Although Men are accus’d for not knowing their own Weakness, yet perhaps as few know their own Strength] The concluding part of the sentence is a corollary of the first, which in turn is familiar from The Preface to The Battle of the Books (p. 32, ll. 1-2), so that there is no need to search for manifestations of the idea elsewhere.

Satyr is reckon’d the easiest of all Wit] “Satyr and invective are the easiest kind of wit. Almost any degree of it will serve to abuse and find fault. For wit is a keen instrument, and every one can cut and gash with it, but to carve a beautiful image and to polish it requires great art and dexterity ... A little wit, and a great deal of ill nature will furnish a man for Satyr” (John Tillotson, “The Folly of Scoffing at Religion,” The Works of the Most Reverend Dr. John Tillotson: Containing Fifty Four Sermons and Discourses on Several Occasions, 3rd ed. [London: B. Aylmer and W. Rogers, 1701], p. 41 [Passmann and Viênken III, 1858-60]), quoted in full by Sir Thomas Pope Blount, “Concerning Satyr,” De Re Poetica: or, Remarks upon Poetry (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1969 [1694]), pp. 40-45 (40-41).

I take it to be otherwise in very bad Times: For it is as hard to satyrize well a Man of distinguish’d Vices, as to praise well a Man of distinguish’d Virtues] It is unclear why Swift thought it “hard to satyrize well a Man of distinguish’d Vices”; as a matter of fact, he did little else throughout his career as a satirist. The majority of his satires are ‘personal’, ad hominem attacks, targeting “discernible historical particulars” (Edward W. Rosenheim, Jr, Swift and the Satirist’s Art [Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963], p. 31; P. K. Elkin, The Augustan Defence of Satire [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973], pp. 118-45), and the number of his victims, historically authentic personages, is legion, including members of the political caste, the aristocracy, and the royal family (Hermann J. Real, “A Dish plentifully stor’d’: Jonathan Swift and the Evaluation of Satire,” Reading Swift [1993], pp. 45-58 [49-50]). In what is perhaps his strongest statement on the subject, Swift described the time-honoured apophthegm, De mortuis nihil nisi bene, as a “most foolish Precept.” On occasion, he continued, it was even necessary for the satirist to pursue his vendetta beyond the grave, not because he took delight in insulting a dead victim, but because he took it not to be legitimate not to care about sin incarnate:
“Although their Memories will rot, there may be some Benefit for their Survivors, to smell it while it is rotting” (Prose Works, XII, 24-25).

“The greatest instance of wit is to commend well. And perhaps the best things are the hardest to be duly commended. For tho there be a great deal of matter to work upon, yet there is great judgment required to make choice; and where the subject is great and excellent it is hard not to sink below the dignity of it” (Tillotson, The Works, p. 41 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN III, 1858-60]).

[49] INVENTION is the Talent of Youth, and Judgment of Age; so that our Judgment grows harder to please, when we have fewer Things to offer it] “And yet the Invention of Young Men, is more lively, then that of Old: And Imaginations streame into their Minde better, and, as it were, more Divinely ... Young Men, are Fitter to Invent, then to Judge; Fitter for Execution, then for Counsell ... Men of Age, Object too much, Consult too long, Adventure too little, Repent too soon, and seldom drive Businesse home to the full Period” (Sir Francis Bacon, “Of Youth and Age,” The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall, ed. Michael Kiernan [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985], pp. 130-31 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 125-26]). Jeremy Collier, whose Essays Swift read in 1697/8 (REAL [1978], pp. 128-30), is equally explicit on the superior judgment accumulated by old age: “Old Persons have the best Opportunities for reviewing their Opinions, and bringing their Thoughts to a second Test. For trying what they took upon Trust, and correcting the Errors of Education. And thus their Judgment becomes more exact” (“Of Old Age,” Essays upon Several Moral Subjects, 3rd ed., pt II [London: R. Sare and H. Hindmarsh, 1698], 175).

It is also, as Montaigne had noted in his Essays, “grown peevish and hard to please” (The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame [Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1981 {1965}], p. 854). In Pierre Coste’s edition of the Essais, which was in Swift’s library (PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1269-72), this is Book III, no 13: “ma Raison ... devenuë chagrine & desgoustée” (5 vols [Geneva: M. M. Bousquet, 1727], IV, 574). Within the logic of this argument, the prime of life is, as Swift told Gay and the Duchess of Queensberry in a letter of 1731, “the very season when Judgement & invention draw together” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, III, 429).

[49] When we are old, our Friends find it difficult to please us, and are less concern’d whether we be pleas’d or no] “I will tell you a grievous unhappyness under the Sun,” he wrote to Ford in December 1719, “that when Time brings a man to be hard to please, he finds the World less carefull to please him. Which however is less to be wondred at, because it is what every man finds in himself.
When his Invention decays, his Judgment grows nicer” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, II, 310). See also the previous note.

[50] No wise Man ever wished to be younger] In the dialogue between Philebus and Eutropius in Collier’s “Of Old Age,” Philebus convinces Eutropius that this maxim makes eminent good sense: “Methinks I should be loath to Transmigrate into a Child, or lie in a Cradle, with those few Things I have in my Head.” Eutropius agrees a little later: “In short, Philebus to be afraid of growing Old, is to be afraid of growing Wise, and being Immortal” (Essays upon Several Moral Subjects, II, 174, 185-86).

[52] THE Motives of the best Actions will not bear too strict an Enquiry. It is allow’d, that the Cause of most Actions, good or bad, may be resolved into the Love of ourselves] “Interest, which we Accuse of all our Crimes, deserves often to be commend'd for our Good Actions” (François de La Rochefoucauld, Moral Reflections and Maxims: Newly Made English from the Paris Edition [London: by D. Leach for Andrew Bell, et al., 1706], p. 129 [CCCV]; Reflexions ou sentences et maximes morales [Paris: Claude Barbin et Mabre Cramoisy, 1692], pp. 112-13 [CCCLXXII]).

[52] But the Self-Love of some Men inclines them to please others; and the Self-Love of others is wholly employ’d in pleasing themselves. This makes the great Distinction between Virtue and Vice] The belief in the nature of human nature as essentially selfish became a widely disseminated and accepted philosophical principle in the course of the seventeenth century; in fact, it came to be ‘recognized’ as the most fundamental maxim of Christian ethics (Dirk F. Passmann and Hermann J. Real, “The Intellectual History of ‘Self-Love’ and Verses on the Death of Dr Swift,” Reading Swift [2008], pp. 343-62). As Swift explained in his sermon, Doing Good (1724), “NATURE directs every one of us, and God permits us, to consult our own private Good before the private Good of any other person whatsoever … The love we have for ourselves is to be the pattern of that love we ought to have towards our neighbour” (Prose Works, IX, 232). Self-love is ‘natural’, a God-given gift, as innate and inherent in humankind as it is imperative. Human beings depend on the psychological experience of self-love in order to be able to love themselves and their neighbour. In other words, the relationship between altruism and self-interest is complementary.

If this relationship is not complementary, self-love as amor proprius may not be channelled into amor socialis, and, as a result, the distinction between Virtue and Vice collapses. Echoing the Essays of Bacon (The Essayes or
Counsels, ed. Kiernan, p. 40 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 125-26]) and Locke (Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], p. 319) as well as the Sermons of Archbishop Tillotson (The Works, pp. 215-16 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN III, 1858-60]), it was “this love of the public,” Swift declared in Doing Good, that “in antient times [was] properly known by the name of Virtue, because it was the greatest of all virtues, and was supposed to contain all virtues in it” (Prose Works, IX, 233).

[52] Religion is the best Motive of all Actions, yet Religion is allow’d to be the highest Instance of Self-Love] Archbishop Tillotson’s sermon on “The Advantages of Religion to Particular Persons” concludes on this note: “If men did but truly and wisely love themselves, they would upon this very ground if there were no other, become Religious. For when all is done there is no man can serve his own interest better than by serving God … it [is] impossible, so long as men love themselves and desire their own happiness, to keep them from being religious; for they could not but conclude that to be their interest” (The Works, p. 58 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN III, 1858-60]).

[53] When the World has once begun to use us ill, it afterwards continues the same Treatment with less Scruple or Ceremony, as Men do to a Whore] “[The Vainglorious Man] makes his applications to the good opinion of the world, not as if she were an honest woman, but a common whore, and were to be accosted with vapouring, ranting, and lying” (Samuel Butler, Characters, ed. Charles W. Daves [Cleveland and London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970], pp. 317-18).

[54] Old Men view best at distance with the Eyes of their Understanding, as well as with those of Nature] The distinction between natural eyesight and the eyes of the understanding is biblical (St Paul, The Epistle to the Ephesians 1:18; see also Acts 26:18).

[55] Some People take more care to hide their Wisdom than their Folly] The most obvious as well as celebrated case in point would be Socrates, “who said he knew nothing, [but who] was pronounced by the Oracle to be the Wisest Man in the World” (A Tritical Essay on the Faculties of the Mind, p. Q): “His common Saying was, that he only knew this, that he knew nothing; with reference to which Persuasion of his, the Oracle pronounced him the Wisest of all Men” (MORERI s.v.); repeated almost verbatim by Martin de Baraton (Poésies diverses [Paris: Denys Mariette, et al., 1704], p. 74 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN, I, 143-44]), Diogenes Laertius (De vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus
clarorum philosophorum libri X, ed. Marcus Meibomius, 2 vols [Amsterdam: H. Wetstein, 1692], I, 103 [II, 37] [PASSMANN AND VIEK NEN I, 525-26]), and Thomas Stanley (The History of Philosophy [1701] [Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1975], pp. 95-96), not to mention Sir William Temple: “Socrates was by the Delphick Oracle pronounced the wisest of all Men, because He professed that He knew nothing” (Miscellanea: The Third Part [London: Benjamin Tooke, 1701], p. 284). See also Solinus Polyhistor in his Collectanea rerum memorabilivm ([Leiden: Hieronymus de Vogel, 1646], pp. 351-52; bound with Swift’s copy of Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis [PASSMANN AND VIEK NEN II, 1220-22]).

