

Gift or commodity?

Rural factor markets and family strategies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

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Factors used in agricultural production include labour, capital, and land. It has long been understood that the European household economy has for a very long time been structured by non-market relationships (kinship, seigniorial, and communal institutions). To a large degree, exchanges and transfers of production factors consisted of gifts within kinship networks characterised by relationships of reciprocity or within relationships of patronage and loyalty (i. e., in the case of a feudal transfer of a farm from a nobleman to a peasant). Conversely, statements about factor markets are absent in most theories of the peasant society and economy. This holds true both for Chayanov (TSCHAJANOW 1923, cf. SMITH 1984) and his more recent adaptations within the field of proto-industry theory (MEDICK 1976) as well as for the German historiographic tradition that considers the house or the holding as the major focus of peasant family strategies (for a critique, see TROßBACH 1993). More than with other goods, to trade factors on “impersonal” markets is seen as a distinctive feature of the modern world, absent from pre-modern peasant society (POLANYI 1979, pp. 131–2).

More recent scholarship, by contrast, has placed greater weight on the commodity character of major factors of production already before the agrarian reforms of the nineteenth century. Thus, MACFARLANE (1978) has argued that already in late medieval England access to land occurred largely through the market, and he has interpreted this fact as a sign for an early appearance of ‘English individualism’. In criticising Macfarlane’s work, LEVI (1986) and SABEAN (1990) demonstrate, however, that market transactions can also occur between kin and that, therefore, market and kinship structures interact in many ways.

In a more general perspective, therefore, both factor markets and kinship systems can be understood as systems of resource allocation. Within kinship systems, many goods and services are allocated, but they are especially relevant for the circulation of factors. For instance, land is transmitted largely through inheritance, and marriage usually results in a recombination of land, capital as well as male and female labour power. Pooling and co-ordination of labour and of other resources is organised within the household, but also beyond its boundaries. In the tradition of Polanyi, many historians and anthropologists emphasize that non-capitalist economies are “embedded” in kinship and other kinds of primary social relations. The dichotomy between “gift” and “commodity”, therefore, implies more than just the distinction between “transfer” vs. “exchange”. Rather, it touches upon assumptions about peasant mentalities, upon the distinction between “use-value” and “exchange value” and, finally, upon the very purposes of peasant activity: “subsistence” and “profit”.

In the perspective of neo-classical economics as well as liberal political theory (WALZER 1984), however, systems of resource allocation should be detached from each other in order to work effectively. The theory of interlocked markets has been derived from the study of factor markets, and it has primarily focused on the drawbacks of interlocking (for an overview, see papers in BARDHAN 1989). For instance, kinship ties should be irrelevant for a person's odds to get a good job, and nobody's choice of employer should be restricted to those to whom he or she owes money. Not surprisingly, agrarian institutions in many parts of the world have missed that standard, leading to various forms of unfree labour, exploitation, and corruption. Traditional agrarian institutions as they were common in pre-reform Westphalia are a case in point: The *Heuerling* institution interlocked labour and housing markets, and seigniorial rights embedded the credit and land markets into the context of the system of domination, even if forced labour was rare in Westphalia. To create "free" markets for factors in order to encourage their better allocation was among the main goals of the liberal agrarian reforms in nineteenth century Prussia.

We do not intend to look at all the relationships that "interlocked" or "embedded" the land and credit markets with kinship, the political realm, or with other markets at the same time. Nevertheless, we think that the only useful answers to the unsettled issues outlined above can be given by empirical studies, and that land and credit are among the most promising objects for such an endeavor. This short paper provides an outline of a project we have been pursuing for quite some time now. Ulrich Pfister has gathered material on notarial records for three parishes of the canton of Zurich during the eighteenth century, and the illustrations provided below are mostly taken from this material (PFISTER 1993, 1994). Georg Fertig and his group are currently working on a project supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and devoted to the analysis of land registers and church records for up to four Westfalian parishes during the nineteenth century. In this context, a pre-study has been elaborated to establish the methodology for the combined study of the land market, mortgage credit and family reconstitution material. The following text provides empirical evidence that may serve as an illustration of the major lines of inquiry that we consider as important. As the research goes on, however, the project will make greater efforts to study equally both, land and credit markets, and link them systematically with information on the demographic evolution of families.

Dimensions of market development

The discussion of the provoking work by Macfarlane suggests that the existence of records covering transactions of real estate and the provision of mortgage credit does not constitute an automatic proof of the commodity rather than gift character of production factors. Rather, beyond purely institutional aspects such as contract freedom for peasants or the obligation to draw written acts, market development involves a variety of dimensions. This section illustrates some of them.

(1) *Degree of commercialisation.* An indication of the relevance of market depth is the share of real estate being transacted over a specific period. Table 1a provides evidence for three parishes with respect to the degree of commercialisation of different types of real estate.

Schöfflisdorf is a typical lowland parish characterised by subsistence grain farming and wine cultivation. Oberrieden is situated on the lake of Zurich and dominated by commercial wine growing (vineyards cover some 30 per cent of the cultivated surface area), dairying and silk manufacture. Oetwil, finally, is an upland community characterised by dispersed settlement, labour-extensive grain farming and cattle raising, and cotton weaving. In comparing the former two parishes, it is interesting to note that the commercialisation of fields and meadows is higher in Schöfflisdorf than in Oberrieden, whereas the market for vineyards, which constitute the major factor of production for small peasants in Oberrieden, is more liquid in the latter community. The permeation of the society of Oetwil with proto-industry seems to go together with a relatively high level of commercialisation for all types of real estate, including houses. By comparison with Sabean's Neckarhausen or with contemporary material from Savoy (LEVI 1992), all these levels of commercialisation appear below average, however; there clearly must be more variables than the development of commercial agriculture or the liquidity added by proto-industrial earnings that determine the degree of commercialisation of factors of production in a particular area.

Table 1b adds comparable evidence from Löhne for the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s. The temporal dimension was included since on July 15, 1840, the common lands of the village were divided. The turnover rates are pretty low compared to the Swiss villages, with the exception of high quality lands: gardens and meadows. After the division of the common lands however, the trade in low quality lands (pastures, which include wasteland) increased dramatically, and transactions in fields increased also. A possible explanation is that parcels of common lands were sold in order to buy fields. In this case, the division of the commons could be interpreted as adding liquidity.

