case of Stilicho, the dancers are presented as an important factor in the failure of a military offensive. Also, Theodosius I. could have been more successful overall and on military campaigns if he had not preferred to attend pantomime performances at the crucial moments. It is clear that there are serious doubts about this account: basically, the whole thing seems to be dismissible as nonsense that cannot be taken seriously.
But precisely because his criticism seems so ridiculous, the question arises all the more as to why it was so crucial for Zosimos. We must always bear in mind that *topoi* that seem incomprehensible to today's readers were understood by their contemporaries. This is the key to the solution of the riddle that is to be presented and discussed in this presentation.

Dealing with Cowardice in the Classical Athenian Military through Measures of Law – Jan Trosien (University of Hamburg, trosien.jan@googlemail.com)

The democracy of classical Athens was a system based on the voluntary participation of its citizens, who in turn sat in assembly to guide the policy of the polis, filled its courts to administer justice, and stood in the ranks of its military to defend its interests abroad. Of these civic duties, none was more demanding of the individual citizen than military service: To stand in the Athenian phalanx and to fight for the polis, thought to be the highest honour, also meant potentially paying the highest price and losing one's life. This was certainly a sacrifice that not all citizens were willing to make, as both Athenian comedy and court speeches attest to the fact that desertion and draft evasion were issues that were present in the public consciousness. While this phenomenon can be observed in all militaries, the case of classical Athens presents some interesting circumstances: In ancient Athens, military service was compulsory for all citizens, and therefore its soldiers served as largely equal peers in what was effectively a lay militia, while also, through the direct nature of Athenian democracy, to some extent representing the political decision-makers and sworn judges of their society.
How such a society, in which the ones calling upon the soldiers, the ones serving in battle and the ones open to persecute transgressions were conjointly serving in its defense, dealt with individuals failing their civic duty in the military is the focus of this presentation. To this end,

the legal actions against deserters (*graphe lipotaxiou*) and draft dodgers (*graphe astrateias*) will be scrutinized with the aim of highlighting the legal tools of a direct democracy to strengthen the obligation of her citizens to partake in a vital aspect of the civic duties. In doing so, close consideration will also be given to the implications of the relation between judges and offenders, in which the ladder effectively directly deserted the former in battle.

Mercenary and Auxiliary Forces in the Ancient Mediterranean World – organized by Marian Helm (helmm@uni-muenster.de) / Patrick Sänger (saengerp@uni-muenster.de)

Citizens, Sodales, Socii, and Misthophoroi: Military Relationships in Early Italy (and the West) – Jeremy Armstrong (University of Auckland, js.armstrong@auckland.ac.nz)

In his 2000 overview of *Roman Warfare*, Adrian Goldsworthy began his section on Rome's engagement with Carthage and the Hellenistic Mediterranean thus: "Rome's army was still essentially a citizen militia, but all the great powers of the Mediterranean world relied almost entirely on professional soldiers" (pg. 61). This summarizes the existing *communis opinio* on the state of military organization c. 300 BCE in the Mediterranean basin. Most of the 'great powers' of the (especially eastern) Mediterranean were, by this stage, using paid, professional, 'mercenary' armies while Rome utilized a 'civic militia', supplemented by allies. Rome was, therefore, different, special, and unique. The Roman Republican army was supposedly autochthonous, and their ultimate conquest of the Mediterranean was a product of their society – not something purchased, and perhaps undeserved.
This model is, of course, problematic on several levels. Most notably, it creates an artificial dichotomy (albeit one which originated in our ancient sources) that promotes a sense of 'Roman exceptionalism' (and, indeed, eastern 'Othering') we have struggled to see past. This paper will explore the nature of military relationships in the Mediterranean basin c. 300 BCE, with a particular focus on how the 'Roman' military system may have been similar to, and in many ways overlapped with, those favoured elsewhere in the Mediterranean. While no two armies or polities in the ancient Mediterranean were identical, it will suggest that the traditional differences between the armies of Rome on the one hand, and Carthage and the Hellenistic kings on the other, are likely exaggerated.

Greek Raiders in the Archaic Eastern Mediterranean as Mercenaries. Problems and Controversies – Fernando Echeverría Rey (Universidad Complutense Madrid, fecheverria@ucm.es)

In the modern scholarship on the Archaic period, Greek military activities in Near Eastern contexts have been traditionally interpreted as mercenary service, drawing from a scholarly tradition of presenting figures such as Archillochus or Antimenidas as mercenaries. This interpretation is in turn based on longstanding discussions on the emergence of the polis and the evolution of military technology and tactics in Archaic Greece. It draws from the existing paradigm of mercenary service in military, strategic and geo-political studies, which presents the phenomenon in predominantly economic terms, as "hiring" an existing stock or "supply" of "specialists" to meet the "demand" of some centralised states. In this paper, I will argue that

the strength of the existing paradigms has very often obscured the specific patterns and dynamics of archaic Greek military activities overseas, not necessarily connected with the notion of "mercenary". Greek military mobility in the Archaic period was not primarily motivated by the external demand of foreign powers, but by internal patterns of Greek elite initiative and ideology. Fighting abroad was one of the activities conducted by local elites to legitimise themselves and stay in power in their respective communities. It took predominantly the form of raiding expeditions overseas, and not of paid military service under contract. An illustration of this alternative paradigm is presented very consistently in the Homeric epics, where leaders engage in raiding activities as a source of legitimacy and leadership, a picture that is consistent with the one presented by the Near Eastern (fundamentally Assyrian) sources.

Auxiliaries during the Punic Wars – François Gauthier (University of British Columbia, francois.gauthier@ubc.ca)

Auxiliaries under the Republic remain understudied. Certainly, some recent studies have focused on Republican auxiliaries, but generally only for the late Republic. At most, they sometimes go back to the time of the Second Punic War, but no further. This paper therefore aims to investigate the contribution of peregrine communities during the First and Second Punic Wars. The support provided to Rome by foreign communities took two forms. First, logistical assistance: the provision of supplies, equipment, and siege weapons. Second, active participation in combat through the provision of auxiliaries, which our sources unfortunately often identify with imprecise, confusing vocabulary. Indeed, the terms σύμμαχοι and socii can refer to Italian allies as well as non-Italic troops.

The First Punic War was not only the first major conflict outside of peninsular Italy in which the Roman Republic was involved, but also the first theater of operations where the Romans began to experiment with the expedients and solutions they applied elsewhere to finance and supplement their armies for the remainder of the Republican period. This trend continued throughout the second conflict with Carthage, during which Rome began to recruit troops in almost every theater of operations in which it was involved. Given the dire financial situation of the Roman Republic during the Second Punic War, the recruitment of auxiliaries provided much needed relief for the Roman treasury since they were financed by their own communities. The use of auxiliaries in the conflict was not rare or an exception, they are attested on every major front, including Sicily and Greece, and even sometimes played a significant role on the battlefield, such as Zama. Auxiliaries provided Rome with crucial reinforcements while allowing the Republic 'to punch above its financial weight'. We can think of auxiliaries almost as an extension of the formula togatorum used for the mobilization of Italian allies.

In the Slipstream of Roman Expansion. Foreign Troops and Their Objectives in the Wars of the Middle Republic– Marian Helm (University of Münster, helmm@uni-muenster.de)

The astonishing success of Roman expansion is traditionally attributed to the Republic's ability to both mobilize overwhelming numbers (Eckstein 2006) and to integrate and utilize allied troops (Pol. 2.24; Armstrong 2020). Apart from the socii, the armies of the res publica Romana also made use of foreign contingents that fought side by side with Roman armies but were not an integral part of the annual levy of legions and alae. This paper will discuss the initial phase of employing foreign units, i.e. troops that were not part of the formula togatorum, in the 4th and 3rd century by exploring how these first instances might have explored Roman practices in the long-term. It will be argued, that the utilization of allied foreign troops allowed Roman commanders to adapt to the military situation on the ground and thus provided crucial flexibility to military campaigns, not least in areas and terrain that Roman or Italic forces were unfamiliar with. Following the conquest of central Italy, Roman military operations could usually expect to find some support due to intraregional rivalries and conflicts (Fronda 2010). The paper will discuss three such cases to highlight the dynamics and consequences of such cooperations: starting with the infamous legio Campana of the Pyrrhic War, it will be argued that the early third century witnessed a process of regularization in regard to the socii, with an attending differentiation between the Italian allies, organized alongside and integrate into the Roman armies, and foreign allies. The cases of Massalia and Celtic tribes like the Veneti will then serve to highlight the role that these groups played in Roman war-making.

Massalia and the Mediterranean Mercenary Market – Simon Lentzsch (University of Trier, lentzsch@uni-trier.de)

The Greek polis of Massalia has long been recognized a key hub for the trade of goods such as wine, tin, and slaves between the Mediterranean and the Celtic regions of central and north-west Europe. It is well known that Celtic mercenaries participated in numerous wars across the Mediterranean during this period. For many, southern Gaul served as a natural departure point into the wider theatres of Mediterranean warfare.
This raises important questions: What role did Massalia play in these movements? Did Massalia's intermediary role in the contact zone of southern Gaul extend beyond material trade to encompass the recruitment and deployment of Celtic mercenaries in Mediterranean conflicts from the 4th to the 1st century B.C.? Was the city merely a passive observer of Celtic military involvement or did it actively leverage its longstanding connections with Celtic groups to serve its own interests or those of its allies, particularly Rome?
To address these questions, the paper analyzes a range of literary sources and reevaluates the use of mercenaries in the military practices of the Roman Republic, contributing to the panel's broader inquiry into the dynamics of recruitment, mobility, and regional interaction in ancient warfare.

The Battle of Vercellae and the Use of nNon-Roman Troops under Marius – Sarah Mark (McGill University, sarah.mark@mail.mcgill.ca)

The aftermath of the battle of Vercellae saw a scrabble for plunder and fame. Gaius Marius and Q. Lutatius Catulus had defeated the Cimbri, but neither was inclined to give the other credit for their joint victory, and conflict broke out between their soldiers. Marius' side could point to a greater quantity of booty, but Catulus' army had captured the enemy standards. Plutarch then recounts a curious incident: a delegation from nearby Parma was asked to judge who was responsible for the victory (Plut. Mar. 27.4). Roman and allied soldiers were both evidently content to accept arbitration from a perceived neutral third party. I argue that this incident deserves attention for what it says about the multiple cross-sections of identity functioning within the army and the relationship between Marius and his Italian allied troops.
The question of allied rewards could be a sensitive one (see Roselaar, Fronda, Rosenstein). While we have examples of allied troops receiving equal donatives to their Roman counterparts, these were awarded at the discretion of the general. In 177, C. Claudius Pulcher declined to give his allied troops a share equal to his Roman soldiers; they made their displeasure clear by marching in silence during his triumph, but had little other recourse (Liv. 41.13.6–8). By the time of Vercellae, Catulus' soldiers united in insisting that their general share in Marius' triumph (Plut. Mar. 27.6). The battlefield dispute speaks to allied integration; it also illustrates the latitude taken by victorious troops. After Vercellae, Marius distributed his plunder among all his troops evenly to avoid showing favouritism (Dio Cass. 27.94.1). Marius later promised citizenship to one thousand allied troops for bravery, perhaps the ultimate reward for military service, but one which caused great controversy in Rome.

