

Embedded Network Security Concept University of Münster

ZIV Lecture
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Guido Wessendorf
Zentrum für Informationsverarbeitung
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
wessend@uni-muenster.de

wissen.leben
WWU Münster


topics

- security in large networks
 - basic considerations
- concept of Uni Münster
- technical realization
 - routing
 - access control lists (acl)
 - firewall
 - virtual private network (vpn)
 - intrusion prevention (ips)

security in large networks

- how do I increase IT-based security in large complex enterprise networks?
 - precedence: ES security
 - scalable
 - user and application oriented
 - methods (e.g.):
 - anti virus scan
 - personal firewall
 - update services
 - host intrusion prevention
 - policy orchestration
 - network security
 - obvious: task allocation
 - ES administrators:
 - security in ES
 - security in ES applications
 - end-to-end security
 - network administrators:
 - security in transport system (OSI layer 1-4)

„classical“ design insufficient



- perimeter firewall absolute insufficient
 - different security requirements within Intranet
 - no protection between Intranet parts
 - complex firewall rules
 - Intranet is as bad as Internet (especially at universities ;-)
 - high Intranet performance may increase efficiency and impact of attacks
- “classical” solution: roll out of many dedicated firewall devices
- problems in large networks
 - management, flexibility, operating and costs
- same considerations for other security instances, e.g. IPS

security concept at Uni Münster (1)



- Net Areas (“Netzzonen”)
 - basic elements are *Net Areas*
 - grouping of IT-Systems and parts of (network) infrastructure for which the users have common security and/or functional requirements, e.g.
 - workstations
 - servers
 - printers
 - lab systems
 - database systems with confidential information
 - public terminals
 - *Net Areas* can be technically mapped to e.g.
 - virtual LANs (vlans)
 - IP subnets

security concept at Uni Münster (2)



- Security for Net Areas
 - securing access to *Net Areas* with embedded network security functions as required, for example by
 - stateless packet screens (Access Control Lists, ACLs on routers)
 - stateful packet inspection (firewalls)
 - application gateways or proxies
 - Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS)
 - Virtual Private Networks (VPN) technology
 - content filter

security concept at Uni Münster (3)



- **Structured Network**

- interconnection of *Net Areas* as required, e.g. via
 - routers
 - switches
 - vpn
- (hierarchical) grouping and interconnection of *Net Areas* analogous to the (hierarchical) organization of enterprise, criteria could be e.g.:
 - rules or responsibilities
 - security requirements
 - service, device or user oriented

security concept at Uni Münster (4)



- **Virtualization**

- (hierarchical) interconnection and embedding of security functions wherever necessary requires many devices to be deployed
- optimization concerning effort, flexibility and costs through intensive usage of virtualization technologies:
 - virtual LANs (vlans)
 - virtual routers (vrf)
 - virtual security functions (firewall, ips, ...)
 - virtual multiple VPN access
- high performant devices centrally installed providing many virtual instances simultaneously

security concept at Uni Münster (5)




- User Self Care mechanism (“Mandantenfähigkeit”)
 - development, implementation and maintenance of typically complex (security) configurations of many (security) instances difficult for staff of central network administration
 - local administrators of decentral *Net Areas* are much deeper involved in their configuration requirements
 - solution: management platforms should support authenticated and authorized access of local administrators to only their (virtual) instances of their *Net Area(s)*
 - relief of central administration
 - shorter delays, just in time
 - important: central administrators keep “master” control and can enforce default or mandatory settings

summarization



- concept of *Net Areas* in *Structured Networks* enables
 - more simple and clear security rule sets
 - obvious and distributed responsibilities
 - delegation of administration to users (*user self care*)
- handling of (complex) security infrastructures also in larger enterprises does more scale and becomes more economic

University of Münster



Map covers around
3.8 x 3.8 kilometers

■ = University
■ = UKM (clinics)

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
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University of Münster



- one network
 - University of Münster (WWU)
 - University Hospital of Münster (UKM)
- together
 - 36.000 students / 12.000 employees
 - 277 buildings
 - 46.451 outlets
 - 19 core router
 - 1701 switches
 - 911 wlan access points

- hierarchical organization




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
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structuring

structure-template
as example



building of hierarchies




Institute of Physical Chemistry

Netzzone
Institut für Physikalische
Chemie (PC)

Stand: 08.01.2007 (GW)

inforum 1/2006



Net Area management

- self-development: *NIC_online*
- new: management of Net Areas included

NIC_online

WILHELMSCHE
UNIVERSITÄT
MÜNSTER

Guido Wessendorf - 24.06.2010 12:42:18

Netzzonen

Beurteilung Stammdaten Kind-Zone(n) zugehörige Objekte Verantwortung / Organisation

Netzzone: CIP
CIP-Pool-Rechner

zugeordnete Subnetze:

