

Tool Support for TLA⁺: TLC, Apalache, and TLAPS

Stephan Merz

(joint work with Igor Konnov and Markus Kuppe)


<https://members.loria.fr/Stephan.Merz/>

Inria Nancy – Grand Est & LORIA
Nancy, France




IFIP WG 2.2 meeting 2022, Münster, Germany

TLA⁺ specification language



- describe and verify distributed and concurrent systems
- based on mathematical set theory and temporal logic TLA
- TLA⁺ Video Course
- documentation available from TLA⁺ home page

TLA⁺ specification language



- describe and verify distributed and concurrent systems
- based on mathematical set theory and temporal logic TLA
- TLA⁺ Video Course
- documentation available from TLA⁺ home page
- support tools
 - ▶ TLC explicit-state model checking
 - ▶ Apalache bounded (symbolic) model checking
 - ▶ TLAPS interactive proof assistant
 - ▶ PlusCal algorithmic language, front-end translator
 - ▶ IDEs TLA⁺ Toolbox, VS Code extension


Objective of this presentation

- Present three main verification tools for TLA⁺
 - ▶ verify (safety and liveness) properties of specifications
 - ▶ check that a specification refines another one
- Expose complementary strengths and weaknesses
 - ▶ push-button verification vs. human interaction
 - ▶ coverage and confidence provided
- Suggest a workflow for analyzing TLA⁺ specifications
- Presentation by example: distributed termination detection

Outline

- 1 Distributed Termination Detection
- 2 Checking Properties of the Specification
- 3 Safra's Algorithm for Termination Detection
- 4 Conclusion

Distributed Termination Detection




- Nodes perform some computation

- ▶ a node can be active (double circle) or inactive (simple circle)
- ▶ “master node” 0 wishes to detect when all nodes are inactive

- Relevant transitions

- ▶ active node finishes its computation and terminates
- ▶ master node announces termination

Distributed Termination Detection




- Nodes perform some computation

- ▶ a node can be active (double circle) or inactive (simple circle)
- ▶ “master node” 0 wishes to detect when all nodes are inactive

- Relevant transitions

- ▶ active node finishes its computation and terminates
- ▶ master node announces termination

Distributed Termination Detection



- Nodes perform some computation

- ▶ a node can be active (double circle) or inactive (simple circle)
- ▶ “master node” 0 wishes to detect when all nodes are inactive

- Relevant transitions

- ▶ active node finishes its computation and terminates
- ▶ master node announces termination
- ▶ active node sends a message to some node in the network
- ▶ node receives a message, waking up if inactive

TLA⁺ Specification: State Representation

MODULE *TerminationDetection*

EXTENDS *Naturals*

CONSTANT *N*

ASSUME *NAssumption* $\triangleq N \in \text{Nat} \setminus \{0\}$

Nodes $\triangleq 0..N-1$

VARIABLES *active, pending, termDetect*

TypeOK $\triangleq \text{active} \in [\text{Nodes} \rightarrow \text{BOOLEAN}] \wedge \text{pending} \in [\text{Nodes} \rightarrow \text{Nat}] \wedge \text{termDetect} \in \text{BOOLEAN}$

vars $\triangleq \langle \text{active}, \text{pending}, \text{termDetect} \rangle$

terminated $\triangleq \forall n \in \text{Node} : \neg \text{active}[n] \wedge \text{pending}[n] = 0$

- Declaration of constants and variables

- Definition of operators

- ▶ *TypeOK* documents expected values of variables: *active* and *color* are arrays (functions)
- ▶ *terminated* describes configurations in which the systems is globally inactive

TLA⁺ Specification: Abstract State Machine

$$\begin{aligned} Init \triangleq & \wedge active \in [Nodes \rightarrow \text{BOOLEAN}] \\ & \wedge pending = [n \in Nodes \mapsto 0] \\ & \wedge termDetect \in \{\text{FALSE}, terminated\} \end{aligned}$$

- **initial condition:** arbitrary activation status, no pending messages

TLA⁺ Specification: Abstract State Machine

$$\begin{aligned} Init &\triangleq \wedge active \in [Nodes \rightarrow \text{BOOLEAN}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending = [n \in Nodes \mapsto 0] \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect \in \{\text{FALSE}, terminated\} \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} Terminate(i) &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge active[i] \\ &\quad \wedge active' = [active \text{ EXCEPT } ![i] = \text{FALSE}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending' = pending \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect' \in \{termDetect, terminated\} \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} DetectTermination &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge terminated \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect' = \text{TRUE} \\ &\quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle active, pending \rangle \end{aligned}$$