[56] Arbitrary Power is the natural Object of Temptation to a Prince, as Wine or Women to a young Fellow, or a Bribe to a Judge, or Avarice to old Age, or Vanity to a Woman] This aphorism recapitulates several long-held convictions of Swift, all of them also prevalent in Gulliver’s Travels: “Arbitrary Power,” Swift wrote in The Sentiments of a Church-of-England Man of 1708, distancing himself from propagandists of absolute government like Thomas Hobbes and Sir Robert Filmer, “I look upon as a greater Evil than Anarchy it self; as much as a Savage is in a happier State of Life, than a Slave at the Oar” (Prose Works, II, 15). Some twenty years later, Gulliver, after having captured the Blefuscudian fleet, refuses to succumb to the ambition of the Lilliputian Emperor to become “sole Monarch of the whole World”: “And I plainly protested, that I would never be an Instrument of bringing a free and brave People into Slavery” (Prose Works, XI, 53 [I, v, 4]). And some ten years later still, the old Dean stressed in a letter of 12 May 1735 to his friend, the leader of His Majesty’s opposition, William Pulteney, the addictive nature of “the lust of absolute power”: “It is very natural for every king to desire unlimited power; it is as proper an object to their appetites as a wench to an abandoned young fellow, or wine to a drunkard” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, IV, 106-7).

The unpleasant image of the corrupt judge is a commonplace in attacks on venality as early as the Old Testament (Exodus 23:8; Deuteronomy 16:19) and many authors since classical antiquity, including, among others, Cicero, De officiis (Opera, 4 vols [in 2] [Paris: Charles Estienne, 1555], IV, 386 [II, xxii, 76-23] [PASSMANN AND VIEK NEN I, 408-11]), and Ovid, Amores (Opera, ed. N. Heinsius, 3 vols [Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1676], I, 149 [III, viii, 53-56] [PASSMANN AND VIEK NEN II, 1355-56]), as well as, among the moderns, Ned Ward, The London Spy, ed. Paul Hyland (East Lansing: Colleagues Press, 1993), p. 148 (John A. Yunck, The Lineage of Lady Meed: The Development of Mediaeval Venality Satire [Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963], pp. 13-37, 143-59, and passim). In Gulliver’s conversations with the
philosopher-king of Brobdingnag and the Houyhnhnm master, Swift renewed his attacks on the venality of magistrates and lawgivers (Prose Works, XI, 129 [II, vi, 11], 248-50 [IV, v, 11-18]).

In his description of the immortal Struldbruggs, Swift called “Avarice ... the necessary Consequent of old Age” (Prose Works, XI, 214 [III, x, 22]), echoing perhaps Cicero’s criticism of its folly in De senectute: “Avaritia verò senilis quid sibi velit, non intelligo. potest enim quicquam esse absurdius, quàm quo minus viæ restat, eo plus viatici quœreret?” (Opera, II, ii, 418 [60] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 408-11]). Jean de La Bruyère echoed the thought in “De l’Homme”: “Ce vice est plûtôt l’effet de l’âge & de la complexion des vieilleurs” (Les Caractères de Théophraste ... avec les caractères ou les moeurs de ce siècle, 3 vols [in one] [Paris: Estienne Michallet, 1697], II, 101 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1016-17]), as did Jeremy Collier, (“Of Old Age,” Essays upon Several Moral Subjects, II, 168) and Sir William Temple (Miscellanea: The Third Part, p. 302; The Early Essays and Romances of Sir William Temple Bt, ed. G. C. Moore Smith [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930], p. 166). In a fit of self-irony, Swift told Pope in August 1729 when he was 62: “Of [avarice] I cannot charge my self yet nor feel any approaches towards it” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, III, 246).


[57] ANTHONY Henly’s Farmer dying of an Asthma, said, Well, if I can get this Breath once out, I’ll take care it shall never get in again] Henley told Swift this amusing anecdote at greater length in a letter of 2 November 1708 albeit with
the meaning reversed: “Hee reply’d, In great Pain. If I coud but gett this same Breath out of my body Ide take care by God How I lett it come In again” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, I, 211 and n3).

ANTHONY Henly] Anthony Henley (1666/7–1711), wit and politician. After studying at Christ Church, Oxford, Henley was admitted as a student of the Middle Temple in 1684. He spent much of his time in political and literary circles in London; his fortune was said to be £3,000 a year at this time (ODNB s.v.).

Henley was acquainted with Sir William Temple, through whom he became a lifelong friend of Temple’s sister, Lady Martha Giffard, and Jonathan Swift. He was a skilled musician on several instruments and wrote words for settings by the Purcell brothers, Henry and Daniel. He became a protégé of Charles Sackville, Earl of Dorset, and in his turn befriended other men of letters. Samuel Garth’s Dispensary is dedicated to him (2nd ed. [London: John Nutt, 1699], sig. π [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 672-73]). In 1712, it was said of Henley that “there is hardly an Author living, who has not tasted of his Bounty” (John Le Neve, Memoirs, British and Foreign, of the Lives and Families of the Most Illustrious Persons who Dy’d in the Year 1711 [London: S. Holt for Andrew Bell, et al., 1712], p. 532).

[58] The Humour of exploding many Things under the Names of Trifles, Fopperies, and only imaginary Goods, is a very false Proof either of Wisdom or Magnanimity, and a great Check to virtuous Actions] “A Humour, apt to put great Weight upon small Matters, and consequently, to make much Trouble out of little; is the greatest Ingredient to Unhappiness of Life” (Temple, Miscellanea: The Third Part, p. 305).

[58] with Regard to Fame: There is in most People a Reluctance and Unwillingness to be forgotten. We observe, even among the Vulgar, how fond they are to have an Inscription over their Grave] Horace, Carmina, III, xi, 52-53: “I secundo / Omine, & nostri memorem sepulcro / Scalpe querelam [God speed thee! And carve upon my sepulchre an elegy in memory of me” (Quintvs Horatvs Flaccvs, ed. Daniel Heinsius [Leiden: Elzevir, 1628], p. 65 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 905]). The same idea was put forward not only by countless Renaissance emblematists (Robert J. Clements, Picta poesis: Literary and Humanistic Theory in Renaissance Emblem Books [Roma, 1960], pp. 127-31) but also by Philotimus in Collier’s dialogue “Of Fame”: “I must repeat, That this Earnestness for recommending the Memory to Posterity, is an unextinguishable Desire. It governs in all Places, Times, and Conditions” (Essays upon Several Moral Subjects, II, 14). By contrast, the rational Houyhnhnms, embodiments of
very opposite values as they are, “are buried in the obscurest Places that can be found” (*Prose Works*, XI, 274 [IV, ix, 9]).

While in the seventeenth-century “only a man of substance could truly be a virtuous ‘honest man’” and epitaphic commemorations of the lower classes, “the vulgar,” still tended to be comical and condescending, this attitude changed at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Alexander Pope was one of the first to ensure “that the worthy, however humble in rank, [were] not lost in oblivion” (Joshua Scodel, *The English Poetic Epitaph: Commemoration and Conflict from Jonson to Wordsworth* [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991], pp. 161, 279; see also pp. 282-83, 361-74, and *passim*).

[58] It requires but little Philosophy to discover and observe that there is no intrinsick Value in all this; however, if it be founded in our Nature, as an Incitement to Virtue, it ought not to be ridicul’d Philalethes in Collier’s dialogue “Of Fame” concurs: “There are several Diseases as universal as the Desire you mention, and as much fixed in the Constitution; but because they are natural, it seems we must not go about to cure them” (*Essays upon Several Moral Subjects*, II, 14).

[59] COMPLAINT is the largest Tribute Heaven receives, and the sincerest Part of our Devotion] See Aphorism [43]: “THE Power of Fortune is confest only by the Miserable” (*Various Thoughts, Moral and Diverting*, p. ).

[60] THE common Fluency of Speech in many Men, and most Women, is owing to a Scarcity of Matter, and Scarcity of Words, for whoever is a Master of Language, and hath a Mind full of Ideas, will be apt in speaking to hesitate upon the Choice of both] This aphorism juxtaposes, and contrasts, the vacuous staleness and portentous emptiness marking the speech patterns of early eighteenth-century polite circles, and satirically exploded by Swift in his “vast panorama of debased language in a debased society” known under the title *Complete Collection of Genteel and Ingenious Conversation* (Johann N. Schmidt, “Talk that Leads Nowhere: Swift’s *Complete Collection of Genteel and Ingenious Conversation,*” *Reading Swift* [1993], pp. 159-64 [162]), with the conscious and considerable efforts one has to make “to subdue one’s mental anarchy into ‘Proper Words.’” In Swift’s view, not to do so was “antisocial and hence irrational” (Ann Cline Kelly, *Swift and the English Language* [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988], p. 105).

[60] common Speakers have only one Set of Ideas, and one Set of Words to cloath them in; and these are always ready at the Mouth] Swift will have
encountered the sartorial metaphor, which makes language the dress of thought, in Pope’s *Essay on Criticism*, ll. 318-23, unless one prefers any of Pope’s predecessors, such as Dryden and Wycherley (*Pastoral Poetry and An Essay on Criticism*, eds E. Audra and Aubrey Williams [London: Methuen, and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961], pp. 274-75).

[60] People come faster out of a Church when it is almost empty, than when a Crowd is at the Door] If this observation is loaded, its meaning has not been uncovered. But then, in the hustle and bustle of life crowds do tend to impede movements: “A Mountebank in Leicester-Fields had drawn a huge Assembly about him. Among the rest, a fat unwieldy Fellow, half stifled in the Press, would be every fit crying out, Lord! what a filthy Crowd is here; Pray, good People, give way a little; Bless me! what a Devil has rak’d this Rabble together: Z- - - -ds, what squeezing is this!” (*A Tale of a Tub*, p. G).