In Search of Mercenaries. Royal Agents on Crete – Christoph Michels (University of Münster, christoph.michels@uni-muenster.de)

This paper on the recruitment of mercenaries in Hellenistic Crete has its starting point in an episode reported by the geographer Strabo regarding his great-great-grandfather Dorylaos. The latter was in the service of the Pontic king Mithridates V Euergetes. As an aner taktikos, he was also sent to the Aegean as a xenologos to recruit mercenaries. When a war broke out between Knossos and Gortyn during one of his visits to Crete, Dorylaos was apparently chosen as strategos by the Knossians due to his knowledge of warfare. He was subsequently honored by them for his successful efforts. He probably received the proxenia and perhaps also citizenship, since he did not return to Pontos after the unexpected assassination of his king, Dorylaos, but instead made his home in Knossos. Based on this episode, the paper is going to explore the contexts of mercenary recruitment on Crete and the associated socio-political relationships.

'Foreign' Professional Soldiers in Ptolemaic Egypt: Origin and Political Significance – Patrick Sänger (University of Münster, saengerp@uni-muenster.de)

This paper on the recruitment of mercenaries in Hellenistic Crete has its starting point in an episode reported by the geographer Strabo regarding his great-great-grandfather Dorylaos. The latter was in the service of the Pontic king Mithridates V Euergetes. As an aner taktikos, he was also sent to the Aegean as a xenologos to recruit mercenaries. When a war broke out between Knossos and Gortyn during one of his visits to Crete, Dorylaos was apparently chosen as strategos by the Knossians due to his knowledge of warfare. He was subsequently honored by them for his successful efforts. He probably received the proxenia and perhaps also citizenship, since he did not return to Pontos after the unexpected assassination of his king, Dorylaos, but instead made his home in Knossos. Based on this episode, the paper is going to explore the contexts of mercenary recruitment on Crete and the associated socio-political relationships.

Mercenaries or Allies? Hellenistic Troops in Roman Service – Noreen Stühmer (Technische Universität Dresden, noreen.stuehmer@tu-dresden.de)

The Roman approach to mercenaries is marked by a striking ambivalence. Contemporary authors of the early second century BCE, as well as later historiographical sources, depict mercenary warfare as foreign, unreliable, and decidedly "un-Roman." At the same time, Roman military practice reveals clear signs of a – at least indirect – recourse to such troops. In conflicts with Hellenistic powers, Rome repeatedly fought alongside eastern allies such as the Achaean League, Rhodes, or Pergamon, whose forces are known to have included mercenaries.
This paper explores the tension between ideological rejection and practical tolerance of mercenary forces. The former is reflected in the noticeably sparse or even deliberately opaque representation of mercenaries in the surviving sources, while the latter appears to stem from pragmatic considerations of military expediency. The first interpretative dimension of the paper, Mercenaries or Allies?, addresses the potential contradiction between Rome's cooperation with allies whose forces included mercenaries and its officially negative stance on mercenary warfare.
A second reading focuses on the perception of the allies themselves. Roman sources attribute to certain groups – particularly the Aetolians – characteristics that are otherwise typical of mercenary stereotypes: unreliability, venality, and opportunism. These attributions bear structural similarities to literary depictions of mercenaries and reveal a shift in perception whereby, under certain conditions, allied forces are semantically aligned with the mercenary image.
The aim of this paper is to reframe the relationship between military necessity, ideological rhetoric, and categories of perception in the Roman treatment of non-Italian combatants.

Mercenaries of the Aegean – Naval Recruitment in the Early Hellenistic Period – Charlotte van Regenmortel (University of Liverpool, C.Van-Regenmortel@liverpool.ac.uk)

The early Hellenistic period saw an increase in the reliance on so-called mercenary forces, especially during the territorial struggles of the Successors and early Hellenistic kings, whose frequent military activity and ever-expanding armies provided ample opportunity for military employment. The use of such paid professionals is well-attested for the infantry but arguably less so for the royal armies' naval divisions; the crews' status is often undefined, or their activities typified simply as piracy. This paper will review some of the evidence regarding the royal armies' naval recruitment and situate this in the wider context of paid military service in the early Hellenistic period.

Plunder and Postliminium: The Laws of Looting in Ancient Warfare – organized by Aaron Beek (alb280@case.edu) / Anna Tarwacka (a.tarwacka@uksw.edu.pl)

The Other Side of the Coin: Spoils and Plunder in Etruria – Hilary Becker (Binghamton University, hbecker@binghamton.edu) and Jeremy Armstrong (University of Auckland, js.armstrong@auckland.ac.nz)

Spoils and plunder in central Italy have always been seen through a distinctively 'Roman' lens. Because of the ultimate triumph of Roman imperialism, and the lack of literary sources from other central Italian peoples to counterbalance the dominant Roman narrative, scholarship has typically taken the traditional 'Roman' approach to spoils as, at the very least, the norm in the region. This has been bolstered by the fact that the Romans are thought to have borrowed many practices related to spoils from their neighbours, most notably the Etruscans to the north, including the ritual of the triumph.

However, it is clear from even a cursory examination of the evidence that not everyone in central Italy dealt with spoils in the same way. The literary sources, although notoriously problematic, regularly highlight the different aims of different peoples in warfare, and the archaeology reveals marked differences in the approach to items we might usually associate with spoils of war. In contrast to Rome and Latium, arms and armour formed an important part of grave assemblages in other parts of central Italy until quite late, and there is little evidence for any interest in conquering land.

This paper will use the region of Etruria as a case study to explore differences in the approach to spoils in early central Italy. It will combine analysis of the archaeological record with discussion of plausibly 'historical' moments reflected in Etruscan culture (e.g. the depiction of heroes in the Francois Tomb and deeds recorded in the Elogia Tarquiniensia) to illustrate differences in practice – to go along with the long-noted similarities. It will also trace the different trends in approaches to spoils in the region, highlighting the marked contrast to Rome that we see in Etruria, and make suggestions as to how and why this may have occurred.

The Divisiveness of Dividing Plundered Plunder – Aaron Beek (North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa, alb280@case.edu)

This paper aims to explore the phenomenon of Roman soldiers acquiring Roman loot from enemy baggage trains, and what they did with it. Legally speaking anything identifiable was supposed to be returned to the former owners. Practically, this did not describe much, and in practice decreasing effort was employed to rectify matters. Our evidence implies this occurs relatively frequently, but rarely gives much detail...the most detailed example is possibly Carausius, accused of allowing looting so that he could profit from the invaders.

This paper begins with an examination of the laws and affirmations of these laws, then proceeds through five examples of actual practice, each in a different century, along with people's

reaction to these events as the soldiers divide the spoils. For the purposes of this paper, I will be sidelining the role of the ius postliminii on slavery to focus upon other forms of booty.

Personal Loot and Public Plunder – Understanding the Relationship Between the Individual and the State Through Greek and Roman Rules of Pillaging – Joshua R. Hall (Linn-Benton Community College, camitlans@gmail.com**)**

War has been central to the discussion of "the state" and how it came to exist since the inception of such dialogue. From simplistic conclusions such as the centrality of war in state formation to more complex analyses of how war fits within the complex web of social power, our understanding of the relationship between individuals and the state has been shaped by war. One aspect of this relationship that has seen much discussion is the intersection of economics, war, and the state. But, an area that has been overlooked to some extent is the intersection of different rules for public and private plundering during warfare and what that can tell us about the nature of the states involved.

This paper focuses the discussion in on what the dichotomy between public and private rights of plunder imply about the relationship between war, the individual, and the state in the Greek and Roman world. My purpose is dual. First, to interrogate whether these rules support the notion that Greek and Roman polities were "states" or something else. Second, to develop our understanding of the intersection of economic and military power in the networks of social power in Greek and Roman polities before the rise of the Empire.

Have You Really Come Home? Nec enim satis est corpore domum quem redisse, si mente alienus est (Dig.49.15.26) – Izabela Leraczyk (The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, izabela.leraczyk@kul.pl)

A passage from the *Institutes of Florentinus*, found in Justinian's *Digest*, states: "Nec enim satis est corpore domum quem redisse, si mente alienus est." This statement accurately reflects the concept of *postliminium* - the legal principle that allowed a free-born Roman returning from captivity to regain his former legal status. It suggests that mere physical return was insufficient; the individual also had to mentally and voluntarily express a will to return.

The case of Atilius Regulus exemplifies this. His arrival in Rome did not trigger the right of return because he had already pledged to return to his captors. This could be understood as a cultural or social influence - what we might broadly term the "barbarization" of the captive. The key issue here is that Regulus failed to express a will to return, as Pomponius notes: *sua voluntate apud hostes mansit*, even though he was aware that he could regain his citizenship and rights.

This raises an important question: what if a returning captive was unable to express their will? This presentation seeks to explore whether an analysis of ancient sources reveals factors that could explain why an individual might be incapable of asserting their right to *ius postliminium*.

Colonization as the Division of Spoils in Ancient Greece – Itamar Levin (Brown University, itamar_levin@brown.edu)

This paper contends that ancient Greek colonization operated in a manner akin to the distribution of spoils of war, with the conventions and mindset guiding settlers in the establishment of an apoikia closely paralleling those observed among soldiers in the division of booty following military campaigns.

Colonization and warfare in archaic Greece share profound structural affinities. Both were characteristically "private" undertakings, spearheaded by elite individuals who rallied groups of young men, driven by necessity, ambition, or a blend of both. Crucially, colonization often entailed armed conflict—whether against indigenous populations or rival emigrant groups—wherein the conquered land was effectively treated as the spoils of war, subject to division among the victors.