- **initial condition:** arbitrary activation status, no pending messages
- **state transitions:** local termination, termination detection,

TLA⁺ Specification: Abstract State Machine

$$\begin{aligned} Init &\triangleq \wedge active \in [Nodes \rightarrow \text{BOOLEAN}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending = [n \in Nodes \mapsto 0] \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect \in \{\text{FALSE}, terminated\} \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} Terminate(i) &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge active[i] \\ &\quad \wedge active' = [active \text{ EXCEPT } ![i] = \text{FALSE}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending' = pending \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect' \in \{termDetect, terminated\} \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} DetectTermination &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge terminated \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect' = \text{TRUE} \\ &\quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle active, pending \rangle \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} SendMsg(i, j) &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge active[i] \\ &\quad \wedge pending' = [pending \text{ EXCEPT } ![j] = @ + 1] \\ &\quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle active, termDetect \rangle \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} RcvMsg(i) &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge pending[i] > 0 \\ &\quad \wedge active' = [active \text{ EXCEPT } ![i] = \text{TRUE}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending' = [pending \text{ EXCEPT } ![i] = @ - 1] \\ &\quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } termDetect \end{aligned}$$

- **initial condition:** arbitrary activation status, no pending messages
- **state transitions:** local termination, termination detection, sending/receiving of messages

TLA⁺ Specification: Abstract State Machine

$$\begin{aligned} Init &\triangleq \wedge active \in [Nodes \rightarrow \text{BOOLEAN}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending = [n \in Nodes \mapsto 0] \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect \in \{\text{FALSE}, terminated\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Terminate(i) &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge active[i] \\ &\quad \wedge active' = [active \text{ EXCEPT } ![i] = \text{FALSE}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending' = pending \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect' \in \{termDetect, terminated\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} DetectTermination &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge terminated \\ &\quad \wedge termDetect' = \text{TRUE} \\ &\quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle active, pending \rangle \end{aligned}$$

$$Spec \triangleq Init \wedge \Box [Next]_{vars} \wedge WF_{vars}(DetectTermination)$$

$$\begin{aligned} SendMsg(i, j) &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge active[i] \\ &\quad \wedge pending' = [pending \text{ EXCEPT } ![j] = @ + 1] \\ &\quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle active, termDetect \rangle \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} RcvMsg(i) &\triangleq \\ &\quad \wedge pending[i] > 0 \\ &\quad \wedge active' = [active \text{ EXCEPT } ![i] = \text{TRUE}] \\ &\quad \wedge pending' = [pending \text{ EXCEPT } ![i] = @ - 1] \\ &\quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } termDetect \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Next &\triangleq \vee \exists i \in Node : Terminate(i) \vee RcvMsg(i) \\ &\quad \vee \exists i, j \in Node : SendMsg(i, j) \\ &\quad \vee DetectTermination \end{aligned}$$

- **initial condition:** arbitrary activation status, no pending messages
- **state transitions:** local termination, termination detection, sending/receiving of messages

Outline

- 1 Distributed Termination Detection
- 2 Checking Properties of the Specification**
- 3 Safra's Algorithm for Termination Detection
- 4 Conclusion

Expressing Correctness Properties

① Safety properties: “nothing bad ever happens”

- ▶ type correctness

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box TypeOK$$

TypeOK is true throughout any execution of *Spec*

Expressing Correctness Properties

① Safety properties: “nothing bad ever happens”

- ▶ type correctness

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box TypeOK$$

TypeOK is true throughout any execution of *Spec*

- ▶ safety of detection

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box (termDetect \Rightarrow terminated)$$

formally again expressed as an invariant

Expressing Correctness Properties

① Safety properties: “nothing bad ever happens”

- ▶ type correctness

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box TypeOK$$

TypeOK is true throughout any execution of *Spec*

- ▶ safety of detection

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box (termDetect \Rightarrow terminated)$$

formally again expressed as an invariant

- ▶ quiescence of the system

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box (terminated \Rightarrow \Box terminated)$$

