19.1 Introduction

During the twentieth century, copyright law has largely been ignored by legal scholars and the judiciary. However, with the start of the digital revolution, copyright became more and more important. Today, questions of copyright are ubiquitous: pictures are shared on social media platforms, streaming begins to displace classic broadcast media like TVs or radios, scientists share their latest results via the Internet and online research platforms. Against that backdrop, the crucial question is whether or not the applicable copyright law meets the requirements of the developing information society. Exceptions to copyright are an important factor in this regard. They have to fairly balance the copyright proprietors’ interest in a comprehensive protection of their work on the one hand and the increasing common interest in the free use of works on the other hand.

The first part of this article aims at giving the reader an overview of exclusions and limitations to copyright, as codified in the current German Act on Copyright and Related Rights (hereafter Urheberrechtsgesetz or UrhG).1 Presenting each and every limitation and exclusion to copyright is certainly beyond the scope of this article so that only some can be closely examined. This contribution focusses on those crucial to works in the digital society and economy.

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19.2 Rights of the Copyright Proprietor

The German Urheberrechtsgesetz grants the author of a work certain rights. The law differentiates between moral rights and exploitation rights. The moral rights are laid down in §§ 12–14 UrhG. The author has the right to determine whether and how his work is initially published (§ 12 UrhG), to be identified as the author of the work (§ 13 UrhG) and to prohibit the distortion or any other derogatory treatment of his work that is capable of prejudicing his legitimate intellectual or personal interests in the work (§ 14 UrhG). Following the continental European tradition, the Urheberrechtsgesetz thus emphasises the special relationship between the author and his work that arises from the fact that his personal feelings and experiences are made perceptible.\(^3\)

The exploitation rights by contrast aim at providing the author the possibility to economically benefit from his work. According to § 15 (1) UrhG, the author has the exclusive right to exploit his work in material form. § 15 (2) UrhG grants the author the exclusive right to communicate the work to the public in non-material form. Both provisions contain a non-exhaustive (in particular) list of sub-forms of material and non-material exploitation, which are further specified in §§ 16–22 UrhG. Thus, the German law generally guarantees a broad protection for copyright proprietors. As a consequence, authors are also protected against new forms of exploitation that come up due to technological developments.\(^4\) It is upon the legislator to nevertheless ensure a fair balance between the author’s economic interest and the public interest in the free use of the work by codifying new limitations and exceptions to the general rule of protection.\(^5\) Consequently, the copyright proprietor profits from a time advantage.

19.3 Limitations and Exceptions to the Protection

The Urheberrechtsgesetz contains numerous limitations and exceptions to the general rule of extensive protection. Some sub-forms of exploitation limitations are laid down in §§ 16–22 UrhG. Special exceptions are made in §§ 44a–63a UrhG (Section VI: Limitations to copyright).

\(^3\) G. Schulze, preface to §§ 12 ff. para. 1. In: Dreier and Schulze (eds), Urheberrechtsgesetz, 5th ed. C.H. Beck 2015.


19.3.1 System of Exceptions

The rules laid down in Section VI of the Urheberrechtsgesetz mainly set limits to exploitation rights, whereas the moral rights are unaffected. This again follows the continental European understanding of copyright, which focusses on the author's special relationship to his work. Nonetheless, there is no risk that authors' moral rights can be misused to block the exceptions provided for by the lawmaker. Some legal provisions even restrict the author's right of publication (§ 12 UrhG): § 44a (temporary acts of reproduction), § 45 (administration of justice and public safety), § 53 (1) (private copies) and § 57 (incidental works) UrhG are also applicable to unpublished works.

In contrast to other copyright systems, the German law does not provide for a fair-use exception but makes use of narrowly defined exceptions. The vast majority of exceptions expressly refer to one or more sub-forms of exploitation. For example, § 52a (1) UrhG is only applicable for making a work available to the public within the meaning of § 19a UrhG. § 52a (3) UrhG then allows to reproduce (§ 16 UrhG) the work needed for that purpose. Due to their exceptional nature, the provisions are subject to a restrictive interpretation by practitioners. The exceptions codified in the Urheberrechtsgesetz are exhaustive (see Sect. 19.2 above). However, in some special cases, a broader interpretation of written exceptions can be necessary to ensure conformity with the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz; hereafter GG). Although the exceptions are narrowly drawn, some leave room for flexibility. Formulations like 'to the extent that is necessary for the respective purpose' (§ 52a, cf. § 51, cf. § 53, cf. § 58, § 62 (4) UrhG) or 'justified for the pursuit of non-commercial aims' (§ 52a UrhG) open the possibility for courts to decide on a case-by-case basis and to take constitutional considerations (see Sect. 19.3.2 below) into account. In regard to § 52a UrhG (making works available to the public for instruction and research), for instance, courts granted teachers and

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### Table 19.1 Interests protected by limitation to copyright

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section(s) of UrhG</th>
<th>Protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§ 45 UrhG</td>
<td>Administration of justice and public safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 45a UrhG</td>
<td>Persons with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§§ 46, 47, 53 (3) UrhG</td>
<td>Usage in public schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§§ 48–50 UrhG</td>
<td>Freedom of information and freedom of press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 51 UrhG</td>
<td>Quotations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 52 UrhG</td>
<td>Communication of works to the public for non-profit purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 52a UrhG</td>
<td>Making works available to the public for instruction and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 52b UrhG</td>
<td>Communication of works at terminals in public libraries, museums and archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§§ 53 ff. UrhG</td>
<td>Private use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§§ 55, 56 UrhG</td>
<td>Interventions due to necessary technical procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§§ 44a, 57 UrhG</td>
<td>Minor interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 58 UrhG</td>
<td>Promotion exception for works in exhibitions, on public sale and in institutions accessible to the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 59 UrhG</td>
<td>Panorama exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§§ 61–61c UrhG</td>
<td>Use of orphan works (cultural heritage)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

lecturers a margin of discretion in respect to what is necessary to reach the educational goals.\(^{11}\)

