The Magazine of Global Issues, Economics, and Ideas
The Eagle Has Crash Landed
Pax Americana is over. Challenges from Vietnam and the Balkans
to the Middle East and September 11 have revealed the limits of American
supremacy. Will the United States learn to fade quietly, or will U.S.
conservatives resist and thereby transform a gradual decline into a rapid
and dangerous fall?
The United States in decline? Few people today would believe this assertion.
The only ones who do are the U.S. hawks, who argue vociferously for policies
to reverse the decline. This belief that the end of U.S. hegemony has
already begun does not follow from the vulnerability that became apparent
to all on September 11, 2001. In fact, the United States has been fading
as a global power since the 1970s, and the U.S. response to the terrorist
attacks has merely accelerated this decline. To understand why the so-called
Pax Americana is on the wane requires examining the geopolitics of the
20th century, particularly of the century's final three decades. This
exercise uncovers a simple and inescapable conclusion: The economic, political,
and military factors that contributed to U.S. hegemony are the same factors
that will inexorably produce the coming U.S. decline.
Intro to hegemony
The rise of the United States to global hegemony was a long process that
began in earnest with the world recession of 1873. At that time, the United
States and Germany began to acquire an increasing share of global markets,
mainly at the expense of the steadily receding British economy. Both nations
had recently acquired a stable political base—the United States by successfully
terminating the Civil War and Germany by achieving unification and defeating
France in the Franco-Prussian War. From 1873 to 1914, the United States
and Germany became the principal producers in certain leading sectors:
steel and later automobiles for the United States and industrial chemicals
The history books record that World War I broke out in 1914 and ended
in 1918 and that World War II lasted from 1939 to 1945. However, it makes
more sense to consider the two as a single, continuous “30 years’ war”
between the United States and Germany, with truces and local conflicts
scattered in between. The competition for hegemonic succession took an
ideological turn in 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany and
began their quest to transcend the global system altogether, seeking not
hegemony within the current system but rather a form of global empire.
Recall the Nazi slogan ein tausendjähriges Reich (a thousand-year empire).
In turn, the United States assumed the role of advocate of centrist world
liberalism—recall former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “four
freedoms” (freedom of speech, of worship, from want, and from fear)—and
entered into a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, making possible
the defeat of Germany and its allies.
World War II resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations
throughout Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost
no country left unscathed. The only major industrial power in the world
to emerge intact—and even greatly strengthened from an economic perspective—was
the United States, which moved swiftly to consolidate its position.
But the aspiring hegemon faced some practical political obstacles. During
the war, the Allied powers had agreed on the establishment of the United
Nations, composed primarily of countries that had been in the coalition
against the Axis powers. The organization’s critical feature was the Security
Council, the only structure that could authorize the use of force. Since
the U.N. Charter gave the right of veto to five powers—including the United
States and the Soviet Union—the council was rendered largely toothless
in practice. So it was not the founding of the United Nations in April
1945 that determined the geopolitical constraints of the second half of
the 20th century but rather the Yalta meeting between Roosevelt, British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin two
The formal accords at Yalta were less important than the informal, unspoken
agreements, which one can only assess by observing the behavior of the
United States and the Soviet Union in the years that followed. When the
war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, Soviet and Western (that is, U.S.,
British, and French) troops were located in particular places—essentially,
along a line in the center of Europe that came to be called the Oder-Neisse
Line. Aside from a few minor adjustments, they stayed there. In hindsight,
Yalta signified the agreement of both sides that they could stay there
and that neither side would use force to push the other out. This tacit
accord applied to Asia as well, as evinced by U.S. occupation of Japan
and the division of Korea. Politically, therefore, Yalta was an agreement
on the status quo in which the Soviet Union controlled about one third
of the world and the United States the rest.
Washington also faced more serious military challenges. The Soviet Union
had the world’s largest land forces, while the U.S. government was under
domestic pressure to downsize its army, particularly by ending the draft.
The United States therefore decided to assert its military strength not
via land forces but through a monopoly of nuclear weapons (plus an air
force capable of deploying them). This monopoly soon disappeared: By 1949,
the Soviet Union had developed nuclear weapons as well. Ever since, the
United States has been reduced to trying to prevent the acquisition of
nuclear weapons (and chemical and biological weapons) by additional powers,
an effort that, in the 21st century, does not seem terribly successful.