Expressing Correctness Properties

1 Safety properties: “nothing bad ever happens”

- ▶ type correctness

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box TypeOK$$

TypeOK is true throughout any execution of *Spec*

- ▶ safety of detection

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box (termDetect \Rightarrow terminated)$$

formally again expressed as an invariant

- ▶ quiescence of the system

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box (terminated \Rightarrow \Box terminated)$$

2 Liveness properties: “something good happens eventually”

- ▶ eventual detection

$$Spec \Rightarrow \Box (terminated \Rightarrow \Diamond termDetect)$$

note: the system isn't guaranteed to terminate

Explicit-State Model Checking Using TLC

- Create a model: finite instance of a TLA^+ specification
 - ▶ instantiate constant parameters and bound potentially large variable values
for example, create instance for $N = 4$
add state constraint $\forall n \in \text{Nodes} : \text{pending}[n] \leq 3$
 - ▶ indicate operator corresponding to system specification and properties to verify
 - ▶ TLC reports 4,097 distinct states (262,145 for $N = 6$)
- TLC integrated into TLA^+ Toolbox and Visual Studio Code Extension

Explicit-State Model Checking Using TLC

- Create a model: finite instance of a TLA^+ specification
 - ▶ instantiate constant parameters and bound potentially large variable values
for example, create instance for $N = 4$
add state constraint $\forall n \in \text{Nodes} : \text{pending}[n] \leq 3$
 - ▶ indicate operator corresponding to system specification and properties to verify
 - ▶ TLC reports 4,097 distinct states (262,145 for $N = 6$)
- TLC integrated into TLA^+ Toolbox and Visual Studio Code Extension
- Exploit the automation of TLC for gaining confidence in the specification
 - ▶ check putative (non-)properties and make changes to specification
 - ▶ e.g., remove guard $\text{active}[i]$ from definition of $\text{SendMsg}(i, j)$

Bounded Model Checking Using Apalache

- Apalache: symbolic (SMT-based) model checker

- ▶ check safety properties for finite executions of k transitions
- ▶ relies on constraint solving rather than state enumeration
- ▶ requires type annotations for constant and variable parameters
- ▶ must fix N , no bound on the number of pending messages

CONSTANT

* @type: Int;

N

VARIABLES

* @type: Int \rightarrow Bool;

active,

* @type: Int \rightarrow Int;

pending,

* @type: Bool;

termDetect

Bounded Model Checking Using Apalache

- Apalache: symbolic (SMT-based) model checker


- ▶ check safety properties for finite executions of k transitions
- ▶ relies on constraint solving rather than state enumeration
- ▶ requires type annotations for constant and variable parameters
- ▶ must fix N , no bound on the number of pending messages

```
CONSTANT
  \* @type: Int;
  N
VARIABLES
  \* @type: Int → Bool;
  active,
  \* @type: Int → Int;
  pending,
  \* @type: Bool;
  termDetect
```

- Performance when increasing N and k

checking both invariants:

- ▶ type correctness
- ▶ safety of termination detection



- Apalache is particularly sensitive to the number of transitions

Apalache for Checking Inductive Invariants

- $TypeOK \wedge (termDetect \Rightarrow terminated)$ is an inductive invariant
 - ▶ implied by the initial condition
 - ▶ preserved by every step allowed by the transition relation

Apalache for Checking Inductive Invariants

- $TypeOK \wedge (termDetect \Rightarrow terminated)$ is an inductive invariant
 - ▶ implied by the initial condition
 - ▶ preserved by every step allowed by the transition relation
- Apalache is well suited for verifying inductive invariants
 - ▶ check $Init \Rightarrow IndInv$ and $IndInv \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow IndInv'$ through Apalache queries for executions of length 0 and 1
 - ▶ verify quiescence property by checking $IndInv \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow (terminated \Rightarrow terminated')$


Apalache for Checking Inductive Invariants

- $TypeOK \wedge (termDetect \Rightarrow terminated)$ is an inductive invariant

- ▶ implied by the initial condition
- ▶ preserved by every step allowed by the transition relation

- Apalache is well suited for verifying inductive invariants

- ▶ check $Init \Rightarrow IndInv$ and $IndInv \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow IndInv'$ through Apalache queries for executions of length 0 and 1
- ▶ verify quiescence property by checking $IndInv \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow (terminated \Rightarrow terminated')$