[61] Few are qualified to shine in Company; but it is in most Mens Power to be agreeable] In *On Good-Manners and Good-Breeding* (first published as an appendix to Patrick Delany’s *Observations upon Lord Orrery’s Remarks on the Life and Writings of Dr Jonathan Swift* ([London: W. Reeve and A. Linde, 1764], pp. 293-308), Swift laid down “GOOD-Manners” as the very first requirement to facilitate social intercourse in conversation, describing it as “the Art of making those people easy with whom we converse” (*Prose Works*, IV, 213). See also Kelly, *Swift and the English Language*, p. 110.

[61] The Reason … why Conversation runs so low at present, is not the Defect of Understanding, but Pride, Vanity, ill Nature, Affectation, Singularity, Positiveness, or some other Vice, the Effect of a wrong Education] In a letter to Archbishop King of 28 September 1721, Swift complained about “the Clatter of Ladies Tongues”: “When your Grace (as you say) was young, as I am not, the Ladies were better Company, or you more easily pleased. I am perpetually reproaching them for their Ignorance, Affectation, Impertinence (but my Paper will not hold all)” (*Correspondence*, ed. Woolley, II, 398-99). The norm, by contrast, had been sketched out by Sir William Temple in “The first Ingredient in Conversation is Truth, the next good Sense, the third good Humour, and the fourth Wit,” and so is “Good Breeding a necessary Quality in Conversation” (*Miscellanea: The Third Part*, pp. 324-25). All of these qualities had been laid out by Charron in a chapter on “Modest and Obliging Behaviour in Conversation” of *De la sagesse*, the English translation of which Swift owned (*Of Wisdom … Made English by George Stanhope*, 2 vols [London: M. Gillyflower, *et al.*, 1697], II, 219-29 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 395-96].

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Singularity] ‘Singularity’ here in the sense of “departing or deviating from what is customary, usual, or normal; peculiarity, eccentricity, oddity, strangeness” (OED).


[62] To be vain is rather a Mark of Humility than Pride] “I confess … I look upon [Ministers of State] as a race of people whose acquaintance no man would court, otherwise than upon the score of Vanity and Ambition. The first quickly wears off (and is the Vice of low minds, for a man of spirit is too proud to be vain) and the other was not my case” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, II, 358).

[62] Vain Men delight in telling what Honours have been done them, what great Company they have kept, and the like; by which they plainly confess, that these Honours were more than their Due, and such as their Friends would not believe if they had not been told] See “The Vainglorious Man” in Butler’s Characters, ed. Daves, pp. 317-18.

[62] a Man truly proud, thinks the greatest Honours below his Merit, and consequently scorns to boast. I therefore deliver it as a Maxim, that whoever desires the Character of a proud Man, ought to conceal his Vanity] In consequence, Swift assured the Duke and Duchess of Queensberry in 1731 when he saw himself in danger of succumbing to vanity due to the Queensberrys’ repeated compliments: “I could have sworn, that my pride would be always able to preserve me from vanity” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, III, 444).

[63] LAW, in a free Country, is or ought to be the Determination of the Majority of those who have Property in Land] Swift reiterates the Harringtonian principle that power follows property: “Because, in all free Nations, I take the proper Definition of Law to be the Will of the Majority of those who have the Property in Land” (The Drapier’s Letters to the People of Ireland, ed. Herbert Davis [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965], p. 164), already disclosed to Pope four years earlier in “A Letter from Dr Swift to Mr Pope” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, II, 354-64 [360]). Harrington enunciated this principle in The Common-Wealth of Oceana of 1656: “Dominion is Propriety reall or personall, that is to say, in Lands, or in money and goods” ([London: J. Streater for Livewell Chapman, 1656], p. 4 [PASSMANN AND VIEKEN II, 800-2]), and the Drapier had echoed

[64] One Argument used to the Disadvantage of Providence, I take to be a very strong one in its Defence. It is objected, that Storms and Tempests, unfruitful Seasons, Serpents, Spiders, Flies, and other noxious or troublesome Animals, with many more Instances of the like kind, discover an Imperfection in Nature, because human Life would be much easier without them: But the Design of Providence may clearly be perceived in this Proceeding] As Archbishop King argued in *De origine mali* [An Essay on the Origin of Evil], which was first published in a Dublin edition of 1702 and which may have been known to Swift in its Latin original, evils were of three kinds, those of imperfection, natural, and moral. King addressed the evil of imperfection, or defect, in his Chapter III. Having established the premise that the Creation is the creative expression of a Supreme Being who is every way ‘perfect in himself,’ the Archbishop proceeded to the (self-destructive) argument that the Creator never re-created Himself in the Creation. As a result, the Creation at no stage was, in fact could never be, identical with its Creator, *Natura naturata*, the universe, never be a replica of *Natura naturans*, God. In a sense, the Divine Essence was victimized by its own will to creativity: not even omnipotence could have created its own double. Thus, the Creation is initially marred by defect, the evils of imperfection, some of which are detailed by Swift. However, once it is accepted that whatever is is imperfect, that imperfection is, paradoxically, as it should be, namely right (Hermann J. Real, “Conversations with a Theodicist: William

[64] The Motions of the Sun and Moon; in short, the whole System of the Universe, as far as Philosophers have been able to discover and observe, are in the utmost Degree of Regularity and Perfection] In its order, regularity, and harmony, the cosmos reflects the order and harmony of its Creator: God, or *Natura Naturans*, revealed Himself in the Creation, or *Natura Naturata*. This idea, originally a hallmark of the Platonic philosophy and the Ptolemaic model of the universe (Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973]), had come under fire in the wake of the paradigm change in seventeenth-century philosophy and science, which favoured the ontological and cosmological principles of Greek atomism – matter and void, infinity of space and infinity of time, plurality of worlds – and which had ostensibly been corroborated by the New Science (Robert Hugh Kargon, *Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966]; Edward Grant, *Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981]). Thanks to the Newtonian revolution, however, the old model, with its distinctive features of plenitude and coherence, hierarchy and order, had been reinstated by the early eighteenth century. Thus, the view of Nature as advocated by, among many others, Swift’s friend Alexander Pope in *An Essay on Criticism* (1711) (*Pastoral Poetry and An Essay on Criticism*, eds Audra and Williams, pp. 219-22; 246-47, ll. 68-73; 249, ll. 88-91), is in fact a new, Newtonian, model of the universe which happens to display the same traits as the traditional one. An especially arresting elucidation is that of John Dennis in *The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry* (1701): “There is nothing in Nature that is great and beautiful, without Rule and Order; and the more Rule and Order, and Harmony, we find in the Objects that strike our Senses, the more Worthy and Noble we esteem them ... Whatever God created, he designed it Regular, and as the rest of the Creatures, cannot swerve in the least from the Eternal Laws pre-ordain’d for them” (*The Critical Works of John Dennis*, ed. Edward Niles Hooker, 2 vols [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1939-43], I, 202, 481).

[64] wherever God hath left to Man the Power of interposing a Remedy by Thought or Labour, there he hath plac’d Things in a State of Imperfection, on Purpose to stir up human Industry, without which Life would stagnate, or indeed
rather could not subsist at all] Although it is not embedded in a religious context as a rule, the conviction that industry is a prerequisite for the wealth of society was a philosophical and economic commonplace by Swift’s time. Thomas Hobbes endorsed it in *Leviathan*: “THE NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life ... Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) meerly on the labour and Industry of men” (*Leviathan: or, The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill* [London: Andrew Crooke, 1651], p. 127 [II, xxiv] [PASSMANN AND VIENTKEN II, 870]). Sir Andrew Freeport, in *Spectator*, no 232, followed suit: “The Goods which we export are indeed the Product of the Lands, but much the greatest Part of their Value is the Labour of the People” (*The Spectator*, ed. Bond, II, 402).

It was in line with this argumentation that, in his sermon *On the Poor Man’s Contentment*, Swift denounced “Idleness [as] the Bane and Destruction of Virtue” (*Prose Works*, IX, 196), and that, in *Gulliver’s Travels*, Gulliver discovers in the Yahoos “the true Seeds of Spleen, which only seizeth on the Lazy” (*Prose Works*, XI, 264 [IV, vii, 17]).

[64] *Curis acuunt mortalia corda*] Obviously quoted from memory: “primusque per artem / Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda [The great Father ... first made awake the fields, sharpening men’s wits by care]” (Virgil, *Georgics*, in *Publii Virgilii Maronis Bucolica, Georgica, et Æneis* [Cambridge: Jacob Tonson, 1701], p. 52 [I, 122-23] [PASSMANN AND VIENTKEN III, 1916-17]).

[65] *PRAISE is the Daughter of present Power*] In his Essay “Of the Inequality that is Between Us,” Montaigne narrates a saying by the Emperor Julian who told his courtiers “[on] praising him for being so just. ‘I would readily take pride in these praises ... if they came from people who dared to accuse or dispraise my unjust actions, if there should be any’” (*The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Frame, p. 195). In Coste’s edition of the *Essais* (PASSMANN AND VIENTKEN II, 1269-72), this is Book I, no 42: “Je m’enorgueillirois volontiers ... de ces louanges, si elles venoient de personnes, qui ozassent accuser ou mesloüer mes actions contraires, quand elles y seroient” (I, 532).

[66] *How inconsistent is Man with himself*] See Aphorism [34]: “IF a Man would register all his Opinions upon Love, Politicks, Religion, Learning, &c. beginning from his Youth, and so go on to Old Age, what a Bundle of Inconsistences and Contradictions would appear at last” (*Various Thoughts, Moral and Diverting*, p. ). Montaigne devoted a whole essay to the theme, “Of the Inconsistency of our Actions;” its central argument is: “[Human actions]
commonly contradict each other so strangely that it seems impossible that they have come from the same shop” (*The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Frame, pp. 239-44 [239]). In Coste’s edition of the *Essais* (PASSMANN AND VIENKEN, II, 1269-72), this is Book II, no 1: “[Les actions humaines] se contredissent communement de si estrange facon, qu’il semble impossible qu’elles soient parties de mesme boutique” (II, 1-14 [p. 1]). Later in the volume (III, no 9), Montaigne went as far as to describe the condition humaine as “hostile to consistency” (p. 758; Coste’s edition, IV, 318).