#### 19.3.1.1 Colliding Interests

With each exception, the legislator tries to fairly balance the conflicting interests of the author in profiting from his work and the public interest in freely using the work. The colliding interests acknowledged by the exceptions to copyright are manifold, as Table 19.1 shows.\(^{12}\)

One can also see that the lawmaker sometimes distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial interests in using the work. By way of example, § 53 (1) UrhG only allows reproductions for private usage ‘insofar as they neither directly nor indirectly serve commercial purposes’.\(^{13}\) On the other hand, the panorama exception (§ 59 UrhG) also includes commercial use like the reproduction and distribution of postcards.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) For more examples see §§ 45a, 46, 52, 52a, 52b UrhG.

\(^{14}\) T. Dreier, § 59 para. 7. In: Dreier and Schulze (eds), Urheberrechtsgesetz, 5th ed, C.H. Beck 2015; for more examples see §§ 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61 UrhG.
19.3.1.2 Compensation
One can distinguish between exceptions that lead to compensation (e.g., § 54 UrhG for private use within the meaning of § 53 UrhG) and those that do not (e.g., § 55 UrhG). If compensation is provided, the law often claims that remuneration may only be asserted by collecting societies (e.g., § 54h (1) UrhG, § 52a UrhG). These provisions ensure that works can be effectively used while the copyright proprietor adequately benefits from the exploitation of his work. Authors are then paid by the collecting societies according to the society’s allocation key.15

19.3.1.3 Enforcement of Exceptions
In order to prevent copyright proprietors from circumventing the restrictions to copyright through technical measures, § 95b UrhG entitles beneficiaries to demand access to the work. The provision only applies to some exceptions that are specified therein. The listed exceptions are mostly designed to protect state interests,16 although parts of the private use exception are also mentioned.

It has to be criticised that the list is rather short. Particularly, neither digital private copies17 nor exceptions of importance to the media and the shaping of public opinion (§§ 48–51 UrhG)18 are included. § 95b UrhG has to be examined against the backdrop of § 95a UrhG, which legally protects effective technical protection measures taken by copyright proprietors. Consequently, beneficiaries are not allowed to crack the protection themselves with the aim of benefiting from an exception.19 Thus, even for the limitations listed in § 95b UrhG, there is a risk that individuals and small entities may fear fighting a lawsuit and are thereby hindered from obtaining the benefit of an exception to copyright protection. A right of self-help for beneficiaries would be more effective in this regard.

19.3.1.4 Impact of Contractual Agreements
The question whether or not exceptions to copyright law can be ruled out by contract is crucial for examining to what extent the public interest in freely using the work was adequately regarded by the legislator. Yet the lawmaker did not finally regulate in this regard. Some provisions explicitly state that exceptions do not apply to cases where a contractual agreement between the proprietor and the user has been reached or a fair agreement is at least possible.20 On the contrary, the legislator

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15 Some allocation keys have been subject to legal discussions and court decisions recently; e.g. Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 21 April 2016, Case No. I ZR 198/13, GRUR 2016, pp. 596–606.
20 E.g. §§ 52b, 53a (1) UrhG.
explicitly declares some other exceptions to be mandatory.\textsuperscript{21} However, as the latter provisions aim to implement EU directives into national law, one cannot conclude by argumentum e contrario that other exceptions are not mandatory.\textsuperscript{22}

Copyright law is part of civil law. Consequently, private autonomy and freedom of contract, as guaranteed by Article 2 (1) GG,\textsuperscript{23} are leading principles for copyright law as well.\textsuperscript{24} Therefore, some legal scholars conclude that each and every exception can be restricted by contract.\textsuperscript{25} This approach would of course pull the rug out from under the exceptions that are the result of a careful balance of conflicting interests by the lawmaker.\textsuperscript{26} Instead, the answer to the question has to be found on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{27} Focus has to be laid especially on the spirit and the purpose of the exception: exceptions aiming at (above all) protecting interests of the public or third parties have to be considered as mandatory.\textsuperscript{28} Consequently, at least the exceptions laid down in §§ 45, 45a, 46, 47, 50, 51 UrhG are mandatory. These provisions contain, inter alia, exceptions for the purpose of administration of justice or public security, for persons with disabilities, for reports on current events and for school broadcasting. Moreover, one can cast an eye on the exceptions listed in § 95b UrhG.\textsuperscript{29} For these exceptions, the legislator provided legal means for beneficiaries to enforce them and thus made clear that the listed exceptions are of high relevance.

Furthermore, contractual restrictions of non-mandatory exceptions in general terms and conditions have to be in line with §§ 307-309 of the German Civil Code (BGB) as well.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{21} E.g. §§ 55a, 69g UrhG.
\textsuperscript{24} Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 18 February 1982, Case No. 1 ZR 81/80, GRUR 1984, pp. 45-52; J. Gräbig, Abdingbarkeit urheberrechtlicher Schranken, GRUR 2012, pp. 331–337.
\textsuperscript{26} J. Gräbig, Abdingbarkeit urheberrechtlicher Schranken, GRUR 2012, pp. 331–337.
\textsuperscript{30} See A. Dustmann, preface to §§ 44a ff. para. 15. In: Fromm and Nordemann (eds), Urheberrecht, 11th ed, Verlag W. Kohlhammer 2014; see J. Gräbig, Abdingbarkeit urheberrechtlicher Schranken, GRUR 2012, pp. 331–337.
§ 52b UrhG allows the communication of works at terminals in public libraries, museums and archives as long as, among other criteria, there are no contractual provisions to the contrary. The German Federal Court of Justice pointed out in this regard that a fair and reasonable contractual offer of the copyright proprietor was sufficient to rule out the exception because, otherwise, beneficiaries could even reject fair offers in order to profit from the legal exception and thus misuse the law.  