Using TLAPS to Prove Correctness Properties

- TLAPS: proof assistant for verifying TLA⁺ specifications
 - ▶ proof effort is independent of the size of the instance
 - ▶ relies on user interaction to guide verification
 - ▶ uses automatic back-end provers for discharging proof obligations

Using TLAPS to Prove Correctness Properties

- TLAPS: proof assistant for verifying TLA⁺ specifications
 - ▶ proof effort is independent of the size of the instance
 - ▶ relies on user interaction to guide verification
 - ▶ uses automatic back-end provers for discharging proof obligations
- TLAPS proof of type correctness

THEOREM $TypeCorrect \stackrel{\Delta}{=} Spec \Rightarrow \Box TypeOK$
 $\langle 1 \rangle 1. Init \Rightarrow TypeOK$
 $\langle 1 \rangle 2. TypeOK \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow TypeOK'$
 $\langle 1 \rangle 3. QED \quad \text{BY } \langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, PTL \text{ DEF } Spec$

- ▶ hierarchical proof language represents proof tree
- ▶ steps can be proved in any order: usually start with QED step
- ▶ invariant follows from steps $\langle 1 \rangle 1$ and $\langle 1 \rangle 2$ by temporal logic

Proving non-temporal facts

- Brute force: cite relevant facts, expand definitions

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. \text{Init} \Rightarrow \text{TypeOK}$

BY *NAssumption* DEFS *Init, TypeOK, Node, terminated*

Proving non-temporal facts

- Brute force: cite relevant facts, expand definitions

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. \text{Init} \Rightarrow \text{TypeOK}$
BY *NAssumption* DEFS *Init, TypeOK, Node, terminated*

- Hierarchical proofs when brute force fails

$\langle 1 \rangle 2. \text{TypeOK} \wedge [\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}} \Rightarrow \text{TypeOK}'$
 $\langle 2 \rangle$ SUFFICES ASSUME *TypeOK*, $[\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}}$ PROVE *TypeOK'*
OBVIOUS
 $\langle 2 \rangle$ USE *NAssumption* DEF *Node, TypeOK*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 1.$ CASE *DetectTermination*
BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1$ DEF *DetectTermination*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 2.$ ASSUME NEW $i \in \text{Node}$, *Terminate*(i) PROVE *TypeOK'*
BY $\langle 2 \rangle 2$ DEF *Terminate, terminated*
... similarly for the remaining actions ...
 $\langle 2 \rangle$ QED BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2, \dots$ DEF *Next*

Proving non-temporal facts

- Brute force: cite relevant facts, expand definitions

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. \text{Init} \Rightarrow \text{TypeOK}$

BY *NAssumption* DEFS *Init, TypeOK, Node, terminated*

- Hierarchical proofs when brute force fails

$\langle 1 \rangle 2. \text{TypeOK} \wedge [\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}} \Rightarrow \text{TypeOK}'$

$\langle 2 \rangle$ SUFFICES ASSUME *TypeOK*, $[\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}}$ PROVE *TypeOK'*

OBVIOUS

$\langle 2 \rangle$ USE *NAssumption* DEF *Node, TypeOK*

$\langle 2 \rangle 1.$ CASE *DetectTermination*

BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1$ DEF *DetectTermination*

$\langle 2 \rangle 2.$ ASSUME NEW $i \in \text{Node}$, *Terminate*(i) PROVE *TypeOK'*

BY $\langle 2 \rangle 2$ DEF *Terminate, terminated*

... similarly for the remaining actions ...

$\langle 2 \rangle$ QED BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2, \dots$ DEF *Next*

Toolbox IDE assists
with decomposition

Proofs of Remaining Safety Properties

$$Safe \stackrel{\Delta}{=} termDetect \Rightarrow terminated$$

- Apalache suggested that *Safe* is inductive relative to *TypeOK*

THEOREM $Safety \stackrel{\Delta}{=} Spec \Rightarrow \Box Safe$

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. Init \Rightarrow Safe$

$\langle 1 \rangle 2. TypeOK \wedge Safe \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow Safe'$

$\langle 1 \rangle 3. QED \quad \text{BY } \langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, TypeCorrect, PTL \text{ DEF } Spec$

- ▶ use previously established theorem of type correctness
- ▶ proofs of steps $\langle 1 \rangle 1$ and $\langle 1 \rangle 2$ are similar as before