[68] I HAVE known great Ministers distinguish’d for Wit and Learning, who preferred none but Dunces] La Rochefoucauld supplies a psychological explanation: “A Man of Wit wou’d be often at a grievous loss, were it not for the Company of Fools” (*Moral Reflections and Maxims*, p. 58 [CXL]; *Reflexions ou sentences et maximes morales*, p. 54 [CLXVIII]). Similarly, Sir William Temple elaborates that “often witty men undertake the patronage of foolish and impertinent opinions either to exercise their own wits or our patience, or perhaps to please themselves with making a foole of the world” (*The Early Essays and Romances of Sir William Temple Bt*, ed. Moore Smith, p. 144).

[69] I HAVE known Men of great Valour Cowards to their Wives] It is difficult to state with confidence what part of the literary tradition in which the theme of the hen-pecked husband is elaborated Swift was familiar with. A famous case in point is of course Socrates, who gave “signal Marks of his Valour, in fighting for the Safety of his Country” (MORÉRI, s.v.) but who subjected himself to his shrewish wife Xanthippe: “Great Socrates but vainly try’d, / To soothe the Passions of his Bride; / Her Female Empire still she holds, / And as He preaches Peace, she Scolds” ([Thomas Newcomb], *Bibliotheca: A Poem, Occasion’d by the Sight of a Modern Library* [London: Printed in the Year, 1712], p. 62; see also Diogenes Laertius, *De vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophorum libri X*, ed. Meibomius, I, 93-95 [II, 22-26] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 525-26]; Stanley, *The History of Philosophy*, pp. 86, 95, 97). Not to mention Shakespeare’s *Macbeth* (1606) and *The Taming of the Shrew* (c.1592), in which the theme is parodically inverted in the figures of Katherina and Petruchio, a play closer to Swift would have been Sir George Etherege’s *She Wou’d if She Cou’d* (1668), in which an imperious Lady Cockwood takes good ‘care’ of her husband, Sir Oliver.

[70] I HAVE known Men of the greatest Cunning perpetually cheated] This remark seems to be rooted in unverified personal experience, although the
theme, the deceiver deceived, was also a popular theme on the stage, with Shakespeare’s *Measure for Measure* (1604) springing to mind easily.

[71] I knew three great Ministers, who could exactly compute and settle the Accounts of a Kingdom, but were wholly ignorant of their own Economy] One of these great ministers is most certainly Swift’s close friend, Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke, who despite having incurred vast debts and who was always short of money (H. T. Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* [London: Constable, 1970], pp. 135, 309-12) would “laugh at [Swift’s] precepts of thrift.” In a letter of October 1729, Swift ironically told Bolingbroke that he wished his Lordship “could learn Arithmetic, that 3 and 2 make 5, and will never make more” (*Correspondence*, ed. Woolley, III, 617, 261; see also II, 162n).

[73] Princes usually make wiser Choices than the Servants whom they trust for the Disposal of Places: I have known a Prince more than once chuse an able Minister, but I never observ’d that Minister to use his Credit in the Disposal of an Employment to a Person whom he thought the fittest for it] Among the schemes proposed in the School of Political Projectors at the Academy of Lagado is “to prevent [the] Forgetfulness” of ministers “because it [was] a general Complaint that the Favourites of Princes [were] troubled with short and weak Memories” (*Prose Works*, XI, 188 [III, vi, 4]).

[73] One of the greatest in this Age own’d and excus’d the Matter from the Violence of Parties, and the Unreasonableness of Friends] “For I know too well,” Swift told Thomas Tickell in September 1725, when he was engaged in damage control about Sheridan’s loss of favour at the Dublin court, “how often Princes themselves are obliged to act against their Judgment amidst the Rage of Factions” (*Correspondence*, ed. Woolley, II, 599-600).

[74] Small Causes are sufficient to make a Man uneasy, when great ones are not in the Way: For want of a Block he will stumble at a Straw] Possibly, a combination of two proverbs, in which the second serves to illustrate the first (“A small cause may produce much grief” and “To stumble at a straw and leap over a block” [Tilley C203 and S922]), but the impact of Montaigne is, again, not to be ruled out: “The pettiest and slightest nuisances are the most acute; and as small letters hurt and tire the eyes most, so do small matters sting us most” (*The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Frame, p. 725). In Coste’s edition of the *Essais* (Passmann and Viênken, II, 1269-72), this is Book III, no 9: “Les plus menus & graisles empeschemens, sont les plus perçans. Et comme les
petites lettres lassent plus les yeux, aussi nous piquent plus les petits affaires” (IV, 231).

[75] DIGNITY, high Station, or great Riches are in some sort necessary to old Men, in order to keep the younger at a Distance, who are otherwise too apt to insult them upon the Score of their Age] Montaigne illustrates the wisdom of this maxim with the story “one lord of good understanding” told him: “From hoarding his riches, he said, he expected to derive no other benefit and use than to make himself honored and sought after by his dependents, since when age had deprived him of all other powers, he would have only this way left to maintain his authority in his family and to avoid incurring everyone’s scorn and disdain” (The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Frame, p. 281). In Coste’s edition of the Essais (PASSMANN AND VIENKEN, II, 1269-72), this is Book II, no 8: “Et si on me respond ce que fit un jour un Seigneur de bon entendement, qu’il faisoit espargne des richesses, non pour en tirer autre fruict & usage, que pour se faire honorer & rechercher aux siens; & que l’aage luy ayant osté toutes autres forces, c’estoit le seul remede qui luy restoit pour se maintenir en autorité en sa famille, & pour eviter qu’il ne vinst à mespris & desdain à tout le monde” (II, 110). La Bruyère, too, comments on the connection between old age and wealth even though he only adumbrates the necessity of wealth as a means of protection in old age: “Quand on est jeune, souvent on est pauvre; ou l’on n’a pas encore fait d’acquisitions ... l’on devient riche & vieux en même temps; tant il est rare que les homes puissent reüir tous leurs avantages” (La Bruyère, “Des Biens de Fortune,” Les Caractères de Théophraste ... avec les caractères ou les moeurs de ce siècle, I, 211 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1016-17]).

[76] EVERY Man desires to live long; but no Man would be old] “L’on espere de vieillir & l’on craint la vieillesse, c’est-à-dire, l’on aime la vie et l’on fuit la mort” (La Bruyère, “De l’Homme,” Les Caractères de Théophraste ... avec les caractères ou les moeurs de ce siècle, II, 76 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1016-17]). Swift was haunted by thoughts of aging and dying as early as 1699 when he scribbled his “Resolutions when I come to be old” (Resolutions 1699, pp. ) and in the late 1720s and 1730s, these reminiscences of memento mori multiplied and intensified (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, III, 261, 294). An early climax occurs in Gulliver’s encounter with the immortal Struldbruggs (Prose Works, XI, 207-14 [III, x]), in which the Immortals demonstrate that Man’s desire for immortality ends in the burden of life-in-death (Hermann J. Real, “The ‘keen Appetite for Perpetuity of Life’ Abated: The Struldbriggs, Again,” Fiktion und Geschichte in der anglo-amerikanischen Literatur: Festschrift für Heinz-Joachim Müllenbrock zum 60. Geburtstag, eds Rüdiger

[77] LOVE of Flattery in most Men proceeds from the mean Opinion they have of themselves; in Women from the contrary] Philippe Hurault, count de Cheverny, accounts for the human addiction to flattery in his Memoires d’estat sous le regne des Roys Henry Troisiesme et Henry IV, which was in Swift’s library (PASSMANN AND VIEKEN II, 932-33) by comparing it to a sweet poison: “Car la flatterie qui est un grand poison, est si douce, qu’elle est receuë & escoutée d’oreilles fort favorables” ([The Hague: Jean & Daniel Steucker, 1669], II, 155-56). “No man is apt to have so mean an opinion of himself, as to believe he is capable of being Flatterd, or if he were that he is so weake and easy, that any man should presume to attempt it” (Butler, Prose Observations, ed. Hugh de Quehen [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], p. 78).

[78] If Books and Laws continue to increase as they have done for fifty Years past, I am in some concern for future Ages, how any Man will be Learned, or any Man a Lawyer] The increase in the number of books as a baneful consequence of the invention of printing is a favourite Swiftian theme (see the note on Aphorism [18] in Various Thoughts, Moral and Diverting, pp. ). According to Swift, who may be particularly indebted to Sir William Temple here, the advent of the printed book had not abolished ignorance, which remained as epidemic as it was endemic (Hermann J. Real, “A Taste of Composition Rare: The Tale’s Matter and Void,” Reading Swift [1998], pp. 73-90 [84-89]), but had resulted in the (re)production of mass and the proliferation of matter. “The invention of printing has not … multiplied books, but only the copies of them,” Temple ruled in his “Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning” (Sir William Temple’s Essays “Upon Ancient and Modern Learning” und “Of Poetry”: eine historisch-kritische Ausgabe mit Einleitung und Kommentar, ed. Martin Kämper [Frankfurt on Main: Peter Lang, 1995], pp. 2, 135 [ad 2.58-60]; see also Daniel Eilon, “Swift Burning the Library of Babel,” The Modern Language Review, 80 [1985], 269-82 (pp. 269-71); and Marcus Walsh, “The Superfoetation of Literature: Attitudes to the Printed Book in the Eighteenth-Century,” British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 15 [1992], 151-61). In his account of Brobdingnagian learning, Gulliver reports that although “[the Giants] have had the Art of Printing … Time out of Mind,” they keep the number of published books at a minimum: “But their Libraries are not very large,” the largest not amounting “to above a thousand Volumes” (Prose Works, XI, 136 [II, vii, 8]).
KINGS are commonly said to have long Hands; I wish they had as long Ears. The first part is proverbial, “Kings have long arms,” signifying that the king’s arm, his power and authority, reaches over all his dominions (TILLEY K87), a meaning frequent in Shakespeare (The Second Part of King Henry VI, ed. Andrew S. Cairncross [London: Methuen, and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962], pp. 126-27 [IV, vii, 77-78], King Richard II, ed. Andrew Gurr [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], pp. 137-38 [IV, i, 8-13]). The proverb is possibly based on a couplet from Ovid’s Heroides, amatory poems in the form of letters purporting to be addressed by mythical heroines to their husbands or lovers. In one of these, an adulterous Helen warns her lover Paris against the “far-reaching hands” of her absent husband, King Menelaus: “sic meus hinc vir abest, ut me custodiat absens / An nescis longas Regibus esse manus? [My lord is away, but in such wise that he guards me, even though away – or know you not that monarchs have far-reaching hands?]” (Opera, ed. Heinsius, I, 72 [XVII, 165-66] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1355-56]).