As § 52b UrhG is based on Article 5 (3) lit. n of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (hereafter InfoSoc Directive), it was upon the Court of Justice of the European Union to clarify the legal situation. The court ruled that a mere contractual offer could not be understood as ‘purchase and licensing terms’ within the meaning of the InfoSoc Directive but that a contract was necessary.

Special regard has to be given to the exception laid down in § 52a UrhG, which allows making works available to the public for instruction and research as long as this use is ‘justified for the pursuit of non-commercial aims’. The German Federal Court of Justice ruled that a fair, reasonable and easily detectable offer for a contractual agreement leads to the result that the usage was not justified within the meaning of the provision. This of course only shifts the problem on to the question what fair and reasonable means in the specific case and thereby hinders beneficiaries from relying on the exception. Yet, after the afore-mentioned judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is likely that courts will apply the same standard to § 52a UrhG so that mere offers for an agreement will not suffice to make the usage unjustified.

In contrast to this, a contractual offer is sufficient to suppress the exception of § 53a (1) UrhG. The provision allows public libraries to reproduce and to transmit works in electronic form in response to an individual order in cases where, among other criteria, ‘it is not made manifestly possible, upon agreed contractual terms, for members of the public to access the contributions or small parts of a work from a place and at a time individually chosen by them and on terms which are equitable’.

35 M. Grünberger, Vergütungspflicht und Lizenzvorrang in der neuen EU-Bildungsschranke, GRUR 2017, pp. 1–11.
19.3.2 Triple Test (and Colliding Interests)

19.3.2.1 The Triple Test and Legislative Power

According to Article 13 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Article 10 (1) and (2) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and Article 16 (2) of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), national legislators of the contracting parties shall only provide for limitations and exceptions in (1) special cases and as long as they (2) do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and (3) do not prejudice the author’s legitimate interest in an unreasonable way. This means that the lawmaker is asked to develop a fair balance between the conflicting interests of the right holders on the one hand and the public on the other hand.37 However, the German legislator cannot be forced to acknowledge the triple test when passing laws on exceptions to copyright law. According to Article 20 (3) GG, the legislator’s power is only limited by the constitution itself. International law is therefore not binding for the lawmaker.38

Anyhow, the fundamental rights codified in the German Constitution set limits to the legislator’s power to pass laws stating exceptions to the proprietors’ rights. According to Article 14 (1) GG, property shall be guaranteed. Property within the meaning of this provision also includes an author’s copyright. At the same time, it is laid down in Article 14 (2) of the Constitution that the use of property shall serve the public good. It is upon the legislator to fairly balance these constitutional goals. Each curtailment of proprietors’ rights has to be justified by a public interest and has to be proportionate against that backdrop in order to be constitutional. As a result, the German Constitution itself states that protection of an author’s work must be the general rule.41

For those exploitation rights deriving from the InfoSoc Directive, Article 5 (5) of the Directive repeats that exceptions have to be in line with the same triple test. In contrast to other international treaties, European law is subject to an examination by the Court of Justice of the European Union,42 and any violation can be sanctioned by the means of the EU treaties.

40 Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 31 May 2016, Case No. 1 BvR 1585/13, GRUR 2016, pp. 690–697.
19.3.2.2 The Triple Test and Judicial Power

The triple test is, however, binding for the German courts when interpreting exceptions to copyright law. For exceptions mentioned in Article 5 (5) InfoSoc Directive, this follows from the fact that, according to Article 4 (3) of the Treaty on the European Union, national courts must construe national law in a way that the goals of the EU law are put into effect optimally.\(^43\) For the above-mentioned international treaties, this follows from the constitutional rule that national law has to be construed in conformity with international law.\(^44\)

Given the great number of cases dealing with exceptions to copyright protection, the number of cases in which courts denied to apply an exception on the account of the triple test is very low.\(^45\) In the most recent case, the Higher Regional Court Stuttgart had to decide on a case concerning the exception of § 52a UrhG, which allows making works available to the public for purposes of instruction and research. The usage is, among other things, allowed for illustration in teaching at universities as long as only ‘small, limited parts of a work’ are affected and to an ‘extent that is necessary for the respective purpose and [that] is justified for the pursuit of non-commercial aims’. In that case, a distance university made available 91 of 476 pages (19.12%) of a textbook for psychology students. The court pointed out that the decision whether or not the published part still is small and limited within the meaning of the law had to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the economic value of the published parts and the proprietor’s corresponding interest in economically benefitting from the work.\(^46\) In order to determine whether the publication’s extent was ‘necessary’, the court explicitly applied the triple test and stated that, as the publication covered each part of the book being relevant to the students’ final exam, the publication was not necessary.\(^47\) The university’s usage of the work conflicted with the normal exploitation of the work as there was no need for the students to purchase the book. For the same reason, the author’s legitimate interests were prejudiced in an unreasonable way. As a consequence, the judges ruled in favour of the plaintiff. The German Federal Court of Justice later overruled the decision but also pointed out that the triple test is decisive for the application of exceptions to

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\(^45\) T. Dreier, preface to §§ 44a ff. para. 21. In: Dreier and Schulze (eds), Urheberrechtsgesetz, 5th ed, C.H. Beck 2015; the following decision can serve as another example; Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 20 September 2012, Case No. 1 ZR 69/11, GRUR 2013, pp. 503–507.