Proofs of Remaining Safety Properties

$$Safe \stackrel{\Delta}{=} termDetect \Rightarrow terminated$$

- Apalache suggested that *Safe* is inductive relative to *TypeOK*

THEOREM *Safety* $\stackrel{\Delta}{=} Spec \Rightarrow \Box Safe$

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. Init \Rightarrow Safe$

$\langle 1 \rangle 2. TypeOK \wedge Safe \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow Safe'$

$\langle 1 \rangle 3. QED \quad \text{BY } \langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, TypeCorrect, PTL \text{ DEF } Spec$

- ▶ use previously established theorem of type correctness
 - ▶ proofs of steps $\langle 1 \rangle 1$ and $\langle 1 \rangle 2$ are similar as before
- Proof of quiescence is similar
 - ▶ proofs of safety properties require essentially no temporal logic
 - ▶ automation of TLA^+ set theory is the main concern

Liveness Proof

- Liveness properties require fairness hypotheses

- ▶ reasoning about fairness requires establishing enabledness of action

LEMMA *EnabledDT* \triangleq ASSUME *TypeOK*

PROVE (ENABLED $\langle DetectTermination \rangle_{vars}$) $\equiv terminated \wedge \neg termDetect$

- ▶ TLAPS provides specific backends for reasoning about ENABLED

Liveness Proof

- Liveness properties require fairness hypotheses

- ▶ reasoning about fairness requires establishing enabledness of action

LEMMA *EnabledDT* \triangleq ASSUME *TypeOK*

PROVE (ENABLED $\langle \text{DetectTermination} \rangle_{vars}$) \equiv *terminated* \wedge $\neg \text{termDetect}$

- ▶ TLAPS provides specific backends for reasoning about ENABLED

- Now prove liveness theorem

THEOREM *Liveness* \triangleq *Spec* \Rightarrow $\Box(\text{terminated} \Rightarrow \Diamond \text{termDetect})$

$\langle 1 \rangle$ DEFINE *P* \triangleq *terminated* \wedge $\neg \text{termDetect}$

$\langle 1 \rangle 1.$ *TypeOK* \wedge *P* \wedge $[Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow P' \vee \text{termDetect}'$


$\langle 1 \rangle 2.$ *TypeOK* \wedge *P* \wedge $\langle \text{DetectTermination} \rangle_{vars} \Rightarrow \text{termDetect}'$

$\langle 1 \rangle 3.$ *TypeOK* \wedge *P* \Rightarrow ENABLED $\langle \text{DetectTermination} \rangle_{vars}$

$\langle 1 \rangle 4.$ QED BY $\langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, \langle 1 \rangle 3, \text{TypeCorrect}, \text{PTL DEF Spec}$

- ▶ again handled by action-level reasoning and propositional temporal logic

TLAPS Architecture




- Isabelle/TLA⁺: faithful encoding of TLA⁺ in Isabelle's meta-logic
- PTL: decision procedure for propositional temporal logic

Outline

- 1 Distributed Termination Detection
- 2 Checking Properties of the Specification
- 3 Safra's Algorithm for Termination Detection**
- 4 Conclusion


Overall Idea of Safra's algorithm (EWD 998, 1986)

- Token circulating on the ring



Overall Idea of Safra's algorithm (EWD 998, 1986)


- Token circulating on the ring



- ▶ nodes remember difference between numbers of messages sent and received
- ▶ token accumulates sum of differences
- ▶ receiving node becomes “stained”, passing token collects “stain”

Overall Idea of Safra's algorithm (EWD 998, 1986)


- Token circulating on the ring



- ▶ nodes remember difference between numbers of messages sent and received
- ▶ token accumulates sum of differences
- ▶ receiving node becomes “stained”, passing token collects “stain”

Overall Idea of Safra's algorithm (EWD 998, 1986)


- Token circulating on the ring



- ▶ nodes remember difference between numbers of messages sent and received
- ▶ token accumulates sum of differences
- ▶ receiving node becomes “stained”, passing token collects “stain”

Overall Idea of Safra's algorithm (EWD 998, 1986)

- Token circulating on the ring



- ▶ nodes remember difference between numbers of messages sent and received
- ▶ token accumulates sum of differences
- ▶ receiving node becomes “stained”, passing token collects “stain”