The distribution of land by settlers bears a striking resemblance to the allocation of booty in the aftermath of battle. Conquered territory was divided into plots which were then allocated by lot, a practice that evoked the egalitarian principles governing the division of spoils. Similarly, the convention of dedicating a tithe of the spoils to the gods found a parallel in the colonists' preliminary act of reserving sacred spaces before proceeding with the general apportionment of land.

The treatment of subjugated indigenous populations further underscores the analogy between colonization and plundering. Conquered peoples were often enslaved or consigned to subordinate roles. Herodotus, for instance, describes how the Libyans in Cyrene were violently attacked and deprived of their land by the Therians (4.159.4) and subsequently revolted against them (4.160.1). Similarly, the elite of Syracuse, descendants of the first settlers, maintained enslaved individuals known as "Cyllyrians," likely the native inhabitants of the region (7.155.2; cf. Dion. Hal. 6.62).

By interrogating these practices, this paper elucidates the shared ethos underpinning ancient Greek colonization and warfare, challenging the conventional separation between these two categories.

Truces Against Looting? On the Spondodikai of Argos and Their Role in the Corinthian War – Jack W.G. Schropp (University of Zurich jack.schropp@uzh.ch)

The recently published bronze tablets from Argos make it now possible to examine the historical role of the Argive officials called σπονδοδίκαι. Based on a detailed analysis of a passage from Xenophon's Hellenica, I will show in this paper that these officials weren't in charge of peace negotiations at the end of the Corinthian War, as previously assumed, but rather were Argive officials which declared sacred σπονδαί to impede the military campaigns by their enemies. In sum, these observations are consistent with the general patterns of development associated with the interstate institution of σπονδαί during the fifth century BC.

No Postliminium Needed. Roman Legal Approach to Things Looted by Pirates – Anna Tarwacka (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, a.tarwacka@uksw.edu.pl)

The Roman concept of occupatio included the possibility to get ownership of things taken from the enemy (G. 2,69). If it was the enemy who looted goods belonging to a Roman, the same principle applied. However, these goods were subject to the ius postliminii and they could be recovered by the previous owner (Paul., D. 49,15,19 pr.).
But if the goods were plundered by the pirates, the rules were different. The aim of the paper is to draw a parallel between the situation of people captured by pirates and the things they looted, in order to explain the problem of ownership. The legal rules on these matters had been developed since early republican times and were fully explained by classical jurists. The reasoning was rather aimed at determining the status of pirate captives and therefore it seems valuable to extend it to things, including slaves.

War in the Steppe – Characteristics and Modalities of Conflict in Palmyra – organized by Antonietta Castiello (antonietta.castiello1@uni-oldenburg.de) / Peter Freiherr von Danckelmann (peter.freiherr.von.danckelman@uni-oldenburg.de) / Stefano Magnani (stefano.magnani@uniud.it)

Maintaining Peace in a War-Torn Zone: The Soft Power of the Palmyrenes – Antonietta Castiello (University of Oldenburg, antonietta.castiello1@uni-oldenburg.de)

Palmyra, strategically situated at the crossroads of the Roman and Parthian Empires, played a pivotal role as a mediator between these two ancient powers. During the height of its influence in the 1st to 3rd centuries CE, Palmyra's strategic location along the Silk Road facilitated the exchange of goods, ideas, and diplomatic missions. The city's unique blend of local, Greco-Roman, and Persian influences fostered an environment where diverse traditions coexisted and thrived. Palmyra's semi-autonomous status within the Roman Empire enabled it to navigate complex political landscapes, acting as a buffer that eased tensions and promoted trade, securing its prosperity and contributing to regional stability.
During the same period, the Palmyrenes embarked on a voluntary diaspora, composed mainly—but not exclusively—of merchants and soldiers who established themselves across the two empires, further strengthening these connections. Their presence not only advanced trade and communication but also served as an unintended form of "cultural diplomacy".

The aim of this paper is to examine the manifold ways the Palmyrenes unknowingly succeeded in creating and maintaining peace between two of the greatest opposing Empires of the Ancient World.

Roman Soldiers in Palmyra – Peter Freiherr von Danckelmann (University of Oldenburg, peter.freiherr.von.danckelman@uni-oldenburg.de)

Palmyra's military endeavours were closely connected to the Roman Frontier System in the East and the various engagements of the Roman Syrian Army with the Parthians and the participation of Palmyrene Auxiliaries in Campaigns and Frontier-Systems throughout the Empire. This Paper aims to take a look in the opposite Direction: How did Roman Soldiers Fare in the City of Palmyra itself, how – if at all – did they integrate into the military and social fabric of the Palmyrenes? What can be said about their reception and their self-identification? To this extent, the epigraphic remains of the roman military presence within the Oasis shall be scrutinized. After it's integration into the Roman Sphere of Influence during the First Century B.C, numerous Roman units either visited Palmyra or were stationed there. This led to a small, but significant body of inscriptions that shed light on the presence of individual Roman Soldiers present within the Oasis. This concerns both foreign born Roman Soldiers who served either in the City or its Hinterland, as well as Palmyrene-borne Veterans of Roman Service who then returned to their roots.

The Gods and the Army. The Cult of Palmyrene Deities by the Soldiers in Dura-Europos, Dacia and Numidia – Aleksandra Kubiak-Schneider (University of Wroclaw, okubiak@gmail.com)

The epigraphic material in Greek, Aramaic and Latin provides evidence of worship of such deities as Yarhibol and Malakbel among the Roman army units composed with Pamyrenes. These deities are attested in the inscriptions related to the army in Dura-Europos (Syria), Dacia and Northern Africa. The gods, especially in the Palmyrene and Durene art, are depicted with the military costume and equipment. Their names are present in dedications set by the members of the Roman army. The goal of this paper is to present the similarities and differences between the material connected to the soldiers and to the cult in Palmyra. We will look at the people who honor these two deities, their identity, names and professions within the army and the cult. The most interesting case present few inscriptions from Dacia concerning the process of "training" or introducing the new cultic personnel of non-Palmyrene origins. Furthermore, we will analyze the way how the people address their dedications to Yarhibol and Malakbel: their epithets and associated deities honored together with them. Finally, we will try to find the answer why these two deities are chosen by the Palmyrenes to be venerated abroad as the divine protectors? This paper is the extension of the ongoing project People of the Gods financed by the National Centre of Science (NCN) and MSCA COFUND.

Palmyrene Troops in Egypt – Stefano Magnani (University of Undine, stefano.magnani@uniud.it)

Among the various Palmyrene units recruited in the auxiliary divisions of the Roman army, certain contingents were stationed in Egypt, where they engaged in garrison and control operations across multiple locations, particularly in the ports along the Nile, the Red Sea, and the routes connecting them. Here, the members of these units encountered environmental and social conditions that closely resembled those of their motherland, while also interacting with individuals from the oasis and its surrounding territory who, as merchants and shipowners, were actively involved in trade along the maritime routes between the Mediterranean and India. This paper seeks to explore several ambiguous aspects of this dual Palmyrene presence. The role played by Palmyrene units in Egypt appears to diverge from the established patterns evident among other units situated in Dacia and Numidia. This concerned, in particular, the scope of their operations, which may not have been confined solely to land routes, as well as their collaboration with corporations of Palmyrene merchants operating within the same province. It seems that, in Egypt, a model characteristic of the motherland was reproduced, featuring a collaboration among merchants, caravan leaders, and military commanders who, leading armed escorts, undertook initiatives to safeguard caravan traffic. This inquiry will examine whether and to what degree these dynamics resulted solely from imperial decisions or whether the interests and authorities of Palmyra also influenced these developments. Additionally, this discussion is pertinent to another area of investigation: the role of the Palmyrene units during the occupation of the province by the forces of Zenobia.

Mlkt᾽ Zenobia and Palmyra's Frontier Warriors – Steppe and Warfare as Decisive Factors of Palmyra's Rise and Fall – Ann-Christine Sander (University of Oldenburg, ann-christine.sander@uni-oldenburg.de)

Numerous sources bear witness to Palmyra's military potential in the Euphrates region, especially from Severian times onwards. Based on these sources, research postulates the existence of an institutionalized Palmyrene militia firmly integrated into the urban organization in the sense of a "police du desert" (Jean-Baptiste Yon), which ensured security and order in the Palmyrena and up to the Euphrates. The construct of this "police du desert" is particularly based on the many honorary inscriptions found in the local context of the oasis, which provide references to local elite members who possessed warlike potential and social positions of power closely associated with their warlike merits. From the Severan period onwards, those men were often referred to as strategoi in the inscriptions. However, a systematic examination of those inscriptions reveals several similarities that speak against the concept of an institutionalized Palmyrene militia. In my talk, I would like to show that these men, who were named as strategoi, functioned as local contacts in the context of Severan frontier policy due to their social position as members of the tribal local elites. Hence, the closer examination of these men allows new insights into the warlike potential of Palmyrene society and its close connection to the steppe, since the key to the local position of power of these men is to be found in the tribal structures

of Palmyrene society. They drew their martial potential from their family connections as they were part of local families which at least partly lived a mainly semi-nomadic and nomadic lifestyle. Members of those families possessed martial skills due to their lifestyle and could join together ad-hoc for example for raids and act as a warlike unit best described as frontier warriors as formulated in the ideal type of Kurt Beck. Based on the strategoi inscriptions, socio-political and military developments as well as power shifts within Palmyra's local elite can therefore be identified, which allow new insights into the rise and fall of Palmyra – as my talk will show.

A Palmyrene Paradigm? The Role of the Cohors XX Palmyrenorum on the Eastern Frontier – Gary T.S. Watson (University of Durham, g.t.s.watson88@icloud.com)

The role of the legions during peacetime is a somewhat unresolved question in scholarship, but an important part of this question is the role of auxilia. Scholarship has, in more recent times, emphasised the growth in importance of auxiliary units as they were integrated into the provincial and military system, and became regular units, during the imperial period. This led to a growth in status which placed auxiliary units almost on an equal footing with legionaries and, along with their new status, came new, and greater, responsibilities. This meant auxiliary units were now garrisoned in designated areas, or districts, within provinces, over which their commander often took charge. The garrison at Dura Europos represents just such a case and also provides some of the clearest evidence for the activity of soldiers during peacetime. Here, the records of the cohors XX Palmyrenorum, written on papyri, were discovered in the temple of Azzanathkona in the military quarter of the city. They contain morning reports, messages between commanders, and unit rosters, among other documents. The unit rosters, in particular, give some definitive evidence for the duties of the soldiers of this unit. Addressing the latest research, and utilising the some of the best evidence for the activity of Roman soldiers, I will elucidate what the role of the twentieth cohort of Palmyrenes was: why it was garrisoned at Dura, what it did while there, and what the implications are for the role of Palmyrene units in the wider empire. This unit may represent, not only a paradigm for Palmyrene soldiers working under the aegis of Rome, but also for auxiliary units in general.