\(^46\) Higher Regional Court Stuttgart, Decision of 4 April 2012, Case No. 4 U 171/11, GRUR 2012, pp. 718–727.

\(^47\) Higher Regional Court Stuttgart, Decision of 4 April 2012, Case No. 4 U 171/11, GRUR 2012, pp. 718–727.
copyright. The federal judges decided that the normal exploitation is only endangered when the usage is in direct competition with it. As the textbook was not only created for university use, this was not the case.

19.3.3 Examples

19.3.3.1 Exhaustion of the Right of Distribution with Special Regard to Digital Works

The Urheberrechtsge-setz provides the author with the right to determine whether or not his work is distributed (§ 17 (1) UrhG). If this right was unlimited, the proprietor could control the distribution of the work even if it was sold with his consent and he thus economically benefited from the work. In order to protect the freedom of trade, § 17 (2) UrhG therefore determines that 'Where the original or copies of the work have been brought to the market by sale with the consent of the person entitled to distribute them within the territory of the European Union or another state party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, their dissemination shall be permissible, except by means of rental'.

With respect to Article 4 (2) of the Directive of the European Union and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (hereafter Computer Programs Directive), which § 69c No. 3 UrhG implements into national law, the Court of Justice of the European Union decided that the right of distribution for software also exhausts when computer programs have not been sold on data storage devices but the 'buyer' downloaded a copy of the program in order to install the software (UsedSoft judgment). Considering the growth of digital distribution channels (e.g., downloads of music files, video files or e-books), the question whether or not the principle of exhaustion also applies to these situations becomes crucial when examining if the Urheberrechtsge-setz adequately regards the challenges of the digital society. Generally, the right of distribution (§ 17 (1) UrhG) applies to physical works like statues, paintings or CDs/DVDs, whereas the right of making works available to the public (§ 19a UrhG) is affected when works are distributed in a non-material form. Consequently, § 17 (2) UrhG does not directly apply to online distribution of works. The controversial question therefore is

whether § 17 (2) UrhG can be applied by analogy to cases dealing with digital works (online exhaustion). Analogous application is possible where two requirements are met: Firstly, there has to be a loophole that was unintended by the lawmaker. Secondly, the situations and affected interests in the not-regulated case have to be comparable to the one regulated.

German courts and some legal scholars are of the opinion that these criteria are not fulfilled in cases of digital distribution. They argue that § 19a UrhG (making works available to the public) conclusively regulates the topic and contains no provision comparable to § 17 (2) UrhG. Furthermore, they point out that the CJEU’s UsedSoft judgment cannot be transferred to other digital works because the InfoSoc Directive and not the Computer Programs Directive governs these cases. Additionally, it is argued that recital 29 of the InfoSoc Directive explicitly states that ‘the question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-line services in particular’. Finally, the opponents point out that, from an economic point of view, embodied and digital works are not comparable: whereas traditional storage devices like CDs are subject to deterioration, this is not true for files so that works on the primary and secondary markets directly compete with each other without qualitative differences. Furthermore, files could be reproduced without loss and any number of times.

However, each and every argument can be opposed. First of all, recitals of directives are not binding so that they can only influence the construction of the law. As the InfoSoc Directive dates back more than 15 years, it is obvious that the European lawmaker did not imagine how the online distribution of works would develop. The same holds true for the national lawmaker. As the UsedSoft judgment and the current legal discussion show, the question of exhaustion does arise in cases of online distribution.
services. Consequently, the obviously outdated recital cannot serve as an argument in this legal discussion.\textsuperscript{60} This also leads to the conclusion that there in fact is an unintended regulatory gap.\textsuperscript{61}

The opponents also forget that although the CJEU’s judgment cannot be transferred directly, it is possible to draw conclusions for other cases. The CJEU laid emphasis on the purpose of the exhaustion principle and pointed out that the author economically benefited from his work once and that he therefore should not be able to control the secondary market with regard to this work.\textsuperscript{62} In line with this, it is not understandable why the traditional book buyer should be able to resell the book, whereas e-book buyers do not have that possibility.\textsuperscript{63} The slightly lower price for e-books cannot justify that difference. The CJEU’s conclusions can thus be transferred to the question at hand. Any other result would provide copyright proprietors with the possibility to circumvent the principle of exhaustion by only relying on online distribution.\textsuperscript{64} At the same time, it is the copyright proprietor’s very own risk that digital works do not deteriorate when it decides to open up to the onlinedistribution market.\textsuperscript{65} Additionally, the possibility of numerous reproductions is irrelevant for the right of distribution and the question of exhaustion. The right of reproduction never exhausts so that each and every reproduction has to be covered by another exception to copyright.\textsuperscript{66} Finally, any other result would eliminate a functioning digital single market within the European Union.\textsuperscript{67}

However, as long as the legal discussion goes on and judgments of the highest courts do not clarify the legal situation, one cannot say that the current copyright law sufficiently acknowledges the challenges of the digital society. The lawmaker is consequently asked to explicitly extend the principle of exhaustion to cases of online distribution.

\textsuperscript{60}J. Druschel, Die Regelung digitaler Inhalte im Gemeinsamen Europäischen Kaufrecht, GRUR Int 2015, pp. 125–137; T. Hoeren and S. Jakopp, Der Erschöpfungsgrundsatz im digitalen Umfeld, MMR 2014, pp. 646–649.

\textsuperscript{61}T. Hoeren and S. Jakopp, Der Erschöpfungsgrundsatz im digitalen Umfeld, MMR 2014, pp. 646–649.

\textsuperscript{62}CJEU, case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp., ECLI:EU:C:2012:407, par. 43.