- Condition for detecting termination

- ▶ sum of counters at master node and token is zero
- ▶ master node is inactive and clean, and it holds a clean token

Verification in TLA⁺ (1)

- Similar correctness properties as for the abstract state machine
 - ▶ type correctness, safety, liveness, quiescence

Verification in TLA⁺ (1)

- Similar correctness properties as for the abstract state machine
 - ▶ type correctness, safety, liveness, quiescence
- Explicit model checking using TLC
 - ▶ fix number of nodes, assume bounds on counter values

values of bounds	# states	time
3 nodes, node counters ≤ 3	1.3 million	42 sec
4 nodes, node counters ≤ 3	219 million	50 min

Verification in TLA⁺ (1)

- Similar correctness properties as for the abstract state machine

- ▶ type correctness, safety, liveness, quiescence

- Explicit model checking using TLC

- ▶ fix number of nodes, assume bounds on counter values

values of bounds	# states	time
3 nodes, node counters ≤ 3	1.3 million	42 sec
4 nodes, node counters ≤ 3	219 million	50 min

- Is this enough for gaining confidence?

- ▶ model checking for 5 or 6 nodes looks infeasible
- ▶ experiment: error found for $N = 4$, but not $N = 3$
- ▶ TLC supports random exploration, finds seeded bugs in majority of runs

Verification in TLA⁺ (2)

- Checking inductive invariants

- ▶ type correctness
- ▶ invariant provided by Dijkstra (EWD 998), inductive relative to type correctness

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Sum}(f, S) &\triangleq \text{FoldFunctionOnSet}(+, 0, f, S) \\ \text{Inv} &\triangleq \wedge \text{Sum}(\text{pending}, \text{Node}) = \text{Sum}(\text{counter}, \text{Node}) \\ &\quad \wedge \vee \wedge \forall i \in \text{token.pos} + 1, N - 1 : \text{active}[i] = \text{FALSE} \\ &\quad \quad \wedge \text{token.q} = \text{Sum}(\text{counter}, (\text{token.pos} + 1) .. (N - 1)) \\ &\quad \vee \text{Sum}(\text{counter}, 0 .. \text{token.pos}) + \text{token.q} > 0 \\ &\quad \vee \exists i \in 0 .. \text{token.pos} : \text{color}[i] = \text{"orange"} \\ &\quad \vee \text{token.color} = \text{"orange"} \end{aligned}$$

Verification in TLA⁺ (2)

• Checking inductive invariants

- ▶ type correctness
- ▶ invariant provided by Dijkstra (EWD 998), inductive relative to type correctness

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Sum}(f, S) &\triangleq \text{FoldFunctionOnSet}(+, 0, f, S) \\ \text{Inv} &\triangleq \wedge \text{Sum}(\text{pending}, \text{Node}) = \text{Sum}(\text{counter}, \text{Node}) \\ &\quad \wedge \vee \wedge \forall i \in \text{token.pos} + 1, N - 1 : \text{active}[i] = \text{FALSE} \\ &\quad \quad \wedge \text{token.q} = \text{Sum}(\text{counter}, (\text{token.pos} + 1) .. (N - 1)) \\ &\quad \vee \text{Sum}(\text{counter}, 0 .. \text{token.pos}) + \text{token.q} > 0 \\ &\quad \vee \exists i \in 0 .. \text{token.pos} : \text{color}[i] = \text{"orange"} \\ &\quad \vee \text{token.color} = \text{"orange"} \end{aligned}$$

• Verification with TLA⁺ tools

- ▶ Apalache confirms that $\text{TypeOK} \wedge \text{Inv}$ is inductive
- ▶ TLAPS proves $\text{Spec} \Rightarrow \Box \text{Inv}$ for arbitrary N , modulo lemmas on Sum

Correctness by Refinement

- Specifications and properties are TLA⁺ formulas

▶ THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow Prop$ every run of $Spec$ satisfies property $Prop$

Correctness by Refinement

- Specifications and properties are TLA⁺ formulas

- ▶ THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow Prop$ every run of $Spec$ satisfies property $Prop$
- ▶ THEOREM $Impl \Rightarrow Spec$ every run of $Impl$ corresponds to a run of $Spec$