Visualizing Victory: Propaganda Around Military Victories in Antiquity – organized by Julius Arnold (Julius.Arnold@colorado.edu) / Diego Suárez (diego.suarezmartinez@outlook.com)

(In-)Effective Commemoration of the Third Macedonian War? Re-Approaching the Monument of Aemilius Paullus at Delphi – Julius Arnold (University of Colorado-Boulder, Julius.Arnold@colorado.edu)

While much has been written about the history of the Monument of Aemilius Paullus at the Sanctuary of Apollo and its relationship to earlier dedications by Hellenistic kings at Delphi, such as the Pillar of Prusias II and the benefactions of Eumenes II, scholars have given little attention to how effectively the first Roman monument at the sanctuary would have commemorated the victory of Aemilius Paullus and Rome over the last Antigonid king, Perseus, and Macedon in the Third Macedonian War (171–169 BCE). This paper examines the challenges in conveying its message to different visitors of the sanctuary caused by the inscription, the sculptural decoration, and the location of the Monument of Aemilius Paullus. Now, its Latin inscription, explaining the origins of the monument, is displayed with translations at the Delphi Archaeological Museum. But would Greek-speaking visitors to the sanctuary in the 2nd century BCE have understood them? A Roman audience would have experienced difficulties in understanding the monument as well, especially the story told by the frieze. Nowadays, its fragments, depicting scenes from the decisive First Battle of Pydna (168 BCE), are accessible at eye level. But how visible would the clashing soldiers on the only 0.31-meter-high panels, once attached to the top of the nine-meter-tall monument, have been? Moreover, how comprehensible was the entire narrative, given that the back of the Monument of Aemilius Paullus directly faced the adjacent Temple of Apollo? I argue that Aemilius Paullus' decision to repurpose the structure begun by Perseus into a Roman victory monument was primarily symbolic. In doing so, he inherited the significant limitations of the original project, including its position within the sanctuary and the placement of the frieze, only being able to alter specific details. A new monument might have commemorated the achievements of Aemilius Paullus more effectively.

Foreign Royal Women in Roman Triumph: Gender Representation in Roman Victories during the Republic – Hatin Boumehache Erjali (University of the Basque Country, hatin.boumehache@ehu.eus)

In specific contexts, the inclusion of foreign royal women in Roman triumphs constituted a pivotal element of Roman propaganda and military spectacle, meticulously crafted to underscore the empire's supremacy over its adversaries. Recent scholarly contributions, such as Gendering Roman Imperialism (2022), edited by Hannah Cornwell and Greg Woolf, have elucidated the critical role of the agency and representation of foreign women within the historical narratives and ideological frameworks shaped by Roman imperialism. These

women—frequently high-status captives or hostages, including queens, princesses, and other members of defeated foreign royal households—were prominently displayed in the triumphal processions of victorious Roman generals, paraded through the streets of Rome as tangible evidence of Rome's absolute dominion over subjugated people. Their presence symbolised the complete domination of Rome over its adversaries, underscoring the power and reach of Roman authority.

This study seeks to examine the narrative and visual construction of these women as instruments of imperial propaganda during the Republican period. Notable examples of foreign royal women featured in triumphal processions include the display of the wife and children of Perseus during the celebrations of Aemilius Paullus, Arsinoe IV in the triumph of Julius Caesar, and the Mithridatic royal women showcased in Pompey's triumph. In most instances, the visibility of these women within such spectacles derived from their familial connections to defeated foreign leaders. In exceptional cases, they were sovereign rulers of foreign states, such as the Hellenistic kingdoms, that had directly opposed Rome's expansionist ambitions.

Moreover, literary sources speculate that certain foreign queens and princesses, such as Sophonisba and Cleopatra VII, chose to commit suicide to evade the humiliation of being paraded in triumph. In such cases, their physical absence was supplanted by visual representations, designed to portray them as vanquished adversaries, as exemplified by depictions of the Ptolemaic queen. These public displays exerted a profound influence on Roman audiences and collective cultural imaginaries, resonating across both the Republican and Imperial periods, as demonstrated by historiographical comparisons with figures such as Boudicca and Zenobia of Palmyra.

Three Illiadic Alternatives to the Illiad – Antonio Cilibrizzi (New York University, ac10640@nyu.edu)

Classical scholarship has long recognized that the Iliad threatens its plot through misdirection (Morrison 1992) and by conjuring up counterfactual scenarios to its narrative of the Trojan War (Lang 1989, Slatkin 1991, 2018). In my essay, I engage in a close reading of three Iliadic scenes that outline and/or visualize alternative scenarios to the main plot: Achilles' reply to the embassy in which the hero considers his own nostos, the shield's ekphrastic description of the two cities which juxtaposes war with third-party conflict resolution, and the athlon between Ajax and Diomedes during the Funeral Games which figures as a non-lethal outlet for demonstrating heroic valor. My method employs both narratologically informed (De Jong 1991, Grethlein 2008) and critical-theoretically oriented scholarship (Bloch 1986, Jameson 2024, Rose 1992, 2012, Sissa 2021) as it considers the epic's utopian élans in their theoretical implications as well as functional embeddedness within the plot.

Throughout the essay, Achilles functions as the only character who exposes and disowns at once the poem's dependence on war and valor deriving from victory. Patroclus' death, then, marks the end of his opposition to the epic's war-dependent trajectory. With the shield's ekphrasis, Iliad XVIII abstracts the epic from the characters' imbrications for a critique of its plot from a cosmic perspective. Patroclus' Funeral Games, instead, offer up an ersatz battlefield

which does not sacrifice physical existence in the name of heroism. I, then, conclude with some brief remarks on the pithoi passage (24.527-8), which exalts the inescapable agonism of mortality.

Basileus Nikator. The Victorious Body in the Official (Self-)Representation of Hellenistic Rulers – Gunnar R. Dumke (Münzkabinett und Antikensammlung Winterthur, Gunnar.Dumke@win.ch)

The concept of the victorious ruler in the Hellenistic era has been a foundational element in the study of Hellenistic rulership ideology, at least since Gehrke's essay of the same name in 1982. While the idea of the victorious king is prominently represented in Alexandrian court poetry, explicit references to the ruler's victory are exceedingly rare in official state documents. The victorious ruler is celebrated and presented in statuary depictions, yet even these are rarely official works, meaning those commissioned directly by the royal household.
If we turn our attention to the coinage of Hellenistic monarchs as a form of official documentation, it becomes evident that the ruler's body is almost never addressed in these representations. However, one geographical area stands out significantly in this regard from the Eastern Mediterranean: the Hellenistic Far East.
In the coinage of the Bactrian and Indo-Greek kings, the ruler's body is celebrated in ways not seen in other dynasties. Only here do we regularly find various portrait types that position the ruler's body within different legitimizing contexts. Additionally, depictions of rulers in heroic and combative poses appear. The choice of epithets for these rulers further emphasizes their victorious nature: titles such as Nikator ("Victorious"), Aniketos ("Invincible"), and Nikephoros ("Bringer of Victory") are among the most frequently used.
In my presentation, I will analyze the differences in the official representations of rulers across various dynasties (focusing primarily, though not exclusively, on the medium of coinage) and attempt to explain the unique position of the easternmost kings.

Vero Victoris Vanitas? Public Displays as a Proof of Victory With Political and Diplomatic Aims – Miguel Esteban Payno (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, mig.esteban.p@gmail.com)

To win a war, the diplomatic pressure is as much required as the success on the battlefield. The military victory was rarely enough if it was not political exploded. For that reason, victories were largely display in a public fashion before both inner and external audiences. The importance of portraying propaganda about one's own achievements for internal consumption —that is, aimed to one's fellow citizens— is largely known for Roman society, which had its own very structured formula in the well-known triumph. The purpose of those manifestations was clear: to explode politically the fruits of the victory. However, victory was needed to be explode also before an external, foreign audience and then the reasons used to be different.
In a multipolar context of high international struggle, one of the most difficult tasks was to convince potential allies to join forces against a common enemy. To do so, one should be able

to display oneself as the most appealing option. Despite the diplomatic skills of the sent ambassadors, tangible proofs of suitability (to become military allies) were likely more effective than any rhetoric discourse. After all, a picture is worth a thousand words. For that reason, visual evidence of previous victories became an evident instrument of persuasion. The key was, then, to be able to show something that could only have been acquired by defeating the enemy: the most obvious and less questionable was the standards. Since no army would have blithely abandoned these signs which had an important role in tactical organisation and strong emotional ties with collective identity, to be able to display enemies' standards was a clear demonstration of a victory over them. Moreover, they entailed additional advantages: they can easily be moved and displayed, they can be touch and they were, by their very character, clearly identifiable. Thus, "to walk the enemy's standards", like the Lusitanians did at least twice, has nothing to do with arrogance but to strategy.

The Eion Herms in the Athenian Agora. Display and Textual Strategies of a Collective (Hypo)Mnema – Pelayo Huerta Segovia (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, pelayo.huerta@estudiante.uam.es)

The siege of Eion in Thrace (c. 476/5 B.C.E.) marked the first military triumph of the newly formed Delian League commanded by Kimon. Ancient sources mention that the Athenian demos decided to commemorate the victory over the Persians by dedicating an honorific group of three herms with epigrams in the Agora. Although the precise location of this monument remains unknown, the northern sector of the Agora was referred to in antiquity as "the Herms", and the "Stoa of the Herms", mentioned by some authors, may have functioned as the architectural public frame for the statuary monument.
The herm, an image associated with Athenian political power since the Peisistratid tyranny, took on a distinct propagandistic role during Kimon's period, which I aim to explore and redefine in my paper. Thus, based on material, visual, and literary evidence, my contribution delves into the signification and the narrative of the triple herm group within the context of post-Persian Athens. Throughout my communication, I will deal with some topics such as the creation of the Agora's honorific scenario, the use of herms in shaping collective Athenian memory, and the visual perception of the Eion monument within the Athenian urban landscape, with a focus on its textual strategies and attending to its spatial interrelation with other memorial monuments erected after the Persian's destruction of Athens.