The desire for long royal ears is more difficult to account for because the proverb has also come down in the variants, “Kings have long ears,” and “Kings have long hands and ears” (Erasmus’ Adagia, in Opera omnia, ed. Jean Le Clerc, II [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1961], col. 69D), here rewritten as a wish. This seems to point to audiences at Court, which were granted not only to important visitors but also to petitioners who beg to be listened to well. “To give audience” means “to give ear” (OED). Alternatively, given the impossibility of royal presence in “every Corner of their Dominions,” kings have to rely on ministers, “Persons fit for their Service”: “They cannot see far with their own Eyes, nor hear with their own Ears; and must for the most part do both with those of other Men,” Temple noted in “Of Popular Discontents,” edited by Swift in 1701 (Miscellanea: The Third Part, p. 27), and echoed in “A Sermon upon the Martyrdom of K. Charles I” (Prose Works, IX, 229). To remedy the situation, Swift wishes for long(er) ears.

PRINCES in their Infancy, Childhood, and Youth, are said to discover prodigious Parts and Wit, to speak Things that surprie and astonish: Strange, so many hopeful Princes, and so many shameful Kings! If they happen to die young, they would have been Prodigies of Wisdom and Virtue: If they live, they are often Prodigies indeed, but of another sort] One constituent of this aphorism may be situated in the context of the hagiographic puer senilis or puer senex topos, which by the beginning of the second century AD had established itself and which remained alive down to the seventeenth century. This topos combines, and contrasts, the tender years of youth with the dignity and maturity
of age, often extolled “as a gift from heaven only granted to emperors and demigods” (CURTIUS, p. 99). Among the very many poets and writers who tried their hands at it and who were known to Swift are Virgil, Ovid, Pliny the Younger, and Claudian, not to forget Sir William Temple (Sir William Temple’s Essays “Upon Ancient and Modern Learning” und “Of Poetry”, ed. Kämper, p. 283 [ad 59.680-81]), and the authors of the Bible. It is impossible to tell with any degree of certainty which “Prodigies … of another sort” Swift had in mind, but “the Cæsars and their Successors” of the Roman Empire, which he described as “the most infamous tyrants that have any where appeared in story” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, II, 361) is presumably as good a guess as any.

[81] POLITICKS, as the Word is commonly understood, are nothing but Corruptions, and consequently of no Use to a good King, or a good Ministry, for which Reason Courts are so over-run with Politicks] As Swift remembered in 1727, his knowledge of courts derived from conversations at Moor Park and began in late 1691. Assuring Gay and Pope that he could list no less than 24 “constant” individual corruptions, he particularly singled out four: first, “the trite old Maxim of a Minister never forgiving those he hath injured”; second, “the insincerityes of those who would be thought the best Friends”; third, “the Love of fawning, cringing and Tale bearing”, and, finally, “sacrificing those whom we realy wish well, to a point of Interest or Intrigue” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, III, 141 and n8). A few months later, he reaffirmed this view in a letter to Bolingbroke and Pope: “I will venture all I am worth, that there is not one humane creature in power who will not be modest enough to confess that he proceeds wholly upon a principle of Corruption” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, III, 230).

[82] SILENUS, the Foster Father of Bacchus, is always carried by an Ass, and has Horns on his Head. The Moral is, that Drunkards are led by Fools, and have a great Chance to be Cuckolds] “Silenus, the Foster-father and Companion of Bacchus, whom the Poets represent sitting upon an Ass, and always Drunk” (MORÉRI s.v.). By contrast, Diodorus of Sicily, whom Swift read and “abstracted” at Moor Park in 1697/8 (REAL [1978], pp. 128-31), describes Silenus as the god’s “personal attendant and caretaker” as well as “his adviser and instructor in the most excellent pursuits” (The Library of History, IV, 4, 3). In iconography and art, Silenus usually appears as a grotesque creature, bald and naked, thick-lipped and squat-nosed, potbellied and with the legs of a human, but without horns. In Swift’s imagination, Silenus, a faun, is likely to have figured as a satyr (A Discourse concerning the Mechanical Operation of the
and thus would have counted among the horned attendants of Bacchus (MORÉRI s.v.; TOOE, pp. 202-3).

[83] VENUS, a beautiful good-natur’d Lady, was the Goddess of Love; Juno, a terrible Shrew, the Goddess of Marriage; and they were always mortal Enemies] In Venus’ countenance, “all the Graces sit and play, and discover all their Charms.” Viewers of her image “see a Pleasantness, a Mirth and Joy in every part of her Face” as well as “a thousand pretty Beauties and Delights sporting wantonly in her snowy Bosom” (TOOE, pp. 107-8). As the Goddess of Marriage, Juno’s *epitheton ornans* is *Perfecta*, “Marriage [being] esteem’d the Perfection of human Life.” “Juno’s most notorious Fault” was her “Jealousy,” for which TOOE quoted many examples (TOOE, pp. 94, 88-90). The perennial antagonism between Juno and Venus is one of the most powerful motifs of Vergil’s *Aeneid*, announced proleptically at the beginning of Book One: “Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine læso, / Quidve dolens Regina Deûm, tot volvere casus / Insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores / Impulerit. tantæne animis cœlestibus iræ? [O Muse! the Causes and Crimes relate, / What Goddess was provok’d, and whence her hate: / For what Offence the Queen of Heav’n began / To persecute so brave, so just a Man! / Involv’d his anxious Life in endless Cares, / Expos’d to Wants, and hurry’d into Wars! / Can Heav’nly Minds such high resentment show; / Or exercise their Spight in Human Woe?]” (*Publii Virgili Maronis Bucolica, Georgica, et Æneis*, p. 160 [I, 12-15] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1916-17]; Dryden, *The Works of Virgil*, in *The Poems of John Dryden*, ed. Kinsley, III, 1064-65, ll. 11-18). In what follows, Juno’s hatred makes Venus complain to Jupiter about Aeneas, her son’s, misfortunes.

[84] THOSE who are against Religion, must needs be Fools] A subtle twist to the Psalmist’s “The fool hath said in his heart, *There is no God*” (Psalms 14:1; 53:1). Swift replaces the Psalmist’s atheism by religion, perhaps induced by the traditional semantic indeterminacy of ‘orthodox’ theological and philosophical polemics against atheism (Michael Hunter, *Science and Society in Restoration England* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], pp. 162-70), which has tended to identify irreligion with atheism: “All that Impugne a received *Religion* … are by the adverse Part, branded with the Name of *Atheists*” (Bacon, “Of Atheisme,” *The Essayes or Counsels*, ed. Kieran, pp. 52-53 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 125-26]). In his first Boyle Lecture, significantly entitled “The Folly of Atheism,” Richard Bentley used the lines from Psalms as an epigraph (*The Works* [1836-1838], ed. Alexander Dyce, 3 vols [Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1971], III, 1-26), and the second of John Tillotson’s sermons
addresses “The Folly of Scoffing at Religion” (*The Works*, pp. 34-42 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN III, 1858-60]).

[84] we read that, of all Animals, God refus’d the *First-born* of an Ass] “And every firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break his neck” (Exodus 13:13). Under the Mosaic law, the sheep or lamb with which the ass was redeemed had to be given to the priest, to be used by him in any way he desired. If the owner did not wish to redeem it, he had to break its neck and bury it, so as to have no benefit from its body. Although the Scriptural passages use the general expression “unclean beasts,” the Rabbis made the law apply only to the first-born of an ass. In Swift’s specious logic, however, God does not suffer *fools* gladly, rejecting the ass not as an unclean animal but as the embodiment of folly: “Stupidum hoc animal indignum erat quod Deo immolaretur [This stupid animal was not worthy to be sacrificed to God],” as Matthew Poole dryly noted in his massive variorum commentary of the Bible, *Synopsis criticorum aliorumque S. Scripturæ interpretum*, 5 vols (London: J. Flesher and T. Roycroft, 1669-76), I, col. 374 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1488-90]). Accordingly, ass’s flesh is not mentioned either among the offerings allowed in sacrifices (John Richardson, *Choice Observations and Explanations upon the Old Testament* [London: by T. R. and E. M. for John Rothwell, 1655], diagram placed between pp. 18 and 19). Significantly, it is the favourite food of the Yahoos (*Prose Works*, XI, 262 [IV, vii, 13]).

