Copyright © 2002 The International
Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
Both lists could be debated, but the first - those nations that have improved relations with the Bush administration - would almost certainly include Russia, Pakistan, Israel, Uzbekistan, China, Yemen and, of course, Afghanistan. The opposite list, surprisingly but undeniably, would have to include much of the European Union as well as Mexico, Canada, South Korea and Japan. With the exception of Israel, the first group is made up of countries that previously had arm's-length relationships with Washington and were subject to heavy U.S. criticism for their lack of democracy or their abuse of human rights - failings that in most cases have only grown worse in the last year. The second group, in contrast, consists entirely of democracies and close U.S. allies, nations that have the greatest interest in supporting America against its enemies. The emblem of the first group might be President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, who a year ago was regarded in Washington as an unsavory dictator and today is embraced as a valued U.S. partner. The latter group might be embodied by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany, who last September joined a pro-American demonstration by 200,000 people in Berlin and this September has made opposition to the Bush administration a central message of his re-election campaign. It may be that much of this outcome was unavoidable. The United States needed the help of Pakistan and Uzbekistan to wage war against Al Qaeda and Afghanistan's Taliban regime, and it saw in the offer of assistance by President Vladimir Putin of Russia a chance to transform relations with Moscow. Much-touted administration plans to upgrade relations with Mexico and Japan were bound to suffer as resources and high-level attention were redirected toward winning the war. And European leaders, such as Schröder, bear a large measure of responsibility for the trans-Atlantic tension; they have failed to fully face the threats to Western security revealed by Sept. 11 and instead cynically have lapsed into exploiting the anti-American resentment always latent in their countries. Still, it's hard not to conclude that the administration failed to take full advantage of a rare international opportunity. It forged a close alliance with European partners in combating Al Qaeda's clandestine cells and financial networks, but it stunted the coalition by deliberately excluding most NATO armies from the heart of the Afghan campaign and needlessly infuriated those governments with its gratuitous campaigns against international treaties and its embrace of trade protectionism. It not only abruptly dropped discussions with Mexico on better management of the border, but also ignored or brusquely dismissed Latin America's growing financial problems. And despite much rhetoric about fighting terrorism through the spread of democratic values, it did little to advance these values among its new friends, or old ones in the Arab Middle East; instead it found ways to condone Russia's brutal campaign in Chechnya and China's against the Muslims of its western provinces. The administration enters the second year of the war facing the possibility of more resistance and criticism as it moves toward military action against Iraq. The incipient rumbling is not all sincere, and not all the fault of missteps in Washington; much of it can be overcome, and a strong new coalition constructed, if the administration acts wisely. But it would help to learn some lessons from the past year. One is that it is better to include allies in military campaigns than to exclude them, especially if their support will be needed off the battlefield. The second is that American engagement abroad must shift some weight back toward insisting on the democratic values that are the best antidote to terrorism - the values that made Mexico, and not Uzbekistan, a close U.S. friend before Sept. 11. Copyright © 2002 The International Herald Tribune |