Another indicator for market relevance is the share of total transactions (including family events such as transactions linked to dowries or post-mortem inheritance) that are handled through the formal market. The only indication to that respect comes from Sabean's study on Neckarhausen, and we will perform a similar analysis for Westfalian material.

(2) *The context of interaction.* Related to the indicator just mentioned is the question about how formal the market really is. Sabean has observed an eighteenth-century trend from a predominance of transaction by consent to an overwhelming pattern of transaction by auction. This implies that the market becomes increasingly formalised over time. The material on Löhne suggests that even in the nineteenth century a great variety of type of contracts were in current use (Table 2). Obviously, notaries are the most important institution although only a third of all contracts was made in their offices (which, by the way, justifies our resort to other sources in the study of this parish). Kin, too, made use of notaries, however to a lesser degree. Does this mean they had more trust for each other than for "foreigners"? Since our data are, after all, from official records, the categories "unknown", "oral", "private", and "none" do not actually imply unlimited trust, they might rather be summarized under "revisions protocols and land registers". It might be however be worthwhile to look at the time span that elapsed between the contracts and the registration of different types of transactions. In eighteenth-century Oberrieden, too, "the market" seems to have been fragmented into several segments where a particular degree of social proximity correlated with a specific degree of contract formalization: Land transactions among kin (about a third of all contracts) and among neighbours (some forty

per cent) tend to be conducted less frequently as auctions than transactions among unrelated persons.

If contractual institutions tend to be differentiated according to varying degrees of social proximity, it is important to know how the field of interaction on factor markets evolved over time. In his important studies on Neckarhausen, SABEAN (1990, 1998), observes a mounting share of transactions conducted by kin, implying that reciprocal relationships and the formal market are being blended. This fascinating result is explained by the increased necessity of co-operation among those who inherited land from the same ancestors, especially among patrilateral parallel cousins given rising levels of land fragmentation in a context characterized by partible inheritance. At the same time, cousin intermarriage and other forms of multiple alliances between family groups became widespread in Neckarhausen. It therefore seemed worthwhile to look at family endogamy in Löhne which is situated in quite a different context. Löhne was part of the proto-industrial region in northeastern Westphalia where the local population was divided into the classes of *Heuerlinge*—often engaged in proto-industrial activities—and full peasants (MOOSER 1984; SCHLUMBOHM 1994). Within a sample of 34 parishes with available information, it stands out as having the highest proportion of wealthy landowners—in other words, the number of smallholders was particularly small, and presumably most of the lower classes did not own any land at all. In contrast to Neckarhausen, impartible inheritance was the rule. Table 3 gives the percentages of consanguinal and affinal marriages for three cohorts in the 18th end 19th century. The analysis is based on a computer program that automatically detects every linkage in the family reconstitution material, as opposed to Sabean's method who usually stopped when he had found the most relevant linkages by hand. It turns out that consanguinal marriages were rather unfrequent in Löhne. As in Neckarhausen, marriages with first and second cousins occurred primarily during the nineteenth century, but typically, couples were linked through more than one path, and most of these linkages were through some affinal kin's husband or wife. In outstanding contrast with Neckarhausen, the replication of alliance in the same generation, especially by marriage with the sister of the brother's wife (BWZ), is documented from the seventeenth century onwards, and also second cousin marriages started as early as 1703. As it seems, Löhne was not “kinship hot” and did not become more so during the process of modernization. Only rarely did alliances bind lineages together for more than one generation, they rather ensured the cooperation of two nuclear families who were already related. This resulted in a pattern where most couples were not related, but some were in multiple ways. Looking at individual cases reinforces our impression that multiple linkages were the result of strategic behaviour. The couple that was linked through the highest number of paths in the middle cohort (10) also married their children into the same family groups, and generally, the husband was one of the most prominent and successful members of the village community. We will, again, have to look more closely at our data. But we would be surprised if Löhne would tell us the same story as Neckarhausen with respect to the interaction between kinship structures and factor markets.

To what degree does market fragmentation, as it has been observed above, result in a differentiation of price formation? As mentioned, Levi suggests that price variability is higher in contracts concluded among kin than in contracts concluded among social “strangers”. This result cannot be replicated in our material: Table 4 lays out the results of a regression on prices

using registered tax values as the independent variable for each group of transactions in Löhne: rail, kin, non-kin and unknown. During the period under study, Löhne was turned into a center of the railroad network, and the two railway companies can be considered as an archetypal example of “strangers”. The regressions suggest that the railroads paid hefty prices, but that otherwise, the price mechanisms did not vary according to social proximity: the estimated slopes (B values) in the models for kin, non-kin (where both participants have already been identified in the local registers), and “unknown” (which may include people from outside) are strikingly similar—it was usual to pay 30 times the tax value. In contrast to the finding reported by LEVI (1986), price variability in contracts among non-kin appears to be greater than among kin (cf. the values for r^2). In Löhne, social proximity does not seem to result in a greater impact of “non-economic” factors in price formation. As the overall level of r^2 indicators make clear, variations in tax values accorded for only about half the variance in prices. In other words, there is still room for finding other determinants for prices even if kinship does not explain much in this—as it seems at first sight—wealthy, modernizing, and individualist parish.

Another aspect of market operation concerns the frequency with which individuals appear on the market. Persons with frequent appearance may serve as lenders and thus exert a kind of clientelistic dominance over the rural population (cf. PFISTER 1994). In the case of the real estate markets, frequent sellers and buyers may act as a rudimentary kind of brokers. This seems to be the case in Oetwil, where market participation is heavily skewed. Two individuals appear in about a quarter of all contracts studied, and characteristically these are the keeper of the village inn and a major proto-industrial entrepreneur; both are notables in the political bodies of the parish. It seems that relatively high liquidity of the land market in this parish (see below) was partly made possible by the accumulation of information and cash with these two men.

(3) *Market liquidity.* Particularly in Schöflisdorf, activity on the real estate market is concentrated on the years 1770–72 when the region was haunted by a major subsistence crisis. This suggests that in a context characterised by subsistence agriculture, real estate and credit markets basically perform the function of safety valves for holdings which are confronted with a crisis (this point is further elaborated below). Seasonal fluctuations also differ markedly between the three Zurich parishes (Table 5): The three months with the most frequent transactions comprise 58.4% of all contracts in Schöflisdorf, 55.8% in Oberrieden and 47.4% in Oetwil. By contrast, the three months with the lowest level of activity comprise 11.4% in Schöflisdorf, 13.2% in Oberrieden and 21.2% of all contracts in Oetwil. We clearly conclude that market activity is more even in the proto-industrial context where earnings from work in the manufacture sector provide for continuous liquidity, and that market activity is most temporally skewed in the context characterised by subsistence agriculture. Löhne also shows a relatively smooth pattern, except in the period when the commons were divided. The seasonal shift from March to May remains to be explained.