[85] A very little Wit is valued in a Woman, as we are pleas’d with a few Words spoken plain by a Parrot] Montaigne resorted to a military metaphor to explain why this is the case: “Learning is a dangerous sword that will hamper and hurt its master, if it is in a weak hand that does not know how to use it … Perhaps this is the reason why neither we nor theology require much learning of women” (*The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Frame, p. 103; in Coste’s edition of the *Essais* [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN, II, 1269-72], Book I, no 24: “C’est un dangereux glaive, & qui empesche & offence son maistre s’il est en main foible, & qui n’en saché l’usage … A l’aventure est-ce la cause, que & nous, & la Theologie ne requerons pas beaucoup de science aux Femmes” [I, 232-33]). In the “Age of Wit,” as scholars have termed the time from 1650 to 1750, a witty woman was looked upon as an oddity (D. Judson Milburn, *The Age of Wit, 1650-1750* [New York and London: Collier-Macmillan, 1966], pp. 235-40; Jocelyn Harris, “Sappho, Souls, and the Salic Law of Wit,” *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany*, eds Alan Charles Kors and Paul J. Korshin [Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia

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According to Juvenal’s Sixth Satire (given in Dryden’s translation), the greatest of all evils is a learned woman: “But of all Plagues, the greatest is untold; / The Book-Learn’d Wife, in Greek and Latin bold. / The Critick-Dame, who at her Table sits; / Homer and Virgil quotes, and weighs their Wits” (The Poems of John Dryden, ed. Kinsley, II, 710, ll. 560-63). Only few women were accorded the capacity for genuine wit, and especially women writers were aware of the fact that they were “intrudor[s] on the rights of men,” as Anne Finch, Countess of Winchilsea, wrote in “The Introduction,” a poem, which was written in 1689 but which is missing from her collection of Poems on Several Occasions, published anonymously in 1713 through the good offices of John Barber, Swift’s publisher and friend (The Poems of Anne Countess of Winchilsea, ed. Myra Reynolds [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903], p. 4, l. 10; see also Kirsten Juhas, “I’le to My Self, and to My Muse Be True”: Strategies of Self-Authorization in Eighteenth-Century Women Poetry [Frankfurt on Main: Lang, 2008], pp. 50-65). Not coincidentally, Swift’s poetic tribute to Anne Finch bears the title of “Apollo Outwitted” (1709).

Conversely, little wit or learning, however desirable, does not make anybody a scholar. As the anonymous author of An Answer to a Late Pamphlet Called, An Essay concerning Critical and Curious Learning argues: “There is a sort of Common-place, which any Man, that keeps good Company, may be easily furnished with, and yet at the same time be no more a Scholar, than the Pope’s Parrot, that could repeat the Creed, by keeping much Company with his Holiness, was a Christian” ([London: E. Whitlock, 1698], pp. 9-10).

[86] A nice Man is a Man of nasty Ideas] Presumably because he is “wanton, dissolute, lascivious” (OED).

[87] APOLLO was held the God of Physick, and Sender of Diseases: Both were originally the same Trade, and still continue] In addition to being the God of Music, Poetry, and Prophecy, among many other competences, Apollo, the son of Jupiter and Latona, is described as the “God of Physick” (LITTLETON s.v. [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1088]). Together with Neptune, he helped fortify the walls of Troy for King Laomedon but having been defrauded by the king, Apollo punished the city with a pestilence (Homer, The Iliad, in Homeri qvae exstant omnia, ed. Jean de Sponde, 2 vols [in one] [Basle: Sebastian Henricpetri, 1606], I, 379 [XXI, 441-61] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 890]; see also Apollodorus, The Library, trans. Sir James George Frazer, 2 vols [London: William Heinemann, and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963-67], I, 205-7 [II, v, 9]; and Lucian’s sarcastic skit, “De sacrificiis,” Luciani
Samosatensis opera, ed. Johannes Benedictus, 2 vols [Amsterdam: P. and I. Blaeu, 1687], I, 363-64 [3-4] [PASSMANN AND VIEKEN II, 1114-15]), so that “the immission of all epidemick or ordinary Diseases” was later attributed to him (Thucydides, whose History of the Peloponnesian War Swift “abstracted” at Moor Park in 1697/8 [REAL {1978}, pp. 129-31]) in Thomas Hobbes’s translation (The History of the Grecian War, 2nd ed. [London: Andrew Clark for Charles Harper, 1676], p. 74). The fraud is alluded to by Horace, Carmina: “In puluerem, ex quo destituit deos / Mercede pacta Laomedon …Cum populo, & duce fraudulento [Ilium given over to me …with its folk and treacherous king, ever since Laomedon cheated the gods of their covenanted pay]” (Qvintvs Horatív Flaccvs, ed. Heinsius, p. 53 [III, iii, 21-22] [PASSMANN AND VIEKEN II, 905]; Virgil, Georgics, I, 500-1: “satis jam pridem sanguine nostrò / Laomedontecæ luimus perjurìa Trojà [Enough has our life-blood long atoned for Laomedon’s perjury at Troy]” (Publii Virgilii Maronis Bucolica, Georgica, et Æneis, p. 71 [PASSMANN AND VIEKEN III, 1916-17]), and Ovid, Metamorphoses, in Opera, ed. Heinsius, II, 199 [XI, 194-215] [PASSMANN AND VIEKEN II, 1355-56]), to name but a few.


[88] Old Men and Comets have been reverenc’d for the same Reason; their long Beards, and Pretences to foretel Events] “The Beard, conformable to the Notion of my Friend, Sir Roger, was for many Ages looked upon as the Type of
Wisdom,” Budgell writes in *The Spectator* of 20 March 1712 (no 331, ed. Bond, III, 221). “Voluit Deus barbam apparere, quæ est virilitatis insigne,” as Poole explains in his glosses on Leviticus 19:27 (*Synopsis criticorum aliorumque S. Scripturae interpretum*, I, col. 588). In the Old Testament, beards are only cut in mourning, and as a form of penance or punishment (2 Samuel 10:4-5). While, in Greece, Diodorus of Sicily reports, “all men in early times wore long beards” (*The Library of History*, IV, 5, 2 [REAL {1978}, pp. 128-31]), in Roman times, it was particularly philosophers of the second century AD who sported beards, after a beardless fashion lasting from the time of Scipio Africanus Minor (second century BC) to the reign of the emperor Hadrian (117-38 AD) (Aulus Gellius, *Noctium Atticarum libri* XX, eds Johannes Fredericus and Jacobus Gronovius [Leiden: Cornelius Bousteyn and Johannes du Vivié, 1706], pp. 219-20 and nn7,8 [III, iv] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 688-89]), as Pliny the Younger’s description of the philosopher Euphrates shows: “Sermo est copiosus & varius: dulcis in primis, & qui repugnantes quoque ducat & impellat. Ad hoc, proceritas corporis, decora facies, demissus capillus, ingens & cana barba. Quæ licet fortuita & inania putentur, illi tamen plurimum venerationis acquirunt [His style is rich and various, and at the same time so wonderfully sweet, that it seduces the attention of the most unwilling hearer. His outward appearance is agreeable to all the rest: he has a tall figure, comely aspect, long hair, and a large white beard: circumstances which though they may probably be thought trifling and accidental, contribute however to gain him much reverence]” (*Epistolarum libri* X [Leiden: Elzevir, 1640], p. 12 [I, x] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1463-64]).

In Horace, somewhat earlier, Damasippus and Stertinius, being philosophers, proudly exhibit “a wise man’s beard [sapientem pascere barbam]” (*Satyræ*, in *Qvintvs Horatìvs Flaccvs*, ed. Heinsius, p. 159 [II, iii, 16-17, 33-35] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 905]). Lucian poked fun at the habit for its emptiness (*Luciani Samosatensis opera*, ed. Benedictus, I, 862; II, 329 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1114-15]), mockery later to be echoed by Erasmus in *The Praise of Folly* (*Moriae encomium* [Oxford: W. Hall for S. Bolton, 1668], p. [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 574]) and Samuel Butler in *Hudibras*. Having been thrown into prison, Hudibras is about to receive a visit by the widow: “When *Hudibras* the Lady heard / To take kind notice of his *Beard*, / And speak with such respect and honour, / Both of the *Beard*, and the *Beard’s* owner, / He thought it best to set as good / A face upon it as he cou’d” (*Hudibras*, ed. Wilders, p. 104 [II, i, 141-46]; see also *A Vindication of the Clergy* [London: by Andrew Clark for Henry Brome, 1672], pp. 49, 85). In a piece of self-mockery, Pope asked Swift as late as 1734, “do not laugh at my gravity, but permit me to
wear the beard of a philosopher, till I pull it off, and make a jest of it myself” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, III, 759).


[89] A PERSON was ask’d at Court what he thought of an Ambassador, and his Train, who were all Embroidery and Lace, full of Bows, Cringes, and Gestures] Not certainly identified. During the reign of Charles II, numerous foreign princes and senior members of ruling dynasties visited England. Among them was Cosimo Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany, to whose trusted secretary Lorenzo Magalotti, who had accompanied the Duke on a visit to England in 1669 (R. D. Waller, “Lorenzo Magalotti in England, 1668-9,” Italian Studies, 1,
Swift dedicated a copy of his edition of Sir William Temple’s *Letters to the King* (see Preface to Temple’s *Letters to the King*), as well as Prince George of Hanover, the future King George I, and William of Orange, the future William III. If these visits were not incognito, they “were conducted ‘in state,’” with “all consequent pomp” according to well-established formulae, and very much in the public eye, not to mention the symbolic significance of diplomatic ceremonial (Anna Keay, *The Magnificent Monarch: Charles II and the Ceremonies of Power* [London and New York: Continuum, 2008], pp. 174-77; William Roosen, “Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach,” *The Journal of Modern History*, 52 [1980], 452-76; R. O. Bucholz, *The Augustan Court: Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture* [Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993], pp. 202-28). An example of the pompous proceedings to which diplomats would occasionally abandon themselves is the magnificent procession of the Dutch ambassadors on the occasion of George II’s accession to the throne, described in profuse detail by a young Swiss, César de Saussure (*A Foreign View of England in 1725-1729: The Letters of Monsieur Cesar de Saussure to his Family*, ed. and trans. Madame van Muyden [London: Caliban Books, 1995], pp. 175-79). Swift may have felt equally inspired by the engraving of a magnificent ambassadorial train in Jan Nieuhof’s *Legatio Batavica* of 1668, which was in his library (PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1327-28) (tipped in between pt I, pp. 44-45), or, alternatively, by Robert Boyle’s *Reflection “Upon the first Audience of the Russian Extraordinary Embassadour,”* occasioned by the audience granted to the “Moscovy Ambassador” by Charles II in December 1662 and lavishly recorded by John Evelyn (*The Diary of John Evelyn*, ed. E. S. de Beer, 6 vols [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955], III, 349). Boyle’s meditation was contained in “Occasional Reflections” (*The Works of Robert Boyle*, eds Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis [London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999], V, 173-75), which though not in his library, Swift is likely to have known (see *A Meditation upon a Broomstick*, pp. ). Last but not least, he may have remembered any of the several descriptions of ambassadorial pomp reported, and commented on, by the Dutch statesman and diplomat, Abraham van Wicquefort in *Memoires touchant les ambassadeurs et les ministres publics* (Cologne: Pierre du Marteau, 1676), pp. 463-90 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN III, 1965-66]).

a navy of Tharshish with a navy of Hiram: once in three years came the navy of Tharshish, bringing gold, and silver, ivory, and apes, and peacocks].”