The Samnite Head from San Giovanni Lipioni: Visualized Victory? – Davide Morelli (Université Catholique de Louvain, davide.morelli@uclouvain.be)

In 1847, near the village of S. Giovanni Lipioni, not far from ancient Terventum, was unearthed a marvellously crafted Samnite bronze head. It quickly became a topical example of Italic portraiture, and it has been much discussed. Its date oscillates between the third and the first centuries BC. The stylistic references also remain uncertain. Some features connect the head with Roman portraits, like the Capitoline Brutus (hairstyle, shape and facial expression); other

features, like the dotted beard, hint at fourth-third century Lucanian tomb paintings (for example, the Paestan Andriuolo necropolis). In summary, interpreting this masterpiece remains problematic.
Analysing the place of recovery, Pentrian Samnium, may add much to the analysis. Between the fourth and the third centuries BC, Samnites and Romans fought a violent war for the dominion over Italy. After half a century of military activity, the Roman victory did not affect the Samnite way of life. On the contrary, the process of 'Romanization' took place very slowly and pacifically in Samnium, showing a somehow committed adhesion to Roman Italy. For example, the Pentrians, the main Samnite people, did not betray the Romans even when Hannibal invaded Italy; they coined on the Roman standard, and Samnite economy flourished in third century BC.
The bronze head may fit this cultural environment. Its craft, its proximity to both Latin and Campanian/Lucanian art, the likely third-century dating, the aristocratic provenance, all suggest that this artwork represents the artistic depiction of an aristocratic family, who expressed its vicinity to the rulers of Italy and claimed domination over their region. Therefore, this bronze head may assume a new meaning by framing it in the cultural environment of the Samnite-Roman military alliance, as a sign of victory and triumph.

Telling a Different Story: Visualizing Sulla's Civil War Victory – Jaymie Orchard (University of Otago, jaymie.orchard@postgrad.otago.ac.nz)

"Although, in civil war, he might have achieved illustrious deeds most beneficial for the state… no such man triumphed either in ovation or chariot," this often-quoted passage of Valerius Maximus has long been used uncritically (2.8.7). In the last two decades, however, scholars including Lange, Vervaet, Havener, Gotter and Börm have convincingly demonstrated that, though triumphs may not have been officially granted for civil war victories, they were, nevertheless, celebrated. However, the long-held belief that Roman generals involved in civil conflict denied or obfuscated the civil elements in their visual propaganda is still prominent in scholarship. Thus, there remains significant work to be done to (re)consider how civil war victories were visually celebrated in triumph and in subsequent commemorations.
My talk focuses on the first civil war triumph; that of Sulla in 81BCE. I demonstrate that, while Sulla set important precedents for the visualization of civil war victories, much of his visual propaganda extended or refined established conventions rather than introducing innovative ways of articulating victory. In his triumph Sulla utilized the established conventions such as the use of tituli, and the display of people taken as captives in novel ways to commemorate his victory at Porta Collina. Rather than promoting a narrative of conquest, he created one of restoration. The demolition and expansion of the curia and restoration of buildings damaged in the preceding decades of civil conflicts have rarely been considered within the context of Sulla's visual propaganda; however, they form an important component of his visualization of civil victory. Thus, I show that far from distancing himself from the civil aspects of his victory, Sulla utilised established methods of visual propaganda in triumph, coinages, and building projects

to position himself not as a conqueror of foreign enemies, but as restorer and refounder of the Roman Republic.

Open Panels

Peace and Its Correlates in the Ancient World – Jordan Michael Adamson (University of Leipzig, jordan_michael.adamson@uni-leipzig.de)

In this paper, we construct and analyze a database of warfare around the Mediterranean from 600 to 30 BCE. We first summarize the variation across space, time, and belligerents; documenting that battles are not a rare event statistically. Then we examine two main explanations for international peace: democracy and hegemony, using both statistical analyses and case study comparisons. We find no democratic peace among Ancient Greek city-states. We also find mixed results, both inside and outside of Greece, about how war relates to state power. Broadly, our results challenge political theories of peace and suggest more exploration of alternatives.

Miles et Medicus: Troops and Epidemics in the Ancient Rome – Yasmina Benferhat (University of Lorraine, ybenferhat@mail.de)

This paper aims at offering a synthesis about all the ties between war and medicine in the ancient Roman world. The topic does not seem to have been much studied: in the very useful book of Yann le Bohec L'armée romaine (1998), one finds only once the name medicus, and in a list of officers, while the valuable habilitation's book of Julianne Wilmanns Medizin in der Antike (1995) deals with the sanitary staff.
But it does not embrace the other aspects, especially one. Armies could be a vector of epidemics: a famous example is to be found around 172 CE with smallpox coming from Asia with the troops. The conditions of development of diseases could be worth studying: an example is the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC, when the troops suffer from the heat in a swampy place. Then there are many problems with the eyes according to Livy.

Exploitation and Obligation: Supplying the Legions of Republican Rome (200-47 BC) – Max William Michael Buckby (Oxford University College, max.buckby@univ.ox.ac.uk)

The armies of the mid-to-late Roman Republic were exploitative. Year on year citizens and socii of widely different socio-economic status served for ill-defined periods with uncertain gains to be made. The military stipendium was no wage, the distribution of booty and donatives an elite prerogative. In the castra itself, the exploitation of enslaved persons fulfilled many tasks. In the context of military supply, however, scholarship appears reluctant to adopt the term 'exploitation', appearing only once in the oft-cited works by Erdkamp and Roth respectively. In the recent Brill Companion to diet and logistics in
Greek and Roman warfare, there are only nine uses across 432 pages. This presentation, therefore, primarily with regards to the exploitation of civilian communities in Italy, the provinces, and areas of active campaigning, seeks to fulfill two interconnected objectives.

Firstly, it will problematize this lack of reference to 'exploitation', exploring how particular models of Exploitation Theory might augment the ways scholarship explores patterns of republican military supply, especially regarding foodstuffs. This avoids losing sight, innocently or otherwise, of the dark-side of republican military supply vis-à-vis analyses of efficiency and structural scale. Secondly, this presentation will explore and emphasise two
exploitative facets of republican military supply: the direct act/means of accumulating food, and the indirectly exploitative nature of warfare's impact on the productive relationships within ancient agriculture. These arguments, it is hoped, will highlight further the structures through which republican military supply constructed and perpetuated webs of elite-control, the asymmetrical relationships central to Rome's imperial dominance. Furthermore, they seek to direct further attention towards the contradictory patterns of routinisation and moral condemnation that pepper our literary tradition, how literary sources might weaponize the exploitative behaviours embedded in legionary supply, but rarely, if ever, propose alternatives: the imperial military force always needed to be clothed, watered, fed.

Socrates at War. The Military Experience of the Philosopher in Plato's Dialogue – Elena Sofia Capra (University of Rome Tor Vergata, elenasofia.capra@gmail.com)

The paper examines how Plato presents some aspects of Athenian military history through references to the philosopher's experience in the Athenian army. Focusing on Socrates' campaigns at Potidaea (432-429 BCE) and Delium (424 BCE), and Theaetetus's experience in the Corinthian War (around 394), it explores how Plato depicts the realities of ancient warfare. In the Apology (28d-29a), Socrates mentions serving in three military campaigns. While Amphipolis is not further explored, Plato provides vivid accounts of Potidaea and Delium. In the Symposium (219e-220e), Plato transports us to the daily lives of Athenian soldiers (not just the exceptional Socrates but also his ordinary comrades) engaged in a grueling siege marked by harsh weather—a detail that finds significant corroboration in Thucydides (2.70.1-4). The Charmides (153a-d) depicts Socrates, a veteran of Potidaea, returning to Athens and the relief and anxious curiosity of those who remained at home, emphasizing the impact of war on him and his interlocutors.
The Symposium (220e-221c) and Laches (181a-b) offer complementary perspectives on the disastrous retreat from Delium, showcasing Socrates' courage amidst the chaos and highlighting the disparities between infantry and cavalry, exemplified by Alcibiades.
The military experiences of Socrates can be juxtaposed with those of his final student, Theaetetus. The Theaetetus (141a-143b) introduces Theaetetus's own harrowing return from the Corinthian War, wounded and afflicted by dysentery, a common ailment among soldiers. In this way, Plato infuses the philosophical dialogue with a realistic portrayal of military suffering in a conflict in which he may have participated himself.
My paper aims to demonstrate that war for Plato was not merely philosophical or political theme central to memorable works, but a lived reality deeply intertwined with the philosopher's life

and the history of Athens. It explores the possibility of extracting from Platonic texts valuable insights into the ancient experience of war.

The Creation and Development of Rome's Secret Service: From the First Century BC to Late Antiquity – Martine Diepenbroek (University of Johannesburg, Martined@uj.ac.za)

The Roman army has had intelligence networks, at least since the time of Caesar (first century BCE). Various detachments of secret service within the Roman military include the speculatores and exploratores, the frumentarii, beneficiarii, agentes in rebus, and the stationarii. While scholars in the past have analyzed the structure and use of these various detachments of secret service within the Roman military, no study on the development of Rome's secret service has been done so far. This paper analyses how Rome's secret service developed from Caesar's spying network, with the exploratores and speculatores, into a complete military intelligence network by the time of Domitian who installed the frumentarii (late first century CE).
It will be shown that the development of Roman secret services represents a critical aspect of the Empire's ability to maintain political control, manage military operations, and monitor both internal and external threats. The speculatores and exploratores served as early military scouts and intelligence officers, responsible for gathering information on enemy movements and conducting covert operations. The frumentarii, initially tasked with overseeing military supplies, gradually assumed more significant roles in internal surveillance and policing, functioning as an early form of a state security apparatus. The beneficiarii, originally administrative officers, became integral to the imperial security network, particularly in their work with the emperor's personal safety and confidential communications. The agentes in rebus, often seen as imperial agents, were key figures in managing covert missions, diplomacy, and espionage. Meanwhile, the stationarii operated as an early form of local military police, maintaining order in Roman cities and military installations. By examining the development and interrelation of these distinct yet complementary units, this paper highlights the increasingly sophisticated nature of Roman intelligence, revealing its significance in the broader context of Roman imperial governance and military strategy.