\textsuperscript{63}T. Hoeren and S. Jakopp, Der Erschöpfungsgrundsatz im digitalen Umfeld, MMR 2014, pp. 646–649.


\textsuperscript{67}T. Hoeren and S. Jakopp, Der Erschöpfungsgrundsatz im digitalen Umfeld, MMR 2014, pp. 646–649.
19.3.3.2 Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Press

The Urheberrechtsgesetz contains a number of provisions relating to the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press.

§ 50 UrhG, e.g., allows the usage (i.e., the reproduction, distribution and communication to the public) of works that become perceivable in the course of current events. Newspapers, periodicals, as well as other data carriers mainly devoted to current events and TV stations can rely on this exception when reporting about current events. The exception is limited to the extent justified by the purpose of the report, which opens the possibility to acknowledge conflicting interests above all the freedom of the press as laid down in Article 5 GG. The provision includes not only traditional newspapers but also digital online media. In these cases, however, the content has to be deleted as soon as a report is outdated. It is thus not allowed to create online news archives under § 50 UrhG.

§ 48 (1) UrhG further allows the press to reproduce and distribute speeches relating to current affairs as long as the speeches were made in public or were published by means of communication to the public.

Moreover, § 49 UrhG even permits the reproduction and distribution of individual broadcast commentaries and individual articles, as well as illustrations published in connection therewith if they concern current political, economic or religious issues and do not contain a statement reserving rights. In these cases, however, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the reproduction unless the new article only contains short extracts of several commentaries or articles in the form of an overview.

§ 51 s. 1 UrhG allows everyone, not just press representatives, to reproduce and distribute a published work for the purpose of quotation in so far as such exploitation is justified by the particular purpose. § 51 s. 2 UrhG then contains model examples: scientific works, works of language and musical works. Other works like videos can also be covered by § 51 s. 1 UrhG. The purpose of quotation is only met if there is a connection between the user’s work and the quoted work. This is, for example, the case, if the reproduction aims at illustrating the new content, at critically analysing the quoted work or at supporting one’s own

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73 Higher Regional Court Munich, Decision of 14 June 2012, Case No. 29 U 1204/12, ZUM-RD 2012, pp. 479–485.
position.\textsuperscript{74} The reproduction of a work without any or with only insignificant ‘intellectual’ debate is not sufficient.\textsuperscript{75}

Besides, it is permissible under § 52 UrhG to communicate a published work to the public if the communication serves a non-profit-making purpose for the organiser, participants are admitted free of charge and, in the case of a lecture or performance of a work, none of the performers (§ 73 UrhG) is paid a special remuneration. The copyright proprietor must be reimbursed adequately for the communication of his work in these cases if none of the exceptions mentioned is applicable (e.g., events organised by the youth welfare service). The exception in § 52 UrhG does not extend to the right of making works available to the public in the sense of § 19a UrhG.\textsuperscript{76} Therefore, publishing protected works on a private website does not fall within the scope of § 52 UrhG.

\textbf{19.3.3.3 Science and Education}

The current Urheberrechtsgesetz contains several exceptions to copyright in order to meet the demands of scientific and educational facilities.\textsuperscript{77}

§ 52a UrhG is applicable if works are made available to the public for instruction and research. According to § 52a (1) No. 1 UrhG, it is ‘permissible for published small, limited parts of a work, small scale works, as well as individual articles from newspapers or periodicals for illustration in teaching at schools, universities, non-commercial institutions of education and further education, and at vocational training institutions, exclusively for the specifically limited circle of those taking part in the instruction to be made available to the public, to the extent that this is necessary for the respective purpose and is justified for the pursuit of non-commercial aims’. One of the main problems with this provision is to determine how large ‘small, limited parts of a work’ may be. The Federal Court of Justice is of the opinion that not more than 12\% of the work or 100 of its pages may be made available to the public to meet that criterion.\textsuperscript{78} Other courts and legal scholars suggest different limits.\textsuperscript{79} On the one hand, it has to be criticised that each and every one of those lines is drawn at random and cannot substitute a case-by-case analysis taking into account the colliding interests.\textsuperscript{80} On the other hand, precise numbers, of course, improve

\textsuperscript{74} Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 30 November 2011, Case No. I ZR 212/10, GRUR 2012, pp. 819–822.

\textsuperscript{75} Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 20 December 2007, Case No. I ZR 42/05, GRUR 2008, pp. 693–697.


\textsuperscript{77} §§ 46, 47, 52a, 52b, 53 (3), 53a UrhG.

\textsuperscript{78} Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 28 November 2013, Case No. I ZR 76/12, GRUR 2014, pp. 549–556.

\textsuperscript{79} E.g. more than 10 but less than 20\%: U. Loewenheim, § 52a para. 4. In: Schricker and Loewenheim (eds), Urheberrecht, 5th ed, C.H. Beck 2017.

legal certainty. Distance universities also belong to the beneficiaries. For illustration in teaching" means that the usage of the work has to be linked to the educational content. It is sufficient that it deepens or complements the content. Furthermore, teachers and lecturers profit from a margin of discretion in respect to what is necessary to reach the educational goals. 

To profit from the exception, the beneficiary has to make use of technical protection measures (e.g., passwords for online platforms) in order to make sure that the work is only made accessible to the participants of the instructed group. The provision does not contain an absolute limit in regard to the number of participants so that in the case of a distance university the Federal Court of Justice found that 4000 participants can still be "a limited circle" within the meaning of § 52a (1) UrhG. The usage has to be 'justified for the pursuit of non-commercial aims'. That opens the doors to a case-by-case examination taking into account the conflicting interests. According to the Federal Court of Justice, a fair, reasonable and easily detectable offer for a contractual agreement leads to the result that the usage is not justified within the meaning of the provision (also see Sect. 19.3.1.4 above).