[90] There is a Story in *Pausanias* of a Plot for betraying of a City discover’d by the Braying of an Ass] If Swift had the same incident in mind as in *A Tale of a Tub*, it was not *Pausanias* but *Herodotus* who “tells us expressly in another Place, how a vast Army of Scythians was put to flight in a Panicke Terror, by the Braying of an ASS” (*A Tale of a Tub*, p. ). The story is told at length in *Herodoti Halicarnassaei Historiarum libri IX*: “Quum Scythæ sæpenuhro Persas adorirentur, eorum equi exaudita asinorum voce, consternati avertebantur” (ed. Thomas Gale [London: John Dunmore, *et al*., 1679], p. 265 [IV, cxxix] [Passmann and Vienken II, 841-42]).

[90] The Cackling of Geese sav’d the Capitol] The cackling of the geese preserved the Capitol in the Gallic war, and they were hence held in high honour by the Romans: “tanto silentio in summum evasere, ut non custodes solum fallerent, sed ne canes quidem, solicitum animal ad nocturnos strepitus, excitarent. Anseres non fefellère, quibus sacris Iunoni, in summa inopia cibi, tamen abstinebatur. quæ res salutis fuit. Namque clangore eorum, alarumque crepitu excitus M. Manlius ... vir bello egregius, armis arreptis simul ad arma ceteros ciens vadit [The Gauls reached the summit, in such silence that not only the sentries but even the dogs – creatures easily troubled by noises in the night – were not aroused. But they could not elude the vigilance of the geese, which, being sacred to Juno, had, notwithstanding the dearth of provisions, not been killed. This was the salvation of them all; for the geese with their gabbling and clapping of their wings woke Marcus Manlius ... a distinguished soldier, who caught up his weapons and at the same time called the rest to arms]” (*Titi Livii Historiarum libri ex recensione Heinsiana*, 3 vols [Leiden: Elzevir, 1634], I, 393 [V, 47, 3-4] [Passmann and Vienken II, 1089-90]). Swift had already referred to this story in *A Tale of a Tub* (p. Q) and in his letters (*Correspondence*, ed. Woolley, I, 434). See also James Howell, *Epistolæ Ho-Elianae: Familiar Letters, Domestick and Foreign*, 8th ed. (London, 1713), p. 432: “You know also how the gagging of Geese did once preserve the Capitol from being surpriz’d by my Countryman Brennus, which was the first foreign Force that Rome felt;” and Butler, *Hudibras*, ed. Wilders, p. 175, ll. 799-802.

[90] and Cataline’s Conspiracy was discover’d by a Whore] “Cataline’s Conspiracy” refers to the anarchic conspiracy of Lucius Sergius Catiline (108-62 BC), an impoverished and dissolute patrician, during Cicero’s consulship in 63 BC. As Sallustius reports in *Bellum Catilinarium*, it was detected by Fulvia, a
lady of noble provenance but loose morals and the lover of Quintus Curius, “a man of no mean birth but guilty of many shameful crimes,” who was one of Catiline’s fellow conspirators: “Huic homini non minor vanitas inerat, quam audacia. neque reticere, quae audierat, neque suamet ipse scelera occultare ... erat ei cum Fulvia, muliere nobili, stupri vetus consuetudo. cui cum minus gratus esset, quod inopia minus largiri poterat, repente gloriars, maria, montesque polliceri, minari interdum ferro, ni sibi obnoxia foret ... at Fulvia, insolentiae Curii caussa cognita, tale periculum reipubl. haud occultum habuit; sed, sublato auctore, de Catilinae conjuratione, quae quo modo audierat, compluribus narravit [This man was as untrustworthy as he was reckless; he could neither keep secret what he had heard nor conceal even his own misdeeds ... He had an intrigue of long standing with Fulvia, a woman of quality ... and when he began to lose her favour because poverty compelled him to be less lavish, he suddenly fell to boasting, began to promise her seas and mountains, and sometimes to threaten his mistress with the steel if she not bow to his will ... But Fulvia, when she learned the cause of her lover’s overbearing conduct, had no thought of concealing such a peril to her country, but without mentioning the name of her informant she told a number of people what she had heard of Catiline’s conspiracy from various sources]” (Bellum Catilinarium: cum commentariis Johannis Min-ellii [The Hague: Arnold Leers, 1685], pp. 85-86 [XXIII, 3-4] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN III, 1634-36]).

Ben Jonson’s play Catiline his Conspiracy essentially follows this story: whereas Fulvia has an adulterous affair with Curius, she is not a whore but acts from patriotic motives (Ben Jonson, eds C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson, V [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954], 476-78 [III, iv] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 980-82]). According to MORÉRI, “the wicked Undertaking [was] ... discovered by a Lady of Quality” (s.v. “Catilina”). For this version, MORÉRI was indebted to Plutarch: “At Fuluia hoc, nobilis fœmina, Cicero nocte ad eum profecta enuntiauit” (Cicero in Plutarchi omnium quæ exstant operum, 2 vols [Paris: Typis Regii, 1624], I, 868C [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1467-68]).

Cataline, rather than Catiline, is Swift’s preferred spelling of the name (Prose Works, III, 82, 84, 148), a spelling not unusual in eighteenth-century authors (Bernard Mandeville, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness [1720], Collected Works of Bernard Mandeville, eds Bernard Fabian and Irwin Primer, V [Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Georg Olms, 1987], 338).

[90] These are the only three Animals, as far as I remember, famous in History for Evidences and Informers] ‘Evidence’ and ‘informer’ are not used pejoratively here, as elsewhere in Swift. In A Letter from Dr Swift to Mr Pope of
1721, for example, the Dean denounced the “whole Tribe of Informers” as “the most accursed, and prostitute, and abandoned race, that God ever permitted to plague mankind” (*Prose Works*, IX, 32-33; *Correspondence*, ed. Woolley, II, 361), and in the penal system of Lilliput, in line with ancient Roman practice and that of the early Christian Church (Joseph Bingham, *Origines Ecclesiasticæ: or, The Antiquities of the Christian Church*, 10 vols [London: R. Knaplock, 1710-1722], VII, 544-45), informers are “immediately put to an ignominious Death” if they are unable to validate their accusations (*Prose Works*, XI, 58 [I, vi, 4]). Irrespective of the question whether there was a personal animus in Swift’s attitude towards informers (Louis Landa, “Introduction to the Sermons,” *Prose Works*, IX, 117), the Lilliputian practice points to a fact which it is easy to forget: until the nineteenth century, in England, law enforcement, “the pursuit and apprehension of suspects, the gathering of evidence, and the preparation of cases … were left largely to the private initiative of the victim” (J. M. Beattie, *Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986], p. 35). The upshot of this practice was that, since the middle of the sixteenth century, English efforts at meting out justice, no doubt encouraged by the political philosophy of the times (Dirk F. Passmann, “The Lilliputian Utopia: A Revised Focus,” *Swift Studies*, 2 [1987], 67-76 [pp. 67-68]), had to rely on a system of paid professional informers “in a wide range of circumstances.” After the Restoration, in the autumn of 1714 when “the Whigs initiated a phase of judicial revenge,” as well as in the wake of the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, informing, opening up as it did “a lucrative new information market” and ushering in accompanying evils like head-hunting, extortion of money and confiscation of goods, perjury and fraudulent evidence, resulted in an enormous strain on social relations (Jeanne Clegg, “Reforming Informing in the Long Eighteenth Century,” *Textus*, 17 [2004], 337-56; and the same author’s “Swift on False Witness,” *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, 44 [2004], 461-85). Not coincidentally, Gulliver is relieved to find that the society of the Houyhnhnms does not know informers “to watch [his] Words and Actions, or forge Accusations against [him] for Hire” (*Prose Works*, XI, 276 [IV, x, 1]).

However, as the conclusion to his sermon *On False Witness*, first published in 1762 but presumably delivered around 1717, demonstrates, Swift was ready to concede that failure to bear witness might pose a serious danger to the public in some situations, such as “all Plots and Conspiracies against the Peace of a Nation,” in fact, “any Action or Word” which discovered “a disloyal and rebellious Heart” (*Prose Works*, IX, 187-88). In a letter to Archbishop King written about the same time as *On False Witness*, he summarized this discriminating attitude in one succinct sentence: “For I think as the rest of Mankind do, that Informers are a detestable Race of People, though they may be
sometimes necessary” (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, II, 204 [our emphasis]). Samuel Butler agrees in his character of “An Informer”: “[This occupation] is never pardonable but when it is done for some public good” (Characters, ed. Daves, p. 285). Clearly, the three ‘animal’ informers became “famous in History” because they acted to the advantage of the public.