A Not So "Moribund and Dead Naval System": Reassessing Roman Naval Forces in the Late Mediterranean (3rd – 6th Centuries) – Alex Elliott (University of St Andrews, ame9@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Scholarship has traditionally conceived the fleets and naval forces employed by the Roman Empire through the lens of modern military organisation. This understanding has led to the widespread belief that, during the early imperial period, Roman classes were organised into a 'Roman navy' that guarded the waterways of the Mediterranean and the northern frontier. No longer facing major competition at sea, this navy was gradually allowed to decay over the 1st and 2nd centuries until being largely swept away during the major barbarian invasions of the 3rd. As a result, this once powerful entity was almost non-existent during the later Empire until

being reconstituted as a 'Byzantine navy' in either the 6th or 7th centuries. However, more recent scholarship has seriously challenged this conventional view, noting that Roman naval forces of the Principate were never actually perceived or organised like that of a modern navy. This paper aims to reassess the role and development of fleets and naval forces of the late Roman Mediterranean (3rd – 6th centuries), directly challenging the concept of a 'Roman navy' and associated narratives of an institutional decline. Through an investigation into the fate of the early imperial classes as well as the creation and development of new classes only attested from the later Empire, a new interpretation of the history of late Roman naval forces will be provided.

A Hidden Roman Defeat of the Second Punic War? The Dictator M. Iunius Pera, Hannibal and the Aftermath of Cannae (216 B.C.) – Mathieu Engerbeaud (Aix-Marseille University, mathieu.engerbeaud@univ-amu.fr)

Some historians and philologists from the late 19th and early 20th centuries noticed the existence of an intriguing contradiction in the narratives of the year 216 B.C. In the aftermath of the battle of Cannae, as the Romans endeavoured to thwart the incursion of Hannibal into Campania, the return of the dictator M. Iunius Pera in Rome is explained in two different ways in ancient narratives. According to Livy, the dictator left Campania because he was called back to Rome to fulfil his duties. However, three other authors (Frontinus, Polyaenus, Zonaras) portray this event as the consequence of a military defeat against Hannibal. This discrepancy, which is infrequently referenced in the modern studies, deserve meticulous scrutiny in order to understand its underlying logic, which is inextricably intertwined with the aftermath of the battle of Cannae. Is it possible that Livy intentionally covered up the dictator's defeat? In the event of such a scenario being confirmed, what would be the implications of this silence and the benefits of a such manipulation? Alternatively, should we subscribe to the historical tradition which defends the idea of a second victory of Hannibal against the Romans in 216 B.C.? These reflections are designed to improve understanding of a relatively obscure episode that occurred at a crucial moment of the Second Punic War. This variant is highly indicative of political, historiographical and memorial logics, and as such, it is worthy of rigorous debate in order to determine its place in the history of the war.

From Conquest to Governance: The Economics of Provincial Command in the Late Roman Republic – Guiseppe Lucio Ficocelli (London, giuseppelucioficocelli@gmail.com)

The exploitation of Rome's provinces is a well-established topic, and often focused on the rapacity of imperium-holders and the infamous activities of the publicani. More recently, scholarship has centered around how the "state" reacted to issues of provincial governance and the activities of non-state actors. This paper aims to examine the changing relationship between senators and equestrians in the late Republic (second and first centuries BCE) as part of the

growing sophistication of the Roman state. In particular, this paper will argue that legal developments regarding the provincia and extortion (rebus repetundis) represented a major contribution to a renegotiation of the political and economic interests of Rome's elite coalition in this period. As Rome's empire expanded, the demands of consolidation led to increased legal restrictions on military commands, gradually transforming senators from conquerors into administrators. Simultaneously, a new framework of financial exploitation emerged. A new taxation regime, established by Gaius Gracchus's tribunate for the province of Asia, favoured the publicani, which was adopted in Africa and across the eastern Mediterranean. With fewer opportunities for plunder through warfare, senators increasingly partnered with equestrian businessmen to profit from provincial governance. These late Republican developments reshaped the dynamics of Rome's elite coalition.

The Role of Ancient Military Writing for Warfare in Antiquity and Beyond – Magnus Frisch (Hamburg, post@magnus-frisch.de)

The genre of ancient military manuals extends from the first half of the 4th century BC to late antiquity and continues into the Byzantine period. It can be divided into various subgenres: poliorcetic writings, which deal with the siege of cities, including those that focus on the technical side; tactical writings, which deal with the arrangement and movements of troops on the battlefield; strategic writings, which look at all aspects of warfare from the selection of a suitable commander to the conclusion of peace, as well as more specialized writings. One question that has not yet been conclusively answered is what role these writings actually played in warfare in antiquity and beyond. In order to answer this question, after a brief outline of the current state of research,1 I will examine what role and function these writings were originally intended to play according to the intentions of their authors, how these writings were actually used by contemporary readers, especially generals and officers, insofar as we have sources about them, and finally how these writings were received in later times, not only in literary but also in practical military terms: first by the Romans, later by the Byzantines and in modern times.

Ambivalent Signs: War Wounds in Classical Greece – Lennart Gilhaus (Humboldt University of Berlin, lennart.gilhaus@hu-berlin.de)

This paper examines the paradoxical status of war wounds in Classical Greece, arguing that while injuries sustained in battle could function as signs of personal bravery, they held limited or even negative value within the political culture of the Greek polis. In contrast to Roman practices, where scars enhanced civic authority and masculine prestige, Greek public discourse often framed the display of wounds as inappropriate or self-aggrandizing. The analysis demonstrates that scars could signify both courage and recklessness, making them inherently ambivalent markers of character. In a political culture that prioritized collective action and civic equality, personal displays of injury risked appearing self-aggrandizing and thus incompatible with the ethos of democratic citizenship

Five Centuries of War. The Development of the Bosporan Army in the Long Hellenistic Age – Julian Gieske (University of Bielefeld, julian.gieseke@uni-bielefeld.de)

Around 480 BC, the Ionian colonies on the Cimmerian Bosporus formed the so-called Bosporan Kingdom to coordinate commercial activities and to defend themselves against Scythian incursions (Diod. 12.31.1, Strab. 7.4.4). Throughout the long Hellenistic period, the realm would be threatened by its nomadic neighbours, but it also saw repeated civil wars, conflict with the neighbouring polis Chersonesos and invasions by Herakleia Pontike, Pontos and the Romans. How did the Bosporan state survive these five centuries of war against diverse foes that often commanded much greater resources than itself? How did they adjust to the different challenges posed by each enemy, and what influence did the native and nomad cultures have on the Bosporan mode of warfare? The paper will answer these questions in a concise analysis of the known wars and battles in Bosporan history during the period in question, drawing on literary, archaeological, epigraphic and numismatic evidence to shed new light on an often-overlooked topic. It will thus be a micro-history of the developments of Greek warfare from the end of the Classical period to the age of Roman dominion in an area where a unique blend of cultures and military styles emerged.

The Early Indian Art of Limited Wars: Understanding the Interplay of 'Kūṭayuddha' and 'Mantrayuddha' from Kauṭilīya's Arthaśāstra and Kāmandak a's Nītisāra – Diptangshu Dutta Gupta (Jadavpur University, Kolkata, dipddg2017@gmail.com)

Contemporary South Asian warfare, largely asymmetrical and limited in nature in a nuclear-armed world, echoes the emphasis on limited war strategies found in ancient Indian texts like the *nītiśāstras* (treatises on law). But total war, in early Indian literature, which was often justified as Dharmayuddha (or just war) costs resources and lives to achieve political objectives. Therefore alternatives to total war were diplomatic wars (Mantrayuddha) and concealed or deceptive wars (Kūṭayuddha). This paper aims to understand the concept of limited wars in Early India by studying these two forms of war in the Early Indian Historical context namely from the study of two prominent texts – the *Arthaśāstra* (c. 300 BCE – 200 CE) and the *Nītisāra* (c. 400 – 700 CE). The former, parts of which are attributed to Chānakya or Kauṭilīya represents the form of warfare in pre-Mauryan and Mauryan India, whereas the latter by Kāmandaka represents the practice of warfare in Gupta and late-Classical periods in India. These texts reflect the contemporary socio-political realities of those times and the evolving nature of warfare in Early India. It explores as these alternative strategies intersected within the framework of *dharmayuddha* (just war) in practice, drawing upon examples from ancient Indian history and Hindu epics like the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata*. The rise of Buddhism and Jainism, in fact, added new flavors to Early Indian violence and warfare. The paper further

demonstrates that Kauṭilīya and Kāmandaka, despite the changing landscape of warfare (including the impact of Greco-Bactrian and Hun invasions), maintained a realist perspective on conquest warfare, advocating for a nuanced approach that integrated diplomacy and deception. It attempts to shed light on comparative war philosophy and martial culture that dominated and shaped early Indian political history.

Can you lie on your tombstone? – Despina Iosif (Hellenic Open University / College Year in Athens, desiosif@yahoo.com)

My paper will examine a sample of pre-Constantinian tombstones that were erected in memory of Christians who had served in the Roman army. Such evidence enriches our understanding of how Christians in the Roman army regarded their position in the world and of how Christians viewed those in the Roman army. It helps us complete the early Christian profile and avoid idealizations. When we examine funerary inscriptions we ought to keep in mind that they were meant to be public exhibits. The text to be inscribed on a tombstone might prove to be the last piece of information that circulated concerning the deceased. Exceptional deeds, if any, and high offices, when available, were proudly enumerated; disgraceful deeds omitted and shocking rumours silenced. A tombstone was meant to honour the deceased, keep their memory alive and comfort their loved ones, and not to provoke the living. A tombstone usually presented what an average person would find admirable or acceptable. Under these circumstances, the existence of a plethora of pre-Constantinian tombstones in which both the Christian faith and a military career were displayed openly side by side is of the utmost importance in order for us to challenge the dominant notion that the early Christians unanimously felt uncomfortable about enlistment in the Roman army.

The Role of the Roman Army in Passing Medical Knowledge from Antiquity to the Middle Ages – Ido Israelowitsch (Tel Aviv University, ido0572@tauex.tau.ac.il)

With the decline of the Roman Republic and the foundation of the Principate the Roman army became a professional fighting force, permanently based in the potential conflict zone on the outskirts of the Roman world. This change called for the foundation of a considerable medical corps to provide medical services for about 300,000 soldiers at any given moment. The implications of such an institution were considerable for the society in which the corps was located. In addition to nursing battlefield wounds, one of the primary concerns of the Roman medical corps was to secure the troops' wellbeing in peacetime – by means of a healthy lifestyle, diet, exercise, and bathing. Thus, the medical corps held great sway over the daily routine in the barracks and also upon its surrounding residents. It offered potential employment for those who were deemed suitable to offer health care services; it led to the diffusion of medical knowledge, practices, and materials; and it encouraged the two way exchange of medical knowledge between army doctors and the local population. Moreover despite the crisis of the third century – which led to some fundamental changes in the organization of the army and

even the final decline of the Roman Empire in the west – the influence of the Roman army on the landscape and local population, particularly in the field of health care, did not diminish. Army bases still propagated certain ideas regarding hygiene and the connection between the environment and health, and they were still centres of knowledge and practice.
In my paper I will therefore look into the role of the Roman army as an agent of health care throughout the Roman world. Firstly I will review its importance in transmitting medical ideas and practices from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. I will then demonstrate that the changes brought about by the crisis of the third century did not diminish the importance of the army in spreading medical ideas. Indeed I will conclude by showing that the army continued to hold a central role in the exchange and diffusion of medical knowledge.