Subnetz	Mask	Adressbereich	Größe (rel)	Default Gateway
10.4.134.0	255.255.255.128	10.4.134.0 - 10.4.134.127	128 (37)	10.4.134.1

über zug Subnetz(s) ermittelbare Netzknoten:
Netzknoten ermitteln...

zugeordnete VPN-Zugänge:

Name	Typ	Beschreibung	VPN Gateway	Nutzergruppe	Gruppen- passwort	VPN-Profil (p-c)
Keine VPN-Zugänge zugeordnet!						

zugeordnete aktive ACL-Regelätze:


Nr.	Typ	Name	Version	Beschreibung
1	↓	v2555-down	5	
2	↑	v2555-up	9	

VPN access

- break through hierarchy to enable special or ad hoc access
- from somewhere
 - from other Net Areas
 - from Internet
- to somewhere
 - to other Net Areas or hierarchies
 - to Internet
- with differentiated authorization
 - e.g. `karl.maier@admin.math.uni-muenster.de`
- client-to-site or site-to-site

VPN access


- IPsec tunnel
- “virtual placement”




realization

„new offer“: security services


- centrally installed
- highly virtualized



so far




new



redundancy and load sharing

- for every part (routing, firewall, ips, ...)
- two redundant network trees
- no hot standby necessary (dynamic routing protocols)
- overbooking possible




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redundancy and load sharing

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Cisco Catalyst 6509




Supervisor Engine 720 (3BXL)

- 40 Gbps/slot (720 Gbps Crossbar)
- 4-port 10GE modules supported
- IPv4 routing in hardware, up to 400 Mpps
- IPv6 routing in hardware, up to 200 Mpps
- up to 1M routes (IPv4), 500k (IPv6)
- up to 1024 VRF (virtual router)
- 32k port ACLs (stateless, wire speed)

FWSM

Firewall Services Module Quick Recap...


Cisco.com



THE WS-SVC-FWM-1-K9 SUPPORTS THE FOLLOWING...

- Fabric line card
- Supported in Cisco IOS and Catalyst OS
- Network-processor based hardware
- Up to 5Gb aggregate throughput
- Up to 3Mpps aggregate performance
- Up to 1M TCP concurrent connections
- Supports dynamic routing (OSPF)
- Up to 100K new connections per second for HTTP, DNS and enhanced SMTP
- Support for 100 Virtual Firewalls
- Transparent Firewall support
- Intra and Inter chassis failover in Active/Standby mode
- Dynamic Routing with RIP and OSPF


- Cisco Security Manager (CSM)
- syslog event management
 - open source implementation:
syslog-ng + MySQL + Apache + php-syslog-ng

[illegible]

- shared port adapter (SPA) for carrier module for Catalyst
- 2.5 Gbps AES/3DES throughput
- up to 8,000 tunnels simultaneously
- tunnel setup rate 60 tunnels/sec
- up to 10 modules/chassis
- vrf support

IPsec VPN SPA

- vrf support (vrf-aware-IPsec feature)



- virtual tunnel end at arbitrary vrf (within same chassis)
- complete routing integration (e.g. ospf)

McAfee IntruShield 4010



- intrusion detection and prevention
 - signature based (e.g. anti virus)
 - behavior based (e.g. anti DoS)
 - known vulnerabilities
 - combined (day-zero-attacks)
- blocking in real time (if required)
- up to 2 Gbps throughput
- up to 1000 virtual systems (e.g. vlan based)
- transparent mode (“in-line mode”)
- management front end multi-subscriber capable (“administrative domains”)

prospects

- further deployment of concept!
 - structuring
 - building of hierarchies
 - user self-care mechanisms (via network database “NIC_online”)
 - access and firewall rules management
 - port configurations
 - subscriber management
- end system security for VPN connections
 - policy enforcement
- content filtering / secure proxies
 - e.g.
 - WebSense
 - N2H2
 - WebWasher
 - BlueCoat
 - IronPort

inforum – information of University Münster Computing Centre (ZIV)

- inforum 1/2005
 - Netzseitige IT-Sicherheitsmaßnahmen des ZIV
 - <http://www.uni-muenster.de/ZIV/inforum/2005-1/a17.html>
- inforum 1/2006
 - Netzseitige IT-Sicherheitsmaßnahmen des ZIV 2006
 - <http://www.uni-muenster.de/ZIV/inforum/2006-1/a04.html>
 - Stateful-Firewall-Service des ZIV
 - <http://www.uni-muenster.de/ZIV/inforum/2006-1/a06.html>
 - VPN-Service des ZIV
 - <http://www.uni-muenster.de/ZIV/inforum/2006-1/a05.html>
- inforum 1/2007
 - Netzstrukturierung im Naturwissenschaftlichen Zentrum (NWZ)
 - <http://www.uni-muenster.de/ZIV/inforum/2007-1/a20.html>