This finding partly relates to the modes in which transactions on the land market are settled. Some of the seasonal peaks in Table 5a clearly cluster around traditional maturity dates which also correspond to major fairs on which peasants acquire cash for their produce (St. Martin [Nov 15], Lightmass [Feb 2]). Table 6, row 5 shows that in Oberrieden contracts frequently stipulate that payment is due on a future maturity date. It appears that in this parish

characterised by commercial wine growing contracts can rely on foreseeable cash incomes of buyers. Such a security lacks in Schöfflisdorf, where subsistence agriculture is dominant, and correspondingly, the share of settlement in ready cash is the highest one recorded in the three parishes (rows 3 and 4). In Oetwil, on the one hand, settlement in ready cash is higher than in Oberrieden. This can be explained by the absence of a clear seasonal concentration of agricultural cash income (labour-extensive subsistence agriculture dominates here; the share of payment relegated to a maturity date is low in this parish) and by the continuous availability of cash income through earnings in the proto-industrial sector. On the other hand, Oetwil is also the parish among the three contexts studied, where mortgage credit is most developed: The share settled simply through the acceptance of existing debt is the highest one in the table (row 1), and the same is true for the share that is settled by incurring new debt (row 6).

We can conclude, therefore, that the availability of cash income through commercial agriculture or proto-industry contributes to a greater liquidity of the land market either through trust in the cash generating mechanism of major transaction or settlement dates in the agricultural calendar or through a developed market for mortgage credit which in turn rests on a higher debt service capacity generated by the cash income available in these regions. On a general level, this finding highlights the importance of studying the interactions between the real estate and the mortgage credit markets.

The land market as a dynamic mirror of the agrarian system

On a most fundamental level it can be argued that a developed real estate market provides an index for the ways in which holdings can be manipulated by individual peasants: by observing which types of real estate are transferred together and which types are transacted independently of each other we can identify the “modules” of the household economy, so to say. By this way, we learn something both on the functional components of an agrarian system and on the space of action circumscribing life cycle strategies of individual households.

Table 7 presents an association matrix of all types of real estate appearing in the contracts of the four parishes studied. From subtable (a) we learn, for instance, that vineyards are transacted in twelve contracts without other types of real estate (which makes 30 per cent of all contracts in which vineyards appear; cf. last two columns), in twenty contracts together with wine presses (cross row 3 with column 6) and again in twelve contracts together with meadows (cross row 6 with column 8). It would now be interesting to know whether the last figure means that the joint transaction of vineyards and meadows occurs particularly frequent or not. Since meadows are used to feed cows which in turn produce the manure for the vineyards, these two types of land may form a functional unit in the peasant household economy which only can be increased or decreased in size together. To this end, the superscript in Table 7 denotes a simple measure of association between two types. Analogous to the Chi² test, an expected value is calculated on the assumption that all combinations occur randomly (on the basis of the marginal distribution), and effective frequencies are compared with this expected frequency, the difference being standardised by the expected frequency (cf. remark at the end of Table 7). From this operation we learn, for instance, that the joint transaction of meadows

and vineyards in Oberrieden occurs (only) slightly more frequently than random. To facilitate a rapid interpretation of these results, Figure 1 provides graphs where positive associations of 1 and greater are marked by a solid line, associations between 0.8 and 1 by a dotted line; it has been attempted to represent strongly negative associations by a large physical distance between the types in question (we hope one day to be able to perform this analysis by something like MDS).

The graphs for the three Swiss parishes look very different, and these differences are at least partly due to quite contrasting agrarian systems. Only a few results can be discussed here. In Oetwil (Table 7.b, Figure 1.b) all types of real estate appear somehow related to each other. This reflects the fact that, due to the spatial isolation of separate holdings in an area of dispersed settlement, it is difficult to transact distant plots; rather, holdings tend to constitute inseparable units traded as a whole. To a certain extent, this may constitute a restriction for the accumulation strategies of proto-industrial workers who often dispose of only small sums for investment (see below). For Löhne, the graph would have to classify three kinds of land: Firstly, fields were traded together with pasture or meadows. Secondly, gardens were traded with houses or mixed combinations of land. Thirdly, forests were traded alone. This dovetails with the fact that Löhne was characterized by a two-class social structure, which set relatively wealthy peasants (interested in fields) apart from dependent workers (presumably more interested in garden plots). Also, it can be assumed that the upper classes tended to follow a stem family pattern of family formation whilst the lower classes followed a neolocal pattern and thus organized the formation of new household through the market in houses.

Let us now compare the positions of fields in the graphs for Oberrieden (a) and Schöfflisdorf (c). The latter parish is characterised by subsistence farming, and the land is being tilled using a plow. Oberrieden by contrast is characterised by commercial wine growing (vineyards cover some 30 per cent of the cultivated surface area), dairying and silk manufacture. Favoured by a very dense population, agriculture is highly labour intensive, draught animals and, by implication, ploughs are absent, tilling is performed manually by using hoes. Figure 1 now suggests that fields are part of the labour-intensive complex connected with vine-growing and gardens in Oberrieden, but not in Schöfflisdorf, where the size of fields is modified completely independently from other elements of the holding. However, the graph for Oberrieden also demonstrates the presence of an extensively laboured “outfield” consisting of plots used alternatively as field and as meadow. These plots are situated far above the settlement area (the parish lies on the slope of the lake of Zurich) and are therefore frequently transacted together with a barn that can be used to store instruments, hay, etc. Likewise, fractions of this “outfield” are traded independently from the “infield” which in turn is intimately connected with the possession of a house.

What these few results suggest, then, is that a study of notarial records or land registers, through the information it provides on the dynamic aspect of an agrarian system, can help us to detect the “modules” which an agrarian system puts at the disposal of peasants to build or modify their holdings over their respective life cycles.