Until 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union coexisted in the “balance
of terror” of the Cold War. This status quo was tested seriously only
three times: the Berlin blockade of 1948–49, the Korean War in 1950–53,
and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The result in each case was restoration
of the status quo. Moreover, note how each time the Soviet Union faced
a political crisis among its satellite regimes—East Germany in 1953, Hungary
in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981—the United States
engaged in little more than propaganda exercises, allowing the Soviet
Union to proceed largely as it deemed fit.
Of course, this passivity did not extend to the economic arena. The United
States capitalized on the Cold War ambiance to launch massive economic
reconstruction efforts, first in Western Europe and then in Japan (as
well as in South Korea and Taiwan). The rationale was obvious: What was
the point of having such overwhelming productive superiority if the rest
of the world could not muster effective demand? Furthermore, economic
reconstruction helped create clientelistic obligations on the part of
the nations receiving U.S. aid; this sense of obligation fostered willingness
to enter into military alliances and, even more important, into political
Finally, one should not underestimate the ideological and cultural component
of U.S. hegemony. The immediate post-1945 period may have been the historical
high point for the popularity of communist ideology. We easily forget
today the large votes for Communist parties in free elections in countries
such as Belgium, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland, not to mention
the support Communist parties gathered in Asia—in Vietnam, India, and
Japan—and throughout Latin America. And that still leaves out areas such
as China, Greece, and Iran, where free elections remained absent or constrained
but where Communist parties enjoyed widespread appeal. In response, the
United States sustained a massive anticommunist ideological offensive.
In retrospect, this initiative appears largely successful: Washington
brandished its role as the leader of the “free world” at least as effectively
as the Soviet Union brandished its position as the leader of the “progressive”
and “anti-imperialist” camp.
One, Two, Many Vietnams
The United States’ success as a hegemonic power in the postwar period
created the conditions of the nation’s hegemonic demise. This process
is captured in four symbols: the war in Vietnam, the revolutions of 1968,
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the terrorist attacks of September
2001. Each symbol built upon the prior one, culminating in the situation
in which the United States currently finds itself—a lone superpower that
lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and few respect, and a
nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control.
What was the Vietnam War? First and foremost, it was the effort of the
Vietnamese people to end colonial rule and establish their own state.
The Vietnamese fought the French, the Japanese, and the Americans, and
in the end the Vietnamese won—quite an achievement, actually. Geopolitically,
however, the war represented a rejection of the Yalta status quo by populations
then labeled as Third World. Vietnam became such a powerful symbol because
Washington was foolish enough to invest its full military might in the
struggle, but the United States still lost. True, the United States didn’t
deploy nuclear weapons (a decision certain myopic groups on the right
have long reproached), but such use would have shattered the Yalta accords
and might have produced a nuclear holocaust—an outcome the United States
simply could not risk.
But Vietnam was not merely a military defeat or a blight on U.S. prestige.
The war dealt a major blow to the United States’ ability to remain the
world’s dominant economic power. The conflict was extremely expensive
and more or less used up the U.S. gold reserves that had been so plentiful
since 1945. Moreover, the United States incurred these costs just as Western
Europe and Japan experienced major economic upswings. These conditions
ended U.S. preeminence in the global economy. Since the late 1960s, members
of this triad have been nearly economic equals, each doing better than
the others for certain periods but none moving far ahead.
When the revolutions of 1968 broke out around the world, support for the
Vietnamese became a major rhetorical component. “One, two, many Vietnams”
and “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh” were chanted in many a street, not least in
the United States. But the 1968ers did not merely condemn U.S. hegemony.
They condemned Soviet collusion with the United States, they condemned
Yalta, and they used or adapted the language of the Chinese cultural revolutionaries
who divided the world into two camps—the two superpowers and the rest
of the world.
The denunciation of Soviet collusion led logically to the denunciation
of those national forces closely allied with the Soviet Union, which meant
in most cases the traditional Communist parties. But the 1968 revolutionaries
also lashed out against other components of the Old Left—national liberation
movements in the Third World, social-democratic movements in Western Europe,
and New Deal Democrats in the United States—accusing them, too, of collusion
with what the revolutionaries generically termed “U.S. imperialism.”
The attack on Soviet collusion with Washington plus the attack on the
Old Left further weakened the legitimacy of the Yalta arrangements on
which the United States had fashioned the world order. It also undermined
the position of centrist liberalism as the lone, legitimate global ideology.