Correctness by Refinement

- Specifications and properties are TLA⁺ formulas

- ▶ THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow Prop$ every run of $Spec$ satisfies property $Prop$
- ▶ THEOREM $Impl \Rightarrow Spec$ every run of $Impl$ corresponds to a run of $Spec$
- ▶ stuttering invariance of TLA⁺ formulas is important here

Correctness by Refinement

- Specifications and properties are TLA⁺ formulas

- ▶ THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow Prop$ every run of $Spec$ satisfies property $Prop$
- ▶ THEOREM $Impl \Rightarrow Spec$ every run of $Impl$ corresponds to a run of $Spec$
- ▶ stuttering invariance of TLA⁺ formulas is important here

- Use existing tools for verifying refinement

$TD \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \text{INSTANCE } TerminationDetection$ THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow TD!Spec$

Correctness by Refinement

- Specifications and properties are TLA⁺ formulas

- ▶ THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow Prop$ every run of $Spec$ satisfies property $Prop$
- ▶ THEOREM $Impl \Rightarrow Spec$ every run of $Impl$ corresponds to a run of $Spec$
- ▶ stuttering invariance of TLA⁺ formulas is important here

- Use existing tools for verifying refinement

$TD \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \text{INSTANCE } TerminationDetection$ THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow TD!Spec$

- ▶ TLC checks refinement relation just as it verifies correctness properties
- ▶ Apalache verifies safety part of refinement by checking implications

$Init \Rightarrow TD!Init$ $TypeOK \wedge Inv \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow [TD!Next]_{TD!vars}$

Proving Refinement Using TLAPS

- Safety part of refinement

- ▶ rely on previous proofs of type correctness and inductive invariant
- ▶ proving initialization and step simulation is then straightforward

Proving Refinement Using TLAPS

- Safety part of refinement

- ▶ rely on previous proofs of type correctness and inductive invariant
- ▶ proving initialization and step simulation is then straightforward

- Proof of liveness: set up proof by contradiction

$$BSpec \triangleq \Box TypeOK \wedge \Box Inv \wedge \Box \neg termDetect \wedge \Box [Next]_{vars} \wedge WF_{vars}(System)$$

- ▶ 3 rounds of the token on the ring may be necessary
- ▶ (i) bring the token back to node 0, (ii) all nodes are white, (iii) token is also white
- ▶ prove corresponding lemmas, e.g. $BSpec \Rightarrow (terminated \leadsto (terminated \wedge token.p = 0))$
- ▶ conclude that action $TD.DetectTermination$ cannot be always enabled
- ▶ effort: 245 lines of proof, less than one person-day

Outline

- 1 Distributed Termination Detection
- 2 Checking Properties of the Specification
- 3 Safra's Algorithm for Termination Detection
- 4 Conclusion

Summing Up

- Complementary strengths and weaknesses of TLA⁺ tools
 - ▶ TLC essentially push-button, random exploration finds trivial bugs
 - ▶ Apalache: bounded model checking, particularly for verifying inductive invariants
 - ▶ TLAPS: highest confidence for proving properties of arbitrary instances

Summing Up

- Complementary strengths and weaknesses of TLA⁺ tools
 - ▶ TLC essentially push-button, random exploration finds trivial bugs
 - ▶ Apalache: bounded model checking, particularly for verifying inductive invariants
 - ▶ TLAPS: highest confidence for proving properties of arbitrary instances
- Tools share the same input language, modulo restrictions
 - ▶ TLC and Apalache require finite models, Apalache doesn't handle general recursion
 - ▶ TLAPS does not yet support recursive operators and relies on theorem libraries

Summing Up

- Complementary strengths and weaknesses of TLA⁺ tools
 - ▶ TLC essentially push-button, random exploration finds trivial bugs
 - ▶ Apalache: bounded model checking, particularly for verifying inductive invariants
 - ▶ TLAPS: highest confidence for proving properties of arbitrary instances
- Tools share the same input language, modulo restrictions
 - ▶ TLC and Apalache require finite models, Apalache doesn't handle general recursion
 - ▶ TLAPS does not yet support recursive operators and relies on theorem libraries
- Ongoing and future work
 - ▶ TLC: parallelize liveness checking, visualize counter-examples
 - ▶ Apalache: explore alternative SMT encodings, adapt algorithms such as IC3
 - ▶ TLAPS: better support for higher-order reasoning and for liveness proofs
 - ▶ IDEs: help with joint use of the tools, e.g. model checking from a proof step