§ 52a (2) UrhG excludes from the exception works intended for use in instruction in schools and sets special rules for cinematographic works. § 52a (3) UrhG states that also the reproduction of works is allowed as long as the copies are necessary to make the work available (e.g., scans and/or storages on hard drives). According to § 52a (4) UrhG, equitable remuneration has to be paid to a collecting society.

§ 52b UrhG covers acts of communication of works at terminals in publicly accessible libraries, museums and archives if the institution neither directly nor indirectly serves an economic or commercial purpose (e.g., university libraries). The exception is limited to the stocks (permanent non-lending collection) of the privileged institution. Reproductions of a work in excess of the number stocked by the institution shall not be made available simultaneously at such terminals. Each and every electronic copy has thus to be ascribed to an analogue one. Consequently, the number of available exemplars can maximally be doubled.

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Works may only be made available under § 52b UrhG if the terminals are specifically dedicated to the purpose of research and private study. Thus, the ability of library users to download works on private laptops is not covered by the exception.\textsuperscript{88} Similarly, it is not allowed to provide computers that can also be used for other purposes (e.g., text processing or Internet research).\textsuperscript{89} The terminals have to be located on the premises of the privileged institution. That hinders the institutions from offering their users the possibility to access the works from outside the institution, e.g., via VPN access.\textsuperscript{90}

In April 2015, the Federal Court of Justice decided that a university library also profits from the exception if it offers its users the possibility to print the works or to store them on external storage media like USB sticks.\textsuperscript{91} The court rightly argued that one has to differentiate between the university’s usage (making the work available), which is covered by § 52b UrhG, and the usage of the library users (reproduction), which is often covered by § 53 UrhG (see Sect. 19.3.3.6 below).

The provision explicitly states that the exception can be ruled out by contract. The Federal Court of Justice pointed out that only existing contractual agreements hinder the beneficiary from profiting from the exception, whereas mere offers do not suffice.\textsuperscript{92} The author is granted equitable remuneration.

Against the backdrop of a developing information society, the foregoing provisions are an important step to adjust the Urheberrechtsgesetz to the needs of the science and education sector. However, there still is pent-up demand in that regard as the wording of the exceptions is often kept very broad, which necessarily leads to legal uncertainty. In order to eliminate the uncertainties, a government draft bill was published in April 2017.\textsuperscript{93} The government plans to reorganise and to extend the exceptions for science and education. Therefore, a new subsection shall be introduced (§§ 60a ff. UrhG). The following text gives a short overview of the most important legal changes suggested in the draft (referred to as § X UrhG draft).

\textsuperscript{91} Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 16 April 2015, Case No. I ZR 69/11, NJW 2015, pp. 3511-3517.
\textsuperscript{92} Federal Court of Justice, Decision of 16 April 2015, Case No. I ZR 69/11, NJW 2015, pp. 3511-3517.
The provision of § 52a UrhG is basically transferred to § 60a UrhG draft. The government suggests to legally define how large a work’s part may be (15%). Besides, the draft explicitly states that the use for preparation and follow-up work is also covered by the exception. Section 60a UrhG draft also regards that new technologies may be developed as it refers to ‘other forms of communication to the public’.

The current § 52b UrhG is transferred to § 60e UrhG draft. The government, however, suggests a significant change: the exception would no longer require that each electronic exemplar has to be ascribed to an analogue one so that it would suffice that the privileged institution is in possession of one analogue copy of the work. The draft also answers the question how terminal users may use the work. It explicitly allows, inter alia, the reproduction of 10% of a work per session.

It is further suggested to introduce a new exception for scientific use in § 60c UrhG draft. Section 60c (1) UrhG draft would allow to reproduce, distribute and make available to the public 15% of a protected work for a clearly defined circle of persons. According to § 60c (2) UrhG draft, up to 75% of a work may be reproduced for one’s own scientific use.

Section 60g (1) UrhG draft explicitly states that the exceptions provided in this new section are mandatory and that contradictory contractual agreements are void. According to § 60g (2) UrhG draft, this shall not be the case for the exception for terminals in public libraries and for the exception for orders for dispatch of copies.

The suggested changes would create a milestone on the way to a copyright law that sufficiently acknowledges the needs of the science and education sector. The changes would make it significantly easier for laymen to understand and follow the law. However, it is uncertain if the bill will be passed during the current legislative term, which will end in September 2017.

19.3.3.4 Exception for Big Data and Data Mining?
The Urheberrechtsgesetz currently does not provide for an exception that allows data or text mining.\textsuperscript{94}

In the above-mentioned draft bill (see Sect. 19.3.3.3 above), the government, however, suggests to implement a text and data mining exception with regard to research and science. The proposed provision (§ 60d UrhG draft) allows to reproduce works even if the reproduction is made automatically and systematically in order to gain evaluable data sets. Furthermore, the provision allows to make works available to a limited circle of persons for joint scientific projects and to third parties in order to make it possible for them to verify the scientific quality. The exceptions will only apply if the user pursues non-commercial purposes. Once the scientific purpose is fulfilled, the data sets have to be deleted. It is, however, possible to transfer the data sets to public libraries, archives, museums and other educational facilities, which then store the data sets as long as these institutions do not pursue a direct

or indirect commercial goal. § 60d UrhG draft does not allow to access protected works but assumes that the used work is already accessible for the scientists.

19.3.3.5 Temporary Copies with Special Regard to Streaming
Section 44a UrhG provides an exception to copyright in regard to temporary acts of reproduction:

Those temporary acts of reproduction shall be permissible which are transient or incidental and constitute an integral and essential part of a technical process and whose sole purpose is to enable

1. a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or

2. a lawful use of a work or other protected subject-matter to be made and which have no independent economic significance.