The direct political consequences of the world revolutions of 1968 were
minimal, but the geopolitical and intellectual repercussions were enormous
and irrevocable. Centrist liberalism tumbled from the throne it had occupied
since the European revolutions of 1848 and that had enabled it to co-opt
conservatives and radicals alike. These ideologies returned and once again
represented a real gamut of choices. Conservatives would again become
conservatives, and radicals, radicals. The centrist liberals did not disappear,
but they were cut down to size. And in the process, the official U.S.
ideological position—antifascist, anticommunist, anticolonialist—seemed
thin and unconvincing to a growing portion of the world’s populations.
The Powerless Superpower
The onset of international economic stagnation in the 1970s had two important
consequences for U.S. power. First, stagnation resulted in the collapse
of “developmentalism”—the notion that every nation could catch up economically
if the state took appropriate action—which was the principal ideological
claim of the Old Left movements then in power. One after another, these
regimes faced internal disorder, declining standards of living, increasing
debt dependency on international financial institutions, and eroding credibility.
What had seemed in the 1960s to be the successful navigation of Third
World decolonization by the United States—minimizing disruption and maximizing
the smooth transfer of power to regimes that were developmentalist but
scarcely revolutionary—gave way to disintegrating order, simmering discontents,
and unchanneled radical temperaments. When the United States tried to
intervene, it failed. In 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent troops
to Lebanon to restore order. The troops were in effect forced out. He
compensated by invading Grenada, a country without troops. President George
H.W. Bush invaded Panama, another country without troops. But after he
intervened in Somalia to restore order, the United States was in effect
forced out, somewhat ignominiously. Since there was little the U.S. government
could actually do to reverse the trend of declining hegemony, it chose
simply to ignore this trend—a policy that prevailed from the withdrawal
from Vietnam until September 11, 2001.
Meanwhile, true conservatives began to assume control of key states and
interstate institutions. The neoliberal offensive of the 1980s was marked
by the Thatcher and Reagan regimes and the emergence of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) as a key actor on the world scene. Where once (for
more than a century) conservative forces had attempted to portray themselves
as wiser liberals, now centrist liberals were compelled to argue that
they were more effective conservatives. The conservative programs were
clear. Domestically, conservatives tried to enact policies that would
reduce the cost of labor, minimize environmental constraints on producers,
and cut back on state welfare benefits. Actual successes were modest,
so conservatives then moved vigorously into the international arena. The
gatherings of the World Economic Forum in Davos provided a meeting ground
for elites and the media. The IMF provided a club for finance ministers
and central bankers. And the United States pushed for the creation of
the World Trade Organization to enforce free commercial flows across the
While the United States wasn’t watching, the Soviet Union was collapsing.
Yes, Ronald Reagan had dubbed the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and had
used the rhetorical bombast of calling for the destruction of the Berlin
Wall, but the United States didn’t really mean it and certainly was not
responsible for the Soviet Union’s downfall. In truth, the Soviet Union
and its East European imperial zone collapsed because of popular disillusionment
with the Old Left in combination with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s
efforts to save his regime by liquidating Yalta and instituting internal
liberalization (perestroika plus glasnost). Gorbachev succeeded in liquidating
Yalta but not in saving the Soviet Union (although he almost did, be it
The United States was stunned and puzzled by the sudden collapse, uncertain
how to handle the consequences. The collapse of communism in effect signified
the collapse of liberalism, removing the only ideological justification
behind U.S. hegemony, a justification tacitly supported by liberalism’s
ostensible ideological opponent. This loss of legitimacy led directly
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would
never have dared had the Yalta arrangements remained in place. In retrospect,
U.S. efforts in the Gulf War accomplished a truce at basically the same
line of departure. But can a hegemonic power be satisfied with a tie in
a war with a middling regional power? Saddam demonstrated that one could
pick a fight with the United States and get away with it. Even more than
the defeat in Vietnam, Saddam’s brash challenge has eaten at the innards
of the U.S. right, in particular those known as the hawks, which explains
the fervor of their current desire to invade Iraq and destroy its regime.
Between the Gulf War and September 11, 2001, the two major arenas of world
conflict were the Balkans and the Middle East. The United States has played
a major diplomatic role in both regions. Looking back, how different would
the results have been had the United States assumed a completely isolationist
position? In the Balkans, an economically successful multinational state
(Yugoslavia) broke down, essentially into its component parts. Over 10
years, most of the resulting states have engaged in a process of ethnification,
experiencing fairly brutal violence, widespread human rights violations,
and outright wars. Outside intervention—in which the United States figured
most prominently—brought about a truce and ended the most egregious violence,
but this intervention in no way reversed the ethnification, which is now
consolidated and somewhat legitimated. Would these conflicts have ended
differently without U.S. involvement? The violence might have continued
longer, but the basic results would probably not have been too different.