Factor markets and the life cycle

Rural factor markets may interact with life cycles of households or individuals in two ways. First, they may serve as channels through which structural downward mobility operates. As is well known, most peasant societies are characterised by structural downward mobility: The upper class overreproduces, the lower class underreproduces itself (e.g. FERTIG 1998). Since economic growth is slow and the occupational structure remains stable over time, net downward mobility has to follow (see LENSKI 1966 for a classical statement). Depending on the institutional context, this intergenerational downward mobility may operate through a fragmentation of holdings, emigration, etc. Factor markets intervene in this process as means to cushion or to resolve inevitable “family accidents”: Debts may be incurred in the hope to keep an untenable holding viable, the land market may resort to in order to raise the funds for emigration or dissolve the property of young orphans etc.

Second, factor markets may play a pivotal role in permanent income strategies of peasants which are pursued over the life cycle as a whole (GHEZ and BECKER 1975; MODIGLIANI 1980): Peasants—as most other people—aspire to an income during old age when their own work capacity is low. This can be achieved by the accumulation of land that later on may hold back children in the households of their parents or that may be sold and converted into credits producing a cash rent. This implies that during life phases characterised by high labour productivity small peasants will save their income and invest it in land whereas during phases characterised by low earnings they will incur debts, run down reserves or live on income from their assets. Consumption, by contrast, will be kept more or less constant. The operation of such a strategy, however, presupposes relatively efficient markets for land and for credit—efficient in the sense that peasants must have access to these markets, that the markets are liquid and that small sums can be invested. The last condition certainly meets a restriction in agrarian systems where whole holdings rather than small pieces are transacted in the real estate market (such as in the case of Oetwil among the parishes studied here). Where peasants have no access to factor markets, life cycle strategies of saving and accumulation are impossible, and consumption has to follow income. Phases of high earnings will thus be marked by conspicuous consumption, while slack periods are accompanied by extreme penury and destitution.

The rest of this section explores these ideas on the basis of material from Oetwil, Löhne, and another Westphalian parish studied by a Münster M.A. student, Volker Lünnemann. In the case of Oetwil, using relational database technique and a simple matching algorithm (and a lot of manual work), notarial records were matched with a household listing (dating from 1762 and adjusted using parish registers) which contains information on age and economic activity of individuals upwards from the age of about ten. Households were broken down, first, according to major economic groups (Table 8). Farmers are households recording no proto-industrial activity and where household heads are reported to work their own land. The acronym “farm&pi” designates households in which at least one member (usually the male head and/or an adult son) works the agricultural holding whereas other household members are engaged in proto-industrial production, usually cotton weaving. The lower class comprises households without agricultural activities and engaged in artisan activities and/or poorly remunerated proto-industrial work, such as cotton spinning and silk combing. In the Westphalian parishes,

no occupational data are available, and social strata have been defined according to the tax value of the holdings.

Second, households were broken down according to the age of the household head at his/her first appearance on the land market. Figures therefore indicate mean purchases and sales, respectively, during the years 1770–79 for each age group in each social category. We know, for instance, that the seven lower class households, whose heads were between 30 and 39 at their first appearance on the market from 1770 onwards, made purchases for 41 fl. and sold real estate for 520 fl. on average during the time span 1770–79. Note that in an analysis of variance of this table, the base effects (class and age), but not the interaction effect (class differences with respect to the life cycle, upon which much of the following interpretation rests) are statistically significant. Before a possible future publication of these results, therefore, an attempt will be made to broaden the material by including the contracts back to 1760. It should also be kept in mind that mean values only refer to market participants, not to the population as a whole, since the sources do not allow to keep track of all physical households of the parish over the whole time span.

The figures in Table 8a suggest that the real estate market plays a completely different role in the life cycles of different classes. Farmer households sell more than they buy across the entire life span. If the levels of market participation fluctuate somewhat with age, we recognise no evidence of an accumulation strategy in Oetwil. Rather, the land market seems to serve as channel through which structural downward mobility is being effected. The picture is different in Löhne where farmers do purchase more than they sell in their 20s and 30s, although the wealthier farmers start selling earlier than middle farmers. In Beelen, the wealthier farmers seem to start out with too much land, or they have to pay out their siblings.

By contrast, the households that combine an agrarian with a lucrative proto-industrial livelihood buy more than they sell across a long time span up to the age of about fifty both in Oetwil and - if the lower tax group is protoindustrial, which seems plausible - in Löhne. The fact that purchases surpass sales by a huge margin even in the age class 20–29 suggests a neolocal pattern of household formation where young couples use dowries or mortgage credit to establish a new holding.¹ In Oetwil, during the next family phase (age 30–39), purchases are much reduced, also in comparison with age group 40–49. This can be explained by the unfavourable shift of the production - consumption balance due to the presence of small children during this phase (as already discussed by MEDICK 1976): The presence of young children implies rising consumption costs for the household, whereas the earning capacity of women in particular is being reduced. Of course, this holds particularly for proto-industrial contexts, where cash earnings by women play a vital role. The reverse side of this phenomenon is a rise of indebtedness to maintain consumption levels: Information for cottager households from a detailed household listing in another parish (Table 9) suggests that proto-industrial employment is comparatively low and indebtedness high during this family phase. Further analysis of this table suggests that the fluctuation of the degree of indebtedness over the life

¹ This finding is corroborated by results for another parish with a similar economic and social structure where a breakdown of occupation by age suggests that males reduce their agricultural labour in favor of proto-industrial work with marriage.

cycle is explained statistically by the fluctuation of proto-industrial employment (despite the small sample, these relationships are statistically significant at least on the 10 per cent level).

The lower class in Oetwil, finally, is again characterised by a predominance of sales over purchases across much of the life cycle—a result which cannot be replicated with the Löhne and Beelen material. Only during the initial phase of the establishment of the household a weak tendency to the opposite emerges. After this, the virtual standstill of purchases during the difficult phase of an unfavourable balance between production and consumption (age group 30–39) and in the age group above 50, indicating widespread old age poverty, is particularly striking. This group clearly lacks the capability to accumulate sufficient funds to participate in a permanent income strategy. Rather, a life-long tendency of increasing proletarianization (in the Marxian sense of a loss of control over factors of production) emerges. This may be due both to low earning capacity as well as to the fact that the agrarian system of the region in question is characterised by “modules” so big and costly that they are beyond the reach of the lower class (cf. previous section). Hence, we expect that consumption has to follow income. It is noteworthy that the contemporary reports analysed by BRAUN (1990) associate new patterns of conspicuous consumption particularly with the proto-industrial lower class, not with the “thrifty” weavers.