The provision implements Article 5 (1) InfoSoc Directive into national law and is not mandatory (see Sect. 19.3.1.4 above). The main question in regard to § 44a No. 2 UrhG is whether or not the provision is applicable to streaming situations. While courts have not dealt with the problem in detail yet, it is highly controversial among legal scholars.

In order to understand the legal debate, it is first necessary to understand the technical process of streaming. One has to distinguish between the so-called true-streaming method and progressive downloads. In the first case, single data packages containing work-pieces are downloaded to the RAM or the hard drive. These data packages are deleted immediately after the part has been played so that the next data package can be saved. The technically well-versed user has the possibility to choose the size of the storage (so-called buffer size) and can thus influence how long the stored movie or audio pieces are. The work as a whole is never stored when using this method. In case of the progressive-download method, the work is completely downloaded to the RAM or the hard drive. Normally, the copy gets deleted automatically after some time (e.g., when the play has ended, the browser is closed).

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closed or the computer is shut down), but it is also possible to change these settings or to simply prevent the deletion by not causing the deletion point. For an average user, it is hardly possible to find the data on the hard drive and to replay it. The user often has no influence on the streaming method, as for example streaming via 'flash player' always makes use of the true-streaming method, whereas a progressive download runs every time the 'DivX' format is used.

The vast majority of legal scholars are of the opinion that a reproduction of the work is only given in cases where the reproduced part itself is a protected work within the meaning of § 2 (2) UrhG. Others argue from a more economic point of view that, although parts of the work are often deleted immediately after they have been played, the whole work is eventually reproduced.

§ 44a is only applicable to temporary reproductions. The vast majority of legal scholars for good reasons are of the opinion that in the case of progressive downloads, the copies are not temporary because the data are not deleted immediately after the work has been played. This opinion is also in line with case law of the CJEU. Others point out that the user is not aware of the fact that the data may be stored on the computer even after the work’s play and ignore that no subjective criterion can be found in § 44a UrhG. Concerning the true-streaming method, it is

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to say that copies are temporary within the meaning of § 44a UrhG as long as the user does not choose a big buffer size.\footnote{C. Galetzka and E. Stamer, Streaming – aktuelle Entwicklungen in Recht und Praxis – Redtube, kino.to & Co., MMR 2014, pp. 292–298.}

The question whether or not a reproduction has independent economic significance can be answered in a similar way: if the data are stored for a longer period, there is also an independent economic significance.\footnote{A. Wiebe, § 44a UrhG para. 9. In: Spindler and Schuster (eds), Recht der elektronischen Medien, 3rd ed, C.H. Beck 2015; M. Stieper, Rezeptiver Werkgenuss als rechtmäßige Nutzung, MMR 2012, pp. 12–17.}

evidently illegal and thus draw a comparison to § 53 (1) UrhG. Others take the view that even those sources can be streamed in accordance with § 44a UrhG and compare the streaming situation to the reception of other communication channels like pirate radio stations or illegally copied books. In these cases, the reception of the work is never restricted by copyright although the source is illegal. Rightly, the same has to apply in the online context because, otherwise, copyright infringements would be dependent from technical coincidences.

On 26 April 2017, the CJEU came to a long-awaited decision in a case concerning the use of illegal streaming platforms. The court ruled that users of those platforms can at least not rely on the exception of Article 5 (1) InfoSoc Directive if they know that the works were made available illegally. The court first referred to former case law and pointed out that the pure reception of a work that was made available illegally generally has to be considered as lawful use. The case at hand, however, had to be judged differently as it was obvious for the user that the streamed content had been made available without the proprietor’s consent. To justify that result, the court made use of the triple test laid down in Article 5 (5) InfoSoc Directive (see Sect. 19.3.2 above). In the CJEU’s view, the normal exploitation of the work would have been endangered and authors’ rights would have been unreasonably prejudiced if the usage was covered by the exception for temporary reproductions.

Before the judgment of the CJEU, it was hard even for legal experts to keep a clear view of the issues and solutions in this matter. Even after the long-awaited judgment, important questions remain unanswered. The CJEU did, for example, not deal with the question whether the copy was temporary and did not differentiate between true streaming and progressive downloads. Furthermore, the court very much referred to the specific case the Dutch national court had to decide. In that case, due to explicit advertising, it was very clear that the users knew that the source was illegal. The decision thus shifts the problem on to the question which criteria determine if a source is obviously illegal. It is very questionable if the judgment can be transferred to less obvious illegal streaming portals.


120 CJEU, case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wallens, ECLI:EU:C:2017:300.

121 CJEU, case C-403/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v Leisure and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:631.
One also has to criticise that the question whether or not a copy is temporary is dependent on the program used by the Internet user, who often does not understand the technical background of streaming and thus does not see any difference. Against that backdrop, the legal situation in Germany and Europe cannot be considered sufficient and is likely to cause chilling effects for the development of an information society. If the reproductions during the streaming procedure are not in line with § 44a UrhG, they can still be covered by § 53 UrhG on the condition that the source is not evidently illegal (see Sect. 19.3.3.6 below).