Heroes of War – The Virtus of the Soldier Saints – Winfried Kumpitsch (University of Graz, winfried.kumpitsch@uni-graz.at)

The relationship between Christianity and war is traditionally seen as a complicated one. Some scholarly traditions claim that before emperor Constantine I. "the" church was overtly pacifistic and opposed to the thought that Christians could be soldiers and remain good Christians, subsequently claiming that the change in this attitude was the result of moral-corruption caused by the newly offered power, while others argue for a more nuanced approach, and that the position of Christian authors and bishops towards the possibility of Christian soldiers being understood as good Christians, relied as much on the individual as on the specific circumstances they were acting in. Participants in this debate most often only focus on the elite discourse therefore drawing from theological treatieses, epistulae and (semi-)official documents, at best referring to sermons, in order to reconstruct what the common attitude was in regard for the requirements of being a good Christian and being a good Roman soldier. Hagiographic texts are often neglected in this context because of their problematic historicity, which contrasts to the otherwise high interest in hagiographic literature as mediator of ideal Christian behaviour. This paper will therefore primarily investigate the attitudes, about the requirements to be a good Christian whilst simultaneously be a good Roman soldier, according to the framing in the hagiographical literature of soldier saints.

Late Antique Narratives of Transgression: Visigothic Warfare – Gonzalo Landau Brenes (University of Hamburg, gonzalo.francisco.landau.brenes@studium.uni-hamburg.de)

During a phase of negotiation of power in the 6th Century, the regional elites that took over the Iberian Peninsula after the end of imperial administration carefully constructed the basis for an elective theocracy, known to us as the regnum gothorum. Local laws and conventions in Hispania, transmitted through oral and written traditions, evolved throughout Late Antiquity, famously finding a "canon" in the Liber Iudiciorum during the 7th Century. This legal compilation laid out, among other matters, the construction of a regnum in which various monopolies on violence co-existed and passed through different instances. The Goths, sackers

of Rome and bound by nature to murder their kings, as Fredegarius tells us, both excite and confuse modern scholars with their troubled royal line of succession, their frictions with neighbors and their hegemonial prescence in Iberia. Looking to understand this regnum, historians dissected the Liber, finding various laws on warfare presenting Visigothic ideals on military conflicts. Since legislative texts are limited by their nature, an interdisciplary eye looks to instead identify transgressions both within and without the Liber Iudiciorum. By focusing on transgressions told not only within legal sources, the reader can compare ideals with social conventions to widen the historical field of view. Aiming to locate and understand narrated transgressions within texts promise a unique view on Late Antique warfare in Iberia and expand on existing knowledge on the Visigothic Kingdom of Toledo. A comparison between different text types will serve to present the hypotheses of my ongoing dissertation on 7th Century discourses on violence in Hispania.

Hooves of Progress: The Evolution of Tactical Command in Western Mediterranean Pre-State Armies c. 400 - 50 BCE. – Alastair Lumsden (University of St Andrews, lumsdenalastair@gmail.com)

Several studies have formulated models tracing the evolution of military command from Archaic Greek warbands to Classical Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman contexts. Amongst others, Keegan and Wheeler distilled the changing nature of military command into three successive stages: The war chieftain or promachoi (who always fought in the front rank), the phalanx commander (who sometimes fought in the front ranks), and the mounted battle manager general (who rarely took part in the fighting). Each successive stage of commander was facilitated by the emergence of increasingly sophisticated and centralised socio-political institutions of power where authority gradually became recognised by individuals drawn from multiple communities. As armies increased in size and this recognition of centralised authority manifested itself militarily, it instilled the horizontal and vertical cohesion necessary to conduct more advanced tactical manoeuvres, which in turn required commanders to assume new roles and physically reposition themselves on the battlefield.
Unfortunately, to date, little attention has been afforded to the development of commanders and their tactical capabilities in 'barbarian' or pre-state cultural groups in the western Mediterranean. This paper addresses this issue and explores the evolution of military command and tactical capabilities of the Cisalpine Gauls, Celtiberians, Iberians, and Transalpine Gallic groups between the fourth and first centuries CE. Using Graeco-Roman battle narratives and archaeological evidence of socio-political developments, it demonstrates that these groups experienced a clear trajectory of tactical evolution from loosely affiliated familial or communal forces commanded by leaders positioned amongst massed infantry ranks with minimal tactical capabilities to large tactically flexible forces controlled by mounted generals able to monitor and react to the changing circumstances of battle reminiscent of the manipular legion.

Hellenistic Epigraphy and Forgotten Events: The Case of I.Rhamnous 407 on the War Between Antigonos Gonatas and His Nephew Alexander (c. 251-245 BC) – Federica Marocco (Unversity of Turin, federica.marocco559@edu.unito.it)

It is well known that the 3rd century BC represents one of the darkest periods in Athenian history due to the scarcity of literary sources. Because of this gap, the contribution of epigraphy assumes primary importance, sometimes enabling the recovery of forgotten events.
One example is the inscription I.Rhamnous 407, rediscovered in the Attic fortress of Rhamnous and recently published by Vasilis Petrakos1. This epigraph sheds light on an almost unknown conflict, recording the mobilization of the local population in 248/7 for a war. Given the strategic location of the Rhamnousian fortress on the northeastern coast of Attica, overlooking the Euboean Gulf, it is likely that this war was the one fought between Antigonos Gonatas and his nephew Alexander, son of Craterus (c. 251-245 BC). In 251 BC, after Antigonos had secured control of Athens following the Chremonidean War (c. 269/8-263/2 BC), Alexander revolted against him and established an independent realm with bases in Corinth, Chalcis, and Eretria. As a result, Rhamnous directly faced the territory seized by Alexander.
This rebellion and the ensuing conflict are briefly documented by a limited number of epigraphic and literary sources (IG XII 9, 212; IG II3 1, 1019, ll. 36-37; Plut. Arat. 17; Iust. Prol. XXVI; Suidas s.v. Euphorion), with essentially no traces of Athens' direct involvement or of the Athenian territory's role in the conflict. In this context, I.Rhamnous 407 would provide evidence that the war between Antigonos and Alexander indeed took place in Attica, thus enhancing our understanding of the event and offering new insights into its historical significance.

The Limits and Continuing Lure of Loot in Classical Sparta – Ellen Millender (Reed College, millende@reed.edu)

While describing the aftermath of the battle of Plataea, Herodotus recounts the Spartan regent Pausanias' reaction to the spoils that accrued from the Greeks' victory (9.82). At a surface glance, Pausanias represents the Spartans' reputed scorn for wealth in his comparison of Persian excess with Greek frugality (9.82.3). Herodotus' emphasis on the regent's visceral attraction to the Persian luxuries (9.82.2), however, indicates that the spoils of victory did not sit well with the Spartans.
The Spartans' concerns with the corrosive effects of plunder is likewise reflected in Herodotus' account of Pausanias' order that only the helots were to touch these treasures (9.80.1). He then describes the helots' assiduous stripping of corpses and theft of booty (9.80.2-3). The entire episode casts the acquisition and management of spoils in a negative light. The helots' ensuing sale of stolen booty to the Aeginetans below market value (9.80.2-3) again points to the Spartan view of the disposition of plunder as an unsuitable occupation for the Homoioi. The helots' transaction with the Aeginetans, more importantly, provides early evidence of the Spartans'

preference for selling their booty in the field and perhaps reveals an early concern not to bring plunder home (cf. Pritchett [1991], 403-16).
This paper first considers the evidence that both Herodotus and later authors provide on the Spartans' attempts to limit the dangerous effects of war-winnings on their society, whether by avoiding the dedication of captured enemy arms to the gods, giving control over the sale of booty to laphuropolai ("plunder sellers") (cf. Xen. Lac. Pol. 13.11) or by preferring to sell their booty in the field. This study then considers the failure of such attempts to curtail the corrosive effects of plunder in fifth- and fourth-century Sparta.

The East Slope of the Acropolis as a Mnemotopos of Mythical and Historical Wars" – Ioannis Mitsios (Athens, imitsios@arch.uoa.gr)

The Acropolis of Athens constituted the religious centre of the city, where all the greatest religious festivals — such as the Panathenaia, the Arrephoria, the Plynteria and the Kallynteria took place — and, most importantly, Athena, the patron goddess of the city, was worshipped.
But besides its major significance as a religious place — also confirmed by the existence of plethora of shrines dedicated to several gods, goddesses and heroes — the east slope of the Acropolis served as a mnemotopos of war.
Philochorus (FGrH 328 F 105) attests that during the mythical war between the cities of Athens and Eleusis, the oracle of Delphi declared that the city of Athens would be saved only if someone sacrificed herself. Then, the heroine Aglauros threw herself from the east slope of the Acropolis, heroically sacrificing herself for the salvation of the city. Similarly, Herodotus (8.53) attests that during the Persian sack of Athens, the Athenians of classical times jumped from the east slope of the Acropolis, from the sanctuary of Aglauros.
In my paper be employing a holistic approach — taking into consideration the literary, epigraphic, iconographic and topographic evidence — I will examine the importance of the east slope of the Acropolis as a mnemotopos of war, both in mythical and and historical times.

"The Last Line of Defence" : The Role of Women in Greek and Roman Siege Warfare – Amanthee Pussepitiya (Trinity College Dublin, amantheepussepitiya@gmail.com**)**

The historical narrative of war often depicts women, particularly the non-elite, in passive roles or as victims, overshadowing their contributions to these historical events and, thereby, to their states. This study examines the role of non-elite women in Greek and Roman siege warfare, focusing on their active participation and contributions from within besieged cities between the 5th century BCE and the 5th century CE. By analysing literary sources from this period, the study identifies recurring patterns in the portrayal of women during sieges while addressing the substantial gaps between the documented male experiences and the largely unwritten female experiences. The research confronts several methodological challenges, such as the scarcity of sources and authors' biases in available sources. Despite these limitations, this research aims to shed light on how these narratives have historically excluded women's active roles and to

discuss their possible contributions to war efforts that have been overlooked or omitted in traditional accounts. The analysis of these portrayals reveals not only the motives of the male authors but also allows room to speculate on the roles and activities of women that were likely left unwritten due to these biases, such as logistical support, morale-boosting, and resistance fighting. Ultimately, this research contributes to the ongoing efforts to integrate women's experiences into the broader historical narrative, offering a foundation for future studies to explore and correct these historical omissions.