A pilot study: Löhne in Eastern Westphalia

In Westphalia, our primary goal has been to identify and to link those sources that provide us with information about land and credit transactions, and to put them into the contexts of life cycle and kinship. The study combines material from Löhne in the hilly protoindustrial region of eastern Westphalia (almost complete), from Oberkirchen in the mountainous south (family reconstitution complete, land and credit data in progress), from Borgeln in the wealthy agricultural zone of Hellweg (family reconstitution in progress), and possibly another parish. The following discussion refers to the methodology of the Löhne study.

(1) *Identifying sources.* In nineteenth century Germany, contracts relating to land (including mortgage) could be made before a notary, and the records of some notaries have indeed survived in Westphalia (although they are not as well-organised as those in the Netherlands, for instance). But even oral contracts were valid in terms of obligational law. Handing over property was (and is) done by modifying the respective entry in the *Grundbuch*, a land register. *Grundbücher*, also known as *Hypothekenbücher*, have also survived from the eighteenth century in Prussian territories. Their purpose was to document all the rights and obligations pertaining to a specific piece of land, including mortgage and all kinds of communal or seigniorial rights. Before an entry was made after a specific transfer, a couple of years could pass. In the case of land sales however, it was in the interest of the sellers to make sure their land was cleared as quickly as possible from the *Kataster*, another set of land registers for purposes of taxation which contains exact data on parcel acreage, land usage, and most notably an estimate of land value. The *Kataster* was revised on an annual base during the nineteenth century, the revisions being recorded in the *Fortschreibungsverhandlungen* (revisions register) which offer an excellent documentation of the land market—we even know whether

buyers and sellers could sign their names. As to the life course, births, marriages, and deaths were recorded in parish registers. Germany has a flourishing scene of genealogists who sometimes produce genealogies of entire villages or towns (*Ortsfamilienbücher*). In Westphalia, these genealogies are particularly rare - no wonder since the very focus of genealogical work, the patrilineal family name, has no universal validity in our area and husbands frequently took their wives' or even marital predecessors' names. However, residence (or migration as its counterpart) cannot be reconstructed from the church registers. Since census lists are missing for most of Westphalia, we have difficulties establishing who lived and worked in which household at a specific moment, except a single cross-section at the end of our period. This is the main reason why we do not include the labour market with this project. Finally, and obviously, documenting kinship is what village genealogies are made for. Genealogists are however primarily interested in continuity and consanguinity. They often leave out those persons who were not related to the village population, and they fail to mobilise the evidence on ritual kinship (witnesses and godparents) which is hidden in the parish registers.

We have been led to the parish of Löhne by chance, or rather by good luck. Löhne is one of the few parishes in Westphalia with a village genealogy. It is one of only two whose genealogy both extend far into the 19th century and where the marriage and filiation links between the individual families are recorded in the genealogy (the other one being Hartum, evaluated by the group of Arthur Imhof, see IMHOF 1990). Both family reconstitutions are available in a machine-readable format. However, the data set on Hartum contains only records on marriages with a known duration (*mariages fermées*) and no kinship links. It therefore seemed worthwhile to travel to the cadastral office where the records for Löhne are preserved, and to have a look at the basement. Indeed it turned out that while some of the local records cannot be used due to infestation by a deadly form of mould (or so we were told by the cadastral officer), the revisions registers have survived and indeed contain every land transaction between 1830 and 1866. Moreover, we found a machine-readable evaluation of the cadasters for both 1830 and 1866, compiled by a local historian, and also the *Hypothekenbücher* have survived in another archive. Löhne is also attractive because some *Übergabeverträge*, contracts organizing familial transfers of holdings, have been preserved. The only shortcomings are that we do not have censuses and that the *Hypothekenbücher* from the eighteenth century are lost. This source combination is rare, but not totally unique in Westphalia. In the villages of Oberkirchen, Borgeln, Beelen, Hartum and Welda one can also combine data on family, land transactions, and mortgage. However, Löhne is the only place where the family reconstitution does not need further data cleaning.

(2) *Linking sources.* Linkage was done by entering the data into an Access database. We had two options: Either typing the sources in in a mechanical way, and linking them afterwards with the help of matching algorithms, or making judgements on who was who when having at hand both the source and whatever information that was accumulated in the database. We decided to follow the second strategy, because the names changed between source domains and in time, and because we believed no algorithm could substitute the informal knowledge of the Löhne families our co-workers acquired while working with the sources. Although the database looks pretty complex (for an overview of its structure see Figure 2), all participants quickly learned to work with it.

This study, thus, employs what PLAKANS (1984, pp. 51-75) calls “domain linkage”. We are less interested in the purely demographic aspects of the family reconstitution as such (although they certainly deserve some attention) but rather in the connections to land transactions and credit. Still, a family reconstitution offers the only reasonable starting point because if we want to know who a certain “Carl Imort” is in our data - and there are quite a few of them - we have to know how many of them are alive at the time and which names they use. The reconstitution data have come in GEDCOM, a special tagged exchange format developed by Mormon genealogists, but with the help of some SAS programming we could convert them into an Access database. This database contains 6.595 persons with their names, kinship ties and vital dates, who lived in a time period between 1545 and 1874.

The next step is to look at the mortgage and land registers (*Grundbücher*), not at the revisions registers. While the revisions registers are organized by time, the land registers make it possible to observe the process of property devolution by holding. Therefore, it is possible to identify owners even if their names vary. The mortgage and land registers were entered into another data base, and within each entry, the participating individuals were linked to the family reconstitution database as far as they could be identified. From the *Grundbücher*, 784 changes of property were recorded as well as 628 credit transactions. Also, *Grundbücher* contain information about seigniorial and communal obligations. This, too, is important material since the establishment of full property rights during the nineteenth century is seen as a major contribution to the development of agricultural factor markets in the literature. Due to the somewhat messy character of these obligations (often in kind) we have so far postponed recording them.