19.3.3.6 Private Use
§ 53 UrhG provides for exceptions to copyright law in regard to the private use of works. § 53 (1) UrhG allows natural persons to reproduce works for private use and on any medium, as long as the copy neither directly nor indirectly serves commercial purposes and no obviously unlawfully produced model or a model that has been unlawfully made available to the public is used for the reproduction. The question whether the copy indirectly serves a commercial purpose is of course a crucial point when applying the provision in practice. For example, copies made for the purpose of professional education (university students) are not covered.\(^\text{122}\)

In line with the legislator’s intention, the vast majority of legal scholars are of the opinion that a model is obviously unlawful if the specific user could reckon that the source was illegal.\(^\text{123}\) The opposing view argues for an objective understanding of the provision and thus examines whether an average user could reckon that the source was illegal.\(^\text{124}\)

§ 53 (1) UrhG also covers reproductions made by others as long as no payment is received therefor or the reproductions are on paper or a similar medium and have been made by the use of any kind of photomechanical technique or by some other process having similar effects. Consequently, both the template and the reproduction have to be in physical form; digitals are not covered by the exception.\(^\text{125}\) However, this does not cover the distribution of the work. Therefore, § 53a UrhG (order for dispatch of copies) was created.\(^\text{126}\) This provision applies to reproductions of individual contributions released in newspapers and periodicals and small parts of a released work made by public libraries that are transmitted by post or facsimile as long as the orderer’s usage is covered by § 53 UrhG. For the reproduction and transmission of works in other electronic form, further criteria have to be fulfilled.


according to § 53a (1) s. 2 f. (also see Sect. 19.3.1.4). Equitable remuneration has to be paid according to § 53a (2) UrhG.

As opposed to this, § 53 (2) UrhG is applicable to ‘one’s own use’ in certain legally defined cases. The difference between these two sections of the provision is that one’s own use can also serve professional and commercial purposes as long as the copies are not passed on to external third parties. Legal entities are also covered by these exceptions. § 53 (2) UrhG is also applicable to reproductions made by others for the privileged purpose. §§ 53 (3)–(7) UrhG covers further specific cases.

The user does not have to pay compensation to the copyright proprietor for the usage covered by §§ 53 (1)–(3) UrhG. An indirect compensation is, however, ensured by §§ 54 ff. UrhG. For example, manufacturers of appliances and of storage mediums that are used for reproduction of works (e.g., copying machines or hard drives) have to pay remuneration to a collecting society according to § 54 (1) UrhG.

Parts of the provision have to be considered mandatory as § 95b UrhG refers to them (see Sect. 19.3.1.4 above).

19.3.3.7 Panorama Exception
Another exception to German copyright is stipulated in § 59 UrhG:

(1) It shall be permissible to reproduce, by painting, drawing, photography or cinematography, works which are permanently located on public ways, streets or places and to distribute and publicly communicate such copies. For works of architecture, this provision shall be applicable only to the external appearance.

(2) Reproductions may not be carried out on a work of architecture.

This so-called panorama exception has been part of the German copyright law since the end of the nineteenth century and is of major importance in the field of architecture. Nonetheless, it is also applicable to artistic works, works of applied art and other types of works listed in § 2 (1) UrhG. According to the provision, it permitted to reproduce works that are permanently located in public places and distribute such copies or make them available to the public. The reproduction is, however, only allowed in two-dimensional ways, e.g. in form of a photo or a video. The replication of a whole building, no matter in which size, is not permitted under § 59 UrhG.

In order to minimise the infringement of the proprietor’s rights, the exception does also not encompass works that are not located in the public permanently. This is particularly relevant for artists who only present their work (e.g., a sculpture) in

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public for a limited period of time. In these cases, a reproduction of the work is not permissible without the consent of the artist.\textsuperscript{131} Similarly, reliance on the exception is not possible when the reproduction shows parts of a work that are not visible from public places. Therefore, a photo of a building that was taken, e.g., from a private apartment across the street does not fall under the exception of § 59 UrhG.\textsuperscript{132} No compensation is granted for the usage in line with § 59 UrhG.

In 2015, when a harmonisation of the panorama exception was discussed in the European Parliament, the topic became part of a heated discussion in the media and the legal world. French delegates in the European Parliament proposed to adopt the French panorama exception which does not encompass reproductions for commercial purposes. This approach would, however, not only create legal uncertainty for photographers and documentary filmmakers. Problems would also arise when pictures or videos are shared on social media since many platforms require users to agree to a commercial usage of their content. In light of these problems and the harsh criticism, the parliament eventually decided to postpone the harmonisation of the panorama exceptions in the European Union.\textsuperscript{133}

\section*{19.4 Conclusion}

As shown above, the question whether the Urheberrechtsgesetz strikes a fair balance between the right of proprietors and the interests of the public to freely use a work is not easy to answer.

German copyright law focusses on the protection of the work and its author and is consequently based on copyright protection as its core principle. A fair balance can thus only be reached by means of the exceptions. In an overall assessment, German copyright law does fairly balance these goals.

The exceptions adequately give regard to the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press, which are the most important factors for a lively and stable democracy.

With respect to the exceptions for science and education, the hitherto steps taken by the lawmaker are in the right direction. The provisions, however, contain openly formulated criteria and thus cause legal uncertainty. The government draft bill of January 2017 would solve these problems and would introduce further exceptions.


for the scientific and educational sector. It is yet uncertain whether the lawmaker will pass the law during the current legislative term.

Besides, the German copyright law lags behind technical developments. As the German law relies on specific exceptions, it is upon the lawmaker to again and again pass new exceptions to copyright. The most important factor for an undisturbed development of an information society, of course, is legal certainty. The foregoing examination has shown that German copyright law often does not meet that requirement.

Especially in regard to the exhaustion of the right of distribution for digital works, users are confronted with legal problems that are incomprehensible for legal laymen. This legal uncertainty causes chilling effects in trade in such works. The same is true for the usage of works via streaming. The long-awaited judgment of the CJEU is not likely to clarify the situation. It will take further court decisions or even better a legal initiative to dispel legal uncertainty in that regard.