"Cold Wars" in Polybius? – Simone Rendina (University of Cassino and Southern Lazio, simone.rendina@unicas.it)

Ancient historians, from Thucydides on, were aware that there is often no clear-cut distinction between peace and war. Instead, there are often many different shades between peace and war. Between two powers, there can be, for example, very tense diplomatic relationships or even warfare during periods of supposed peace; some wars can also be fought more through deception than through open warfare. Polybius of Megalopolis fully understood this complex reality, as his remaining books and fragments illustrate many different kinds of "cold war". His reflections on this topic are either moral and gnomic or refer to specific situations. Polybius asserts that there are situations in which commanders choose to employ deceit rather than open combat. The unfought stages of a conflict are really more pernicious and hazardous for the participants and more advantageous for the victor than the actual fighting stages. Thus, the historian contends that in some cases, using words to subdue an adversary might be more successful than using open combat. Polybius also describes the fundamental, although morally unacceptable, role of deception in wars and how it spread in Roman military customs. A number of situations in his "Histories" also involve ambiguity between war and peace, when it is unclear if two armies are at war or not. He emphasizes that treaties are frequently misleading and might hide animosity from one side in order to moralize against this type of ambiguity. As a result, agreements made with adversaries are frequently immediately broken, and the intentions of those who put a stop to hostilities or form alliances are frequently false. My paper asks what elements of novelty are in Polybius' reflections, what their relationship was with historiography and warfare of his own times, and how they compare to previous and later Greek historiography.

Hamilcar Rhodanus, a Carthaginian Spy in Alexander's Army? – Christian San José Campos (University of Alcalá, christian.san@edu.uah.es)

The aim of this talk is to analyse the figure of Hamilcar Rhodanus, a Carthaginian spy in the army of Alexander the Great. In order to achieve this aim, the paper presents and discusses the sources that report the event: Frontinus, Justin and Orosius. The historiographical analysis suggested here allows to consider that, if there was a Carthaginian spy in Alexander's ranks, any credibility of the event has been lost in the course of history.

De Bellicis Officiis: The Ciceronian System of International Relations Between Being and Ought-To Be – Fabio Saskida (University of Turin, saksida.fabio@gmail.com)

The just war represents a pivotal theme in the work of Marcus Tullius Cicero, especially through his systematisation of the subject in the De Officiis treaty. It is a work that has been the subject of numerous misunderstandings, especially by later theological reflection carried out by Augustine of Hippo.
Part of the difficulty of interpretation stems from the very structure of the text, which is articulated on several tracks, both legal and philosophical, which determine that hiatus between description and imagination of reality. An approach that allowed the author to broaden his reflection on the traditional concept of just war making it the paradigm of a Roman system of international relations.
The end point of the system consists in the applicability of the rights of war which constitute a set of behavioural prescriptions, such as the treatment of war prisoners, that has to be kept during a regular war fought against a legitimate enemy to mitigate excessive conflict violence. Their use is determined by the presence of a series of necessary but not sufficient conditions when taken individually. Cicero identifies three relevant parameters: the legal one, which includes the legitimacy of the adversary, the sociological one of the enemy's behaviour according to a pattern of reciprocity, and the political nature of wars themselves which can be fought for survival or for domination.
What emerges is a conception of war that is legitimate because it responds to elements of formal justice, but is embedded in political praxis and hinged on an ethical sensibility with a stoic matrix. Although the system outlined is not complete, due to the plurality of scenarios that can occur, it represents the most successful attempt in the ancient world to systematise the concept of war according to a secular and legalistic approach.

The Long Road to the Social War: Rome and its Italian Allies between Hannibal and Tiberius Gracchus – Ole Sebastian Siems (Free University of Berlin, ole.sebastian.siems@fu-berlin.de)

From the earliest part of Roman expansion in central Italy, forging alliances, be it by force or by negotiation, was a central feature of the republic's conquest. By the beginning of the second century B.C., the resulting system of bilateral alliances encompassed the entire Italian peninsular and had survived a full-blown assault on its structure in Hannibal's invasion of Italy. In comparison to that, the second century B.C. seems to have been far less strenuous on Rome's bond to its allied communities. Warfare, while being endemic over the entire period, was generally successful and, perhaps more importantly, being waged far from Italian soil. The increasing power of the Roman republic opened economic opportunities, for both Romans and Italians at large, all around the mediterranean.

But despite all that, at the tail end of the second century B.C., the question of Italian loyalties creeps itself into Roman political discourse. Mounting tensions resulted in the so-called social war, which ended with the enfranchisement of the allied communities south of the Apennines into the Roman citizen body. What had caused this explosion of violence? Was it, as later Roman historians let us know, the desire of the allies to become Roman citizens? Or was it a bid for independence or even empire by a coalition of disaffected subjects, as some modern historians like to characterise it? Or something else entirely?
In my presentation I would like to shift the lens on the social war and its reasons back into the early second century to offer a fresh perspective on some structural changes in Rome's treatment and relationship to its Italian alliesthat in my opinion laid the groundwork for the implosion of the system of Roman alliances almost a century later.

Tainaron and Spartan Use of 'Mercenary Diplomacy' – Kyriakos Velos (Monash University of Melbourne, kyriakos.velos@monash.edu)

Spartan territory became the chief recruiting ground for mercenaries in mainland Greece during the second half of the fourth century BC. According to ancient textual sources, tens of housands of troops were recruited from Malea and – most notably – Tainaron for military service in Greece and abroad. How did Spartan-controlled territory come to assume this role?
Scholarly analysis of this question has been largely perfunctory. In this paper, I intend to address this academic lacuna by examining the factors that lead to the establishment of Tainaron as the pre-eminent recruiting centre for mercenaries.
The geographic position of this remote promontory goes some way towards answering the question. Its isolation from Macedonian-dominated territory and its location at the southernmost tip of the Balkan Peninsula made it convenient for both eastbound and westbound expeditions. These benefits, however, do not explain why the Spartan authorities would have acquiesced to the presence of thousands of mercenaries on their territory. I argue that the emergence of Tainaron as a mercenary hub was not haphazard. Rather, it was fostered by the Spartan government in an attempt to regulate and profit from the extensive Peloponnesian mercenary market. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the evidence suggests that Sparta only permitted sympathetic states and leaders to recruit from Tainaron. By restricting access to these mercenaries, the Spartans were able to curry favour with friendly states and prominent commanders. Secondly, the fourth century BC witnessed the advent of the trend of Spartan royals serving as mercenary captains. The camp at Tainaron provided these Spartan leaders with a supply of mercenaries for their expeditions overseas. Ultimately, this investigation broadens our understanding of the ways in which Sparta used mercenaries as a potent tool with which to pursue its diplomatic ambitions in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods.

Group Minds in Roman Military Leadership: The Tetrarchs as a Case Study – Byron Waldron (University of Cyprus, waldron.byron@ucy.ac.cy)

The concept of group minds refers to intermentality, where the thinking, attitudes and decision making of a collective body transcends the cognition of the group's individual members. Group minds have long been a focus of study in the fields of ontology and cognitive science, and in recent years, classicists have sought to apply the study of group minds to ancient texts. This paper seeks to add to the discussion by considering the representation of co-rulership, particularly in the context of military leadership.

The imperial colleges of Diocletian and Maximian (AD 285-305) present an intriguing case study. In 285 Diocletian appointed his friend Maximian as co-emperor, whereby they together held the title of Augustus (senior emperor), and in 293 the Augusti then co-opted their sons-in-law, Constantius and Galerius, with the title of Caesar (junior emperor). In this way, the imperial college was expanded to four. Often referred to as the 'Dyarchy' and 'Tetrarchy', the members of these imperial colleges launched campaigns on multiple fronts on a regular basis, and these campaigns were acknowledged and celebrated by by other members of of the imperial college.

This paper will survey visual, numismatic, epigraphic and literary evidence to consider whether we can detect the implicit and explicit representation of group cognition. Moreover, while acknowledging that the Tetrarchy was unusual in some respects, and that there are limits to comparison across broad swathes of times, the paper will consider whether parallels can be found, specifically through a look at consuls in book X of Livy, where the historian recounts the Third Samnite War.

Onions and Salt-Fish: The Uninviting Menu of Chef Polemos – Guiseppe Zanetto (University of Milan, giuseppe.zanetto@unimi.it)

In Aristophanes' *Peace*, the demon of war is depicted as a monstrous cook preparing a spicy paste (a μυττωτός). Contrary to the traditional recipe, the ingredients are not garlic, cheese and honey, but Greek cities and regions, all ground together with a pestle in a huge mortar. The message is clear enough: war destroys and shatters everything. Yet μυττωτός, a common meal for soldiers in the field, suggests an additional layer of meaning, pointing to the dietary limitations imposed by conflict. A similar theme is evident in the final scene of the *Acharnians*: the warmonger Lamachos, setting out on a military expedition, fills his backpack with unappetizing rations (onions and salt-fish), while Dikaiopolis, preparing for a grand banquet, fills his basket with various delicacies. Onions, olives, and garlic also feature in Dikaiopolis' "parabatic" speech—these are foods hastily prepared in large quantities when Athens decides to go to war. Conversely, the thirty-year truce points to, and stands in sharp contrast with, the familiar call to arms known as "three days' provisions!". At the beginning of the second parabasis of *Peace*, the chorus, rejoicing at the war's end, sings "Oh! joy, joy! no more helmet, no more onions!"

These passages elucidate the common perception, accurately reflected in Aristophanes' comedies, that war is synonymous with dietary disorder and an unpleasant diet. More broadly, dietary and commensality practices reflect the well-being linked to peace and the discomfort caused by war. Polemos is not only portrayed as an abhorrent cook but also as a detestable

dining companion. The chorus of the *Acharnians* declares they would never want him as a symposium guest again, describing him as a drunkard who overturns tables and spills wine, thereby disrupting the convivial atmosphere of the banquet.

This paper aims to systematically explore the relationship between the state of war and the enjoyment and availability of food in ancient Greece, as illuminated by the above literary evidence. While war undeniably causes famine and hunger, it also profoundly affects societal attitudes towards food and the relational dynamics surrounding it, which are essential components of the lived experience.