Finally, the revisions protocols were linked to the land transactions as recorded from the *Grundbücher*, and the annual list of holding sizes was recorded (given in the source only for those owners who had transactions registered). Understanding this set of sources requires some knowledge of who owned what holding, since frequently, only last names (susceptible to change both for men and women) are given. Evaluating the *Grundbücher* first therefore is an efficient way of organizing the task. However, the data on parcel sizes, land usage, and tax values are far more rich in the revisions protocols. Also, possibly also due to the omission of Löhnebeck from the set of land registers we received, the *Fortschreibungsverhandlungen* and *Grundbücher* overlap but partially: Of a total of 1209 transactions, 425 changes of property were recorded in the revisions protocols but not in the *Grundbücher*, 392 only in the *Grundbücher*, and 392 others were recorded in both sources. Linkage with the family reconstitution database can also still be enhanced. Thus, the attempts at evaluation presented above are very preliminary, and a sharper image will hopefully emerge during the project.

Conclusion

(1) We hope this paper has shown that real estate (and, as it will hopefully become clearer in later versions, credit) markets constitute an important element of the agrarian system in at least some parts of Continental Europe. Likewise, they form central institutions through which peasants put their life cycle strategies into effect, and they are used together with as well as beyond transactions within family institutions (i.e., inheritance etc.). Rural factor markets clearly de-

serve more attention in future research (apart from the path-breaking work by Macfarlane, Levi and Sabean, see the volumes edited by DORBAN and SERVAIS 1994 [cf. PFISTER 1994]; FONTAINE et al. 1997; and the important study by POSTEL-VINAY 1998).

(2) The examples recounted in this paper suggest that different types of factor markets strongly interact with each other as well as with other parameters such as the agrarian system, social stratification and the family system. In other words: to fully understand the operation of these markets and their roles in a particular economy and society, a holistic approach on the micro-level is required. We hope to have developed the methodology for such an approach with what has been set out in the last section of the paper. Still, the study of even one single community over a limited time period remains a labourious undertaking. To build a comparative framework that takes account of the institutional, geographical and social variability of Western Europe since the seventeenth century, the co-operation of several research groups is required. We look forward to meeting people with whom we can share this research experience.

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Table 1a:

Levels of commercialisation, 1770–1779

	Oberrieden	Oetwil	Schöfflisdorf
1 houses	.046 (690)	.067 (699)	.045 (568)
2 fields	.121 (10.9)	.456 (382.0)	.177 (171.4)
3 meadows	.127 (24.1)	.342 (127.1)	.216 (99.5)
4 fields/meadows	.217 (60.9)	—	—
5 vineyards	.185 (23.4)	—	.149 (12.0)
6 forest	—	.309 (75.6)	.167 (14.4)

Note: Number of houses transacted divided by population size in 1771 (row 1) and, respectively, surface area of a type of land transacted divided by total surface area of this type of land (other rows). Total surface areas (in Juchart, equals ca. 1/3 metric hectare) are taken from the “economic tables” for 1764 (Schöfflisdorf), 1772 (Oetwil) and 1778 (Oberrieden). Numbers in brackets indicate, respectively, population size and the total surface area covered by the contracts.

Sources: For transactions, see StA ZH B XI Horgen 154 and 155, B XI Stäfa 112 and 113, B XI Dielsdorf 817; for population size StA ZH B IX 1, for total surface areas B IX 89 and 91.

Table 1b: Levels of commercialization, Löhne 1830-1859

	Löhne								
	1830-9			1840-9			1850-9		
	rate	acreage	N	rate	acreage	N	rate	acreage	N
house	.007	.19	7	.008	.47	8	.010	.41	13
field	.080	193.92	111	.127	305.15	203	.129	311.33	271
garden	.330	4.24	9	.390	5.03	16	.085	1.09	6
forest	.009	1.89	6	.128	26.79	30	.111	23.23	31
pasture	.102	34.85	33	.474	161.97	146	.498	170.37	170
meadow	.106	16.43	16	.106	16.47	22	.078	12.16	25
mixed		5.95	12		24.38	35		30.58	35
sum	.078	257.48	194	.163	540.25	460	.166	549.17	551

Note: Rate is acreage of a given type of land transacted, divided by the total acreage of this type of land around 1860, except in row 1 (number of houses transacted divided by medium population size in decade). N is the number of parcels involved in the transactions. Transactions are included only if the acreage of the parcels involved is known, and if the transaction is labelled as a sale.

Table 2:

Type of contract and relationship between buyer and seller on the land market of Löhne, 1830–1866 (per cent; row percentages add up to 100 per cent)

	court	oral	notary	none	private	unknown	(n)
1 railroad	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.6	94.6	(110)
2 kin	7.7	5.8	26.9	1.9	1.9	55.8	(52)
3 non-kin	4.1	8.2	42.0	1.2	1.6	42.8	(243)
4 unknown	4.3	5.7	39.2	1.4	2.9	46.4	(209)
5 total	3.9	5.70	32.2	1.1	2.6	54.4	(614)

Note: Data are preliminary (as of June, 1998), since the kinship analysis is not yet complete.

Table 3:

Kinship endogamy in Löhne, sample cohorts

marriage cohort	1751-1760	1801-1810	1851-1860
N marriages	100 (70)	100 (85)	100 (95)
affinal	12.9 (9)	22.3 (19)	13.7 (13)
consanguinal	2.9 (2)	4.7 (4)	1.1 (1)
both	15.7 (11)	14.1 (12)	7.4 (7)
all endogamous	31.4 (22)	41.2 (35)	22.1 (21)
relations / related couple	3.4 (74)	2.7 (94)	3.3 (70)
N partners	100 (124)	100 (154)	100 (190)
immigrant partners	27.4 (34)	33.1 (51)	38.9 (74)

All values are percentages, with absolute values in parentheses. Relations of up to 7 steps are included, e.g. MBWZxSWZ, mother's brother's wife's sister's stepson's wife's sister. Consanguinal relations are those without affinal elements (W, H). Relations are only included if they existed at the time of marriage. Source: Family reconstitution by Schlien.

Table 4:

Regression analysis for prices on the land market of Löhne, 1830–1866

	Rail	Kin	Non-kin	unknown
Intercept	54,2	51,2	72,5	97,4
B	121,8	29,4	32,6	29,0
Error DF	24	26	181	149
F	46,3	28,2	104,4	128,4
Prob>F	0,0001	0,0001	0,0001	0,0001
r ²	0,66	0,52	0,37	0,46
Adj. r ²	0,64	0,50	0,36	0,46

Note: Dependent variable are prices in *Reichsthaler*. The only independent variable is the tax value of the respective parcels. Outliers (price above 1.500 *Reichsthaler*) have been removed. Data are preliminary (as of June, 1998), since the kinship analysis is not yet complete.