[91] MOST Sorts of Diversion in Men, Children, and other Animals, are an Imitation of Fighting] An allusion to the rough but popular sports of bear- and bull-baiting, cock-fighting and, perhaps, “the Furies of the Foot-ball War.” An elaborate description of the fierce and blood-stirring amusements of bear- and bull-baiting is provided by Butler (Hudibras, ed. Wilders, pp. 21 and 337 [I, i, 671-707]), and of cock- and dog-fighting by the Swiss visitor César de Saussure (A Foreign View of England in 1725-1729, ed. and trans. van Muyden, pp. 174-75, 183). According to John Gay’s Trivia, experienced spectators did not have to consult their calendars in order to know the days of the week: “When through the Town, with slow and solemn Air, / Led by the Nostril, walks the muzled Bear; / Behind him moves majestically dull, / The Pride of Hockley-hole, the surly Bull; / Learn hence the Periods of the Week to name, / Mondays and Thursdays are the Days of Game” (John Gay, Poetry and Prose, eds Vinton A. Dearing and Charles E. Beckwith, 2 vols [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974], I, 153, 155; II, 562). Further evidence, including other sports like sword- and cudgel-play as well as boxing, is assembled in John Ashton, Social Life in the Reign of Queen Anne: Taken from Original Sources (London: Chatto & Windus, 1925), pp. 223-28, 237-48.

[92] AUGUSTUS meeting an Ass with a lucky Name, foretold himself good Fortune] In addition to drawing omens, phenomena or circumstances foreboding good or evil, from birds, lightning, and sacrificial victims, the Romans attached importance to noticeable words or phrases casually spoken. In the Persa of Plautus, for example, Toxilus, a slave, urges his master, the pimp Dordalus, to buy a girl by the name of Lucris. Punning on the word lucrum, “profit, gain,” Toxilus exclaims: “Nomen atque omen quantivis est pretii [The name and its lucky omen is worth any price]” (Comoediae cum commentariis variorum, 2 vols [Amsterdam: Blaeu, 1684], II, 320 [IV, iv, 72-73] [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 1454-55]). Conversely, words of evil omen are to be avoided (Horace, Carmina, III, xiv, 11-12: “male nominatis / Parcite verbis,” in Qvintvs Horatvs Flaccvs, ed. Heinsius, p. 66 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN II, 905]). Pope Sergius II, whose original name was Osporco, or Hogsface, heeded this piece of advice by changing his name, thus giving “a begining to that Custome observd by all Popes ever since … at their Elections, as if all that were to Succeed, were to
have ill Names,” Samuel Butler reports (Prose Observations, ed. de Quehen, pp. 104, 341), following either Sacchi de Platina’s Historia de vitis pontificum Romanorum ([Cologne: P. Cholin, 1611], p. 129), which was in Swift’s library (Passmann and Vienken III, 1625-26), or Sir Thomas Browne’s Pseudodoxia Epidemica (ed. Robbins, I, 589). In 1691, the Athenian Mercury, whose “all four Volumes with their Supplements” Swift had seen (Correspondence, ed. Woolley, I, 107 and n,n1), answered in response to the question, “What is the reason of, and when began that Custom of changing the Popes Name at his Inauguration?”: “[The Cardinals] chose for the Soveraign Bishop of Rome a Roman of Noble Blood, Illustrious Education, but of a harsh Name, viz. Hogsface. Therefore because this Name seemed to him disagreeable to such a Holy Function ... he changed his Name & called himself Sergius ... from thence came the Custom observed to this day, that he who is chosen Pope may at his pleasure take what Name pleases him best” (II, no 20 [Question 9]). Hence, presumably, the proverb, nomen est omen (ODEP, p. 576).

The specific story Swift is alluding to is told by Suetonius in his Life of Octavian, who after his adoption by Caesar was named C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, the later Emperor Augustus. On the eve of the Battle of Actium on 2 September 31 BC, in which he defeated the fleets of Antony and Cleopatra and which introduced the Roman Empire, Octavian reportedly encountered an ass-driver with an ass. While the man’s name was Eutychus, or Felix, the ass was called Victor: “Apud Actium descendenti in aciem, asellus cum asinario occurrít: Eutychus, homini, bestiæ Nicon erat nomen. Vtriusque simulacrum æneum victor posuit in templo, in quod castrorum suorum locum vertit” (C. Svetonii Tranqvilli XII Caesares, ed. Theodorus Pvlmannvs [Antwerp: Christopher Plantin, 1574], p. 122 [II, 96] [Passmann and Vienken III, 1761-62]). After his victory, Octavian set up bronze statues of both in the temple which he had erected where his camp stood.

[92] I meet many Asses, but none of them have lucky Names] A favourite political opponent whom Swift regarded as a fool was Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham and Baron Finch of Daventry. In The Windsor Prophecy, Nottingham figures as “the tall black Daventry Bird,” whose well-known swarthy complexion and morose temper earned him the nickname “Dismal.” When in December 1711, at a time of acute political crisis, Nottingham defected to the Whigs, a defection for which he was widely rumoured to have been bribed, Swift satirized him in An Excellent New Song, Being the Intended Speech of a Famous Orator against Peace (Foxon S844). Reviving the old cry of “No peace without Spain,” Nottingham carried an amendment to the Queen’s Address in the Lords positing that no peace would be acceptable which left
Spain in the possession of the House of Bourbon. In Swift’s poem, this became: “‘Tis a great Shame / There should be a Peace, while I’m Not in game” (Poems, ed. Williams, I, 143-47). Swift was fond of such linguistic tomfoolery throughout his life (see “A History of Poetry in a Letter to a Friend,” Prose Works, IV, 273-75).

[94] WHO can deny that all Men are violent Lovers of Truth] “For of all the Desires that we feel our selves moved with, there is not any of them more closely interwoven with our Nature, than the Desire of Truth,” Charron claimed in De la sagesse, the English translation of which Swift owned (Of Wisdom, trans. Stanhope, I, 142 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 395]), and Bacon followed suit: “But howsoever these things are thus, in mens depraved Judgements, and Affections, yet Truth, which onely doth judge it selfe, teacheth, that the Inquirie of Truth, which is the Love-making, or Wooing of it; The knowledge of Truth, which is the Presence of it; and the Beleefe of Truth, which is the Enjoying of it; is the Soveraigne Good of humane Nature” (“Of Truth,” The Essayes or Counsels, ed. Kiernan, p. 8 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 125-26]). Echoes may be heard in Glanvill (Scepsis Scientifica, p. 82), Sir William Temple’s “Heads, Designed for an Essay on Conversation” (Miscellanea: The Third Part, p. 325), and, with a prescriptive nuance, in Sir John Denham: “But let inviolate Truth be always dear / To thee, even before Friendship, Truth prefer” (Poems and Translations, 5th ed. [London: Jacob Tonson, 1709], p. 151).

[94] when we see them so positive in their Errors, which they will maintain out of their Zeal to Truth, although they contradict themselves every Day of their Lives?] “A mixture of a Lie doth ever adde Pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of Mens Mindes, Vaine Opinions, Flattering, Hopes, False valuations, Imaginations as one would, and the like; but it would leave the Mindes, of a Number of Men, poore shrunken Things; full of Melancholy, and Indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?” (Bacon, “Of Truth,” The Essayes or Counsels, ed. Kiernan, p. 7 [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN I, 125-26]).

[95] THAT was excellently observ’d, say I, when I read a Passage in an Author, where his Opinion agrees with mine. When we differ, there I pronounce him to be mistaken] “Birds are taken with pipes that imitate their own voyces, and men with those sayings that are most agreable to their own opinions,” Butler posits (Prose Observations, ed. de Quehen, p. 79), echoing perhaps Montaigne: “I am pleased … that my opinions have the honor of often coinciding with theirs” (The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Frame, p. 107; in Coste’s edition of the Essais [PASSMANN AND VIENKEN, II, 1269-72], Book I, no 25 [I, 243]).

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Very few Men, properly speaking, live at present, but are providing to live another Time. The Roman Emperor Claudius Nero Tiberius (AD 14-37) provided Montaigne with a case study, which was culled from Tacitus’ *Annals* (VI, 46) ([Passmann and Vienken III, 1784-88]): “Ridiculous and yet common is the disposition of Tiberius, who was more concerned about extending his renown into the future than about making himself estimable and agreeable to the men of his own time” (*The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Frame, pp. 595-96; in Coste’s edition of the *Essais* [Passmann and Vienken II, 1269-72], Book II, no 37: “L’humeur de Tibere est ridicule, & commune pourtant, qui avoit plus de soin d’estendre sa renommée à l’advenir, qu’il n’avoit de se rendre estimable & agreable aux hommes de son temps” [III, 366-67]).

AS universal a Practice as Lying is, and as easy a one as it seems] Throughout the ages, moralists of all kinds have been united, or have pretended to be united, in their detestation of lying – “Haud quidem honestum est mendacia loqui” (John, Stobaeus, *Sententiae ex thesauris Graecorum delectae* [Basle: by J. Oporinus for C. Froschauer, 1549], pp. 138-43 [138] ([Passmann and Vienken II, 977-78]). At the same time, they lament the universality of the practice. The mendacity of people, two friends delight in showing in Lucian’s dialogue, “Philopseudes, sive Incredulus,” is everywhere as epidemic as credulity, its corollary (*Luciani Samosatensis opera*, ed. Benedictus, II, 326-53 [Passmann and Vienken, II, 1114-15]), and the Duchess of Queensberry, one of Swift’s lady friends, told him in a penitent letter: “I have convinced my self that tis better rather to confess my faults than to give you any handle to suspect my truth for the future.” “I wish every body was as timorous as my self,” she continued, “& then lieing & deceite would never be so much in the fashion as it has & will be for many ages past & to come” (*Correspondence*, ed. Woolley, III, 724).

I do not remember to have heard three good Lyes in all my Conversation, even from those who were most celebrated in that Faculty] Writing to Bolingbroke in December 1719, the Dean, in what reads like a fit of comic despair, offers a psychological explanation of why, in his view, lying does not succeed: “The worst of it is, that lying is of no use; for the people here will not believe one half of what is true” (*Correspondence*, ed. Woolley, II, 317).