The picture is even grimmer in the Middle East, where, if anything, U.S.
engagement has been deeper and its failures more spectacular. In the Balkans
and the Middle East alike, the United States has failed to exert its hegemonic
clout effectively, not for want of will or effort but for want of real
The Hawks Undone
Then came September 11—the shock and the reaction. Under fire from U.S.
legislators, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) now claims it had warned
the Bush administration of possible threats. But despite the CIA’s focus
on al Qaeda and the agency’s intelligence expertise, it could not foresee
(and therefore, prevent) the execution of the terrorist strikes. Or so
would argue CIA Director George Tenet. This testimony can hardly comfort
the U.S. government or the American people. Whatever else historians may
decide, the attacks of September 11, 2001, posed a major challenge to
U.S. power. The persons responsible did not represent a major military
power. They were members of a nonstate force, with a high degree of determination,
some money, a band of dedicated followers, and a strong base in one weak
state. In short, militarily, they were nothing. Yet they succeeded in
a bold attack on U.S. soil.
George W. Bush came to power very critical of the Clinton administration’s
handling of world affairs. Bush and his advisors did not admit—but were
undoubtedly aware—that Clinton’s path had been the path of every U.S.
president since Gerald Ford, including that of Ronald Reagan and George
H.W. Bush. It had even been the path of the current Bush administration
before September 11. One only needs to look at how Bush handled the downing
of the U.S. plane off China in April 2001 to see that prudence had been
the name of the game.
Following the terrorist attacks, Bush changed course, declaring war on
terrorism, assuring the American people that “the outcome is certain”
and informing the world that “you are either with us or against us.” Long
frustrated by even the most conservative U.S. administrations, the hawks
finally came to dominate American policy. Their position is clear: The
United States wields overwhelming military power, and even though countless
foreign leaders consider it unwise for Washington to flex its military
muscles, these same leaders cannot and will not do anything if the United
States simply imposes its will on the rest. The hawks believe the United
States should act as an imperial power for two reasons: First, the United
States can get away with it. And second, if Washington doesn’t exert its
force, the United States will become increasingly marginalized.
Today, this hawkish position has three expressions: the military assault
in Afghanistan, the de facto support for the Israeli attempt to liquidate
the Palestinian Authority, and the invasion of Iraq, which is reportedly
in the military preparation stage. Less than one year after the September
2001 terrorist attacks, it is perhaps too early to assess what such strategies
will accomplish. Thus far, these schemes have led to the overthrow of
the Taliban in Afghanistan (without the complete dismantling of al Qaeda
or the capture of its top leadership); enormous destruction in Palestine
(without rendering Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat “irrelevant,” as Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said he is); and heavy opposition from U.S.
allies in Europe and the Middle East to plans for an invasion of Iraq.
The hawks’ reading of recent events emphasizes that opposition to U.S.
actions, while serious, has remained largely verbal. Neither Western Europe
nor Russia nor China nor Saudi Arabia has seemed ready to break ties in
serious ways with the United States. In other words, hawks believe, Washington
has indeed gotten away with it. The hawks assume a similar outcome will
occur when the U.S. military actually invades Iraq and after that, when
the United States exercises its authority elsewhere in the world, be it
in Iran, North Korea, Colombia, or perhaps Indonesia. Ironically, the
hawk reading has largely become the reading of the international left,
which has been screaming about U.S. policies—mainly because they fear
that the chances of U.S. success are high.
But hawk interpretations are wrong and will only contribute to the United
States’ decline, transforming a gradual descent into a much more rapid
and turbulent fall. Specifically, hawk approaches will fail for military,
economic, and ideological reasons.
Undoubtedly, the military remains the United States’ strongest card; in
fact, it is the only card. Today, the United States wields the most formidable
military apparatus in the world. And if claims of new, unmatched military
technologies are to be believed, the U.S. military edge over the rest
of the world is considerably greater today than it was just a decade ago.
But does that mean, then, that the United States can invade Iraq, conquer
it rapidly, and install a friendly and stable regime? Unlikely. Bear in
mind that of the three serious wars the U.S. military has fought since
1945 (Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War), one ended in defeat and two in
draws—not exactly a glorious record.