Table 5a:

Seasonal fluctuations of real estate transactions, 1770–1779

	jan	feb	mar	apr	may	jun	jul	aug	sept	oct	nov	dec
Oberrieden	12.4	2.3	19.4	9.3	11.6	8.5	3.9	3.1	5.4	3.9	12.4	7.8
Oetwil	6.8	11.0	5.9	8.5	11.0	5.1	6.8	3.4	9.3	11.0	14.4	6.8
Schöflisdorf	13.8	18.8	8.1	15.8	5.0	7.7	1.9	10.0	1.5	4.2	3.8	9.2

Note: Percentage of contracts occurring in each month; for the number of observations, see Table 3 (one observation missing for Oetwil). Chi²=95.9, df=22, p<.001.

Sources: See Table 1.

Table 5b:

Seasonal fluctuations of real estate transactions, Löhne

	jan	feb	mar	apr	may	jun	jul	aug	sep	oct	nov	dec	top3	bot3
1830-39	8.3	6.9	16.7	9.7	5.6	4.2	2.8	4.2	11.1	11.1	11.1	8.3	38.9	11.1
1840-49	3.7	10.7	8.6	5.3	4.3	2.1	10.2	5.3	29.9	6.4	6.4	7.0	50.8	10.2
1850-59	4.3	9.1	12.4	12.0	16.3	9.1	7.2	7.2	6.7	3.3	4.8	7.7	40.7	12.4

Note: Percentage of contracts occurring in each month; number of observations with valid dates of transaction: 468. Chi²=84.0, df=22, p<.001. Transactions (including multiple parcels) are included if labelled as sales.

Table 6:

Settlement of transactions on the real estate market, 1770–1779

	Oberrieden	Oetwil	Schöflisdorf
1 mortgage debt (% of total amount)	33.6 (129)	45.4 (119)	32.3 (260)
2 arrears (% of debt)	8.1 (71)	10.5 (78)	10.2 (106)
3 ready cash (% of total amount)	18.2 (129)	32.7 (119)	36.1 (260)
4 ready cash (% of amount payable)	30.3 (124)	53.4 (112)	60.3 (246)
5 future maturity date (% of amount payable)	37.6 (124)	16.6 (112)	18.8 (246)
6 new mortgage debt (% of amount payable)	32.1 (124)	30.0 (112)	20.9 (246)

Note: Mean percentages, figures in brackets showing number of contracts.

Sources: See Table 1.

Table 7:

Association matrix: frequency of joint transaction of different types of real estate, 1770–1779

a. Oberrieden (number of contracts=130)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	nTr	%al
1 houses	0-	11 0.5	19 1.2	19 1.2	30 1.6	13 -1.1	4 -1.6	7 -1.6	3 -0.8	6 -0.4	32	0.0
2 barns		5 -0.6	11 0.3	10 0.0	9 -1.6	13 0.1	6 -0.1	11 0.7	7 1.9	6 0.4	31	16.1
3 winepresses		7 -1.5	14 0.5	19 0.2	20 1.2	8 0.2	10 -0.2	3 -0.5	6 0.3	36 0.0	19.4	
4 other buildings			3 -2.0	18 0.8	13 0.3	5 -0.3	9 0.2	3 0.0	7 1.0	28	10.7	
5 gardens				7 -1.3	12 0.8	4 -0.2	7 0.2	2 -0.2	6 1.2	38	18.4	
6 vineyards					12 -1.0	11 1.0	12 0.2	5 0.4	6 -0.2	40	30.0	
7 fields						8 1.2	7 -0.1	1 -0.9	3 -0.5	21	38.1	
8 meadows							14 0.8	3 -0.6	5 -0.5	35	40.0	
9 fields/meadows								3 1.0	1 -0.9	13	23.1	
10 other land									6 -	17	35.3	

b. Oetwil (n=120)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	nTr	%al
1 houses	2 -	16 1.5	19 0.9	35 1.3	18 0.7	14 -0.4	31 -0.6	34 -0.3	22 -1.6	9 -0.9	47	4.3
2 barns		0 -2.1	10 1.0	13 -0.1	8 0.3	8 0.3	18 0.4	15 -0.5	14 -0.2	8 1.0	19	0.0
3 winepresses		0 -2.5	14 0.5	7 0.2	9 0.17	0.5 14	-0.4 11	-0.7 9	1.6 20	0.0		
4 gardens			3 -3.1	13 0.8	11 0.5	25 1.3	26 1.3	19 0.4	6 0.2	39	7.7	
5 orchards				1 -1.8	8 1.0	16 0.9	14 0.2	7 -1.3	4 -0.1	19	5.3	
6 hempland					1 -1.7	15 0.9	12 -0.1	11 0.2	3 -0.4	16	6.3	
7 forest						12 -2.5	35 1.8	26 0.8	8 -0.2	55	21.8	
8 fields							18 -1.8	34 2.2	8 -0.4	70	25.7	
9 meadows								12 -0.1	5 0.1	49	24.5	
10 other land									3 -	15	20.0	

c. Schöfflisdorf (n=269)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		nTr	%al
1 houses	1 -	22 1.6	13 0.6	7 -0.7	11 -1.6	9 -0.1	2 1.1	0 0.2		23	4.3
2 gardens		0 -2.9	13 0.9	8 1.2	11 0.2	9 1.5	2 2.0	0 0.6		23	0.0
3 orchards			5 -0.7	5 -0.4	8 -1.1	7 0.4	2 1.8	1 2.5		19	26.3
4 vineyards				11 0.1	17 -0.8	13 0.7	2 0.9	0 0.1		31	35.5
5 fields					10 7 1.5	38 -1.6	2 -1.5	2 -0.3		154	69.5
6 meadows						54 0.6	2 -1.5	1 -0.3		95	56.8
7 forest							10 0.7	0 -1.3		12	83.3
8 other land								9 -		12	75.0

Note: Frequencies, with standardized deviations as superscripts ([observed frequency – expected frequency] / root of [expected frequency]); the square of the standardized deviations is equal to a cell's contribution to Chi². Column title numbers correspond with row numbers. nTr: frequency with which a particular type appears in the contracts; %al: percentage of transactions in which type appears, without combination with other types.

Sources: See Table 1.

d) Löhne (1828-66)

	field	garden	house	mixed	forest	pasture	meadow
field	153 ^{-0,22}	16 ^{-2,07}	31 ^{-0,13}	56 ^{-0,90}	50 ^{-0,34}	122 ^{1,09}	68 ^{1,66}
garden		4 ^{-0,27}	9 ^{1,53}	24 ^{4,01}	10 ^{0,34}	11 ^{-1,83}	11 ^{0,48}
house			1 ^{-2,15}	15 ^{0,60}	12 ^{0,40}	25 ^{0,52}	8 ^{-0,99}
mixed				20 ^{-1,10}	23 ^{0,38}	36 ^{-1,32}	27 ^{0,94}
forest					20 ^{0,56}	33 ^{-0,69}	19 ^{0,06}
pasture						93 ^{1,64}	32 ^{-1,19}
meadow							12 ^{-1,76}

Table 8:

Mean values of purchases (P) and sales (S) of real estate in florin according to class and age in Oetwil, 1770–1779

age	20–29			30–39			40–49			50 and above			total		
	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n
farmer	1350	2467	3	651	944	6	610	2824	5	501	1461	4	723	1835	18
farm&pi	1311	175	7	784	169	6	1446	240	6	364	997	10	903	470	29
lower class	461	411	7	41	520	7	381	549	3	0	873	5	212	570	22
total	968	677	17	468	543	19	919	1229	14	297	1062	19	636	858	69

Note: “farm&pi” refers to households which combine agricultural activities (on their own farms) with proto-industrial work, mainly cotton weaving. The “lower class” consists of households of which no continuous agricultural activities are reported and which engage in artisanal activities or in poorly remunerated proto-industrial work such as cotton spinning and silk combing. Four groups are excluded from the analysis: Immigrants (n=6) and inhabitants of neighboring parishes (n=23; for both groups no information on economic activity is available), the commercial elite (drapers, the innkeeper; n=6) and the individuals for whom no information on the economic activity is available (n=10). Age is measured at the moment of first appearance on the real estate market.

Sources: For sale contracts: StA ZH B XI Stäfa 112 and 113; for economic activity: household listing of 1762/3, StA E II 700.27, and “economic table” of 1772, StA B IX 89.

Table 8b:

Mean price of all purchases (P) and sales (S) in a given age group per active individual in Reichsthaler, by age and tax group, Löhne 1830 – 1866

age	< 30			30 – 39			40- 49			> 49			
	tax class	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n
0-15		340	6	22	132	57	23	73	12	23	12	255	21
15-50		171	86	18	344	309	25	240	101	24	150	401	16
50+		700	131	17	196	103	23	311	489	27	219	1102	28
total		1212	223	57	672	470	71	624	602	74	380	1759	65

Note: age group is measured at the time of the transaction; therefore, row totals are not given. Active individuals are buyers and sellers. Tax class is in Reichtaler, it is measured at the maximum.

Table 8c:

Mean tax value of purchases (P) and sales (S) of real estate in Reichthalen according to age and tax group, Beelen 1840 – 1849 (by Volker Lünnemann).

age tax class	< 33			33 – 42			43- 52			> 52			total		
	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n	P	S	n
0-15	5.5	1.3	15	5.8	1.7	26	3.5	3.1	25	6.1	2.5	14	5.1	2.2	80
15-50	8.2	0.4	2	4.4	3.9	7	12.2	10.3	7	3.4	8.5	8	6.7	7.0	24
50+	2.9	20.1	6	5.8	3.3	8	9.2	19.9	8	0.7	6.2	5	5.2	12.5	27
total	5.1	6.1	23	5.6	2.4	41	6.2	7.7	40	4.3	5.0	27	5.4	5.2	131

Source: M.A. Thesis Volker Lünnemann; Protokoll über die Aufnahme der in der Katastral-Mutterrolle der Gemeinde Beelen vorgekommenen Besitz- und sonstigen Veränderungen für das Steuerjahr (1840–60); StAM Landratsamt Warendorf Nr. 165–168, 187–190; BAM: Kirchenbücher Beelen. Tax groups are in Reichtaler.

Table 9:

Indebtedness, proto-industrial work and family cycle (age of household head) among cottagers in Rifferswil, 1692

age	up to 32	33–42	above 42	total
highly indebted, per cent	62.5	81.2	46.2	64.9
spinning mentioned, per cent	50.0	27.8	69.2	46.2
(n)	(8)	(18)	(13)	(39)

Note: The identification of households as cottagers and as highly indebted units is based on the qualitative description of individual households by the pastor. On the details of the coding procedure see PFISTER (1992: 522).

Source: StA ZH A 65.5.

Figure 1:

Schematic representation of the associations between different types of real estate, 1770–1779 (source: Table 1; for explanation, see text)





a. Oberrieden*b. Oetwil**c. Schöfflisdorf*

Figure 2:
Relations within land and credit database



Note: The graph demonstrates all relationships (exclusively of the form 1:n) between tables in the land and credit database, Monopoly.mdb. Only in the case of the table *Parzellen* (parcels), all individual fields have been shown. In order not to complicate the picture, the family reconstitution database has not been visualized.

Figure 3:
Sample entry form: mortgage and other obligations

Onera und Hypotheken		Kataster	Transaktionen	Access verlassen
<input type="text" value="O/H_ID: 215"/> Folio_NR: Löh112f Inhalt: Hypothek entstanden durch: Vertrag Umfang: 800 Taler zu 4,5%; bei verzögter Zinszahlung zu 5%	Pers_ID: Nachname/Fa.: 6633 Kress Vorname: Hermann Christian OFB_ID: Hof_ID: Hofname: Notizen: Parz_ID.: Mg: Ruth: FB: Katastralertrag: Notizen: 4-179/11 GB: 15 102 25 Rthl.: Sgr: Pf.: FV: 15 102 25 15 102 25 4-179/12 GB: 0 8 0 Rthl.: Sgr: Pf.: FV: 0 8 0 0 8 0 4-179/7 GB: 2 40 50 Rthl.: Sgr: Pf.: FV: 2 40 50 2 40 50			
Maß: Geld von: 01.10.1856 bis: 27.01.1873 Personen Höfe Parzellen	Datensatz: 1 von 3 [Navigation Buttons]			
Notizen:				

Note: According to this entry form and the embedded sub-tables on persons, holdings and parcels, Herrmann Christian Kress gave a mortgage credit of 800 Thaler to the owner of parcels 179/11, 179/12 and 179/7 in Flur 4 on October 1st, 1856. The mortgage was paid off on January 27th, 1873.