Saddam Hussein’s army is not that of the Taliban, and his internal military
control is far more coherent. A U.S. invasion would necessarily involve
a serious land force, one that would have to fight its way to Baghdad
and would likely suffer significant casualties. Such a force would also
need staging grounds, and Saudi Arabia has made clear that it will not
serve in this capacity. Would Kuwait or Turkey help out? Perhaps, if Washington
calls in all its chips. Meanwhile, Saddam can be expected to deploy all
weapons at his disposal, and it is precisely the U.S. government that
keeps fretting over how nasty those weapons might be. The United States
may twist the arms of regimes in the region, but popular sentiment clearly
views the whole affair as reflecting a deep anti-Arab bias in the United
States. Can such a conflict be won? The British General Staff has apparently
already informed Prime Minister Tony Blair that it does not believe so.
And there is always the matter of “second fronts.” Following the Gulf
War, U.S. armed forces sought to prepare for the possibility of two simultaneous
regional wars. After a while, the Pentagon quietly abandoned the idea
as impractical and costly. But who can be sure that no potential U.S.
enemies would strike when the United States appears bogged down in Iraq?
Consider, too, the question of U.S. popular tolerance of nonvictories.
Americans hover between a patriotic fervor that lends support to all wartime
presidents and a deep isolationist urge. Since 1945, patriotism has hit
a wall whenever the death toll has risen. Why should today’s reaction
differ? And even if the hawks (who are almost all civilians) feel impervious
to public opinion, U.S. Army generals, burnt by Vietnam, do not.
And what about the economic front? In the 1980s, countless American analysts
became hysterical over the Japanese economic miracle. They calmed down
in the 1990s, given Japan’s well-publicized financial difficulties. Yet
after overstating how quickly Japan was moving forward, U.S. authorities
now seem to be complacent, confident that Japan lags far behind. These
days, Washington seems more inclined to lecture Japanese policymakers
about what they are doing wrong.
Such triumphalism hardly appears warranted. Consider the following April
20, 2002, New York Times report: “A Japanese laboratory has built the
world’s fastest computer, a machine so powerful that it matches the raw
processing power of the 20 fastest American computers combined and far
outstrips the previous leader, an I.B.M.-built machine. The achievement
... is evidence that a technology race that most American engineers thought
they were winning handily is far from over.” The analysis goes on to note
that there are “contrasting scientific and technological priorities” in
the two countries. The Japanese machine is built to analyze climatic change,
but U.S. machines are designed to simulate weapons. This contrast embodies
the oldest story in the history of hegemonic powers. The dominant power
concentrates (to its detriment) on the military; the candidate for successor
concentrates on the economy. The latter has always paid off, handsomely.
It did for the United States. Why should it not pay off for Japan as well,
perhaps in alliance with China?
Finally, there is the ideological sphere. Right now, the U.S. economy
seems relatively weak, even more so considering the exorbitant military
expenses associated with hawk strategies. Moreover, Washington remains
politically isolated; virtually no one (save Israel) thinks the hawk position
makes sense or is worth encouraging. Other nations are afraid or unwilling
to stand up to Washington directly, but even their foot-dragging is hurting
the United States.
Yet the U.S. response amounts to little more than arrogant arm-twisting.
Arrogance has its own negatives. Calling in chips means leaving fewer
chips for next time, and surly acquiescence breeds increasing resentment.
Over the last 200 years, the United States acquired a considerable amount
of ideological credit. But these days, the United States is running through
this credit even faster than it ran through its gold surplus in the 1960s.
The United States faces two possibilities during the next 10 years: It
can follow the hawks’ path, with negative consequences for all but especially
for itself. Or it can realize that the negatives are too great. Simon
Tisdall of the Guardian recently argued that even disregarding international
public opinion, “the U.S. is not able to fight a successful Iraqi war
by itself without incurring immense damage, not least in terms of its
economic interests and its energy supply. Mr. Bush is reduced to talking
tough and looking ineffectual.” And if the United States still invades
Iraq and is then forced to withdraw, it will look even more ineffectual.
President Bush’s options appear extremely limited, and there is little
doubt that the United States will continue to decline as a decisive force
in world affairs over the next decade. The real question is not whether
U.S. hegemony is waning but whether the United States can devise a way
to descend gracefully, with minimum damage to the world, and to itself.
Immanuel Wallerstein is a senior research scholar at
Yale University and author of, most recently, The End of the